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CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA  
 
 
Jamshid Gaziyev 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
THE last years of the Soviet Union were the most challenging for the nations of 
Central Asia. These nations witnessed the dramatic collapse of the Soviet federal 
system and beheld with disbelief the tragic unfolding of inter-ethnic violence in 
the land of ‘eternal friendship of brotherly nations’. Their disbelief, though 
understandable, presents the two puzzles that this dissertation addresses: (1) “how 
can one explain the outbreak of unprecedented inter-ethnic clashes in the lands 
where gracious internationalism should have replaced chauvinist nationalism?” 
and (2) “what lessons can be learnt from Central Asia’s nation-formational 
processes and its recent experiences of ethnic violence lest mistakes be repeated in 
its present and future socio-political development?” These puzzles, and solutions 
to them, are not only significant and intriguing in the regional context of Central 
Asia. They correspond to a set of larger, meta-theoretical questions in Social 
Sciences: (1) how do ethnicity and nationhood originate and change? (2) why do 
certain ethno-national movements become politically salient and others do not? 
and (3) how do ethnic conflicts arise and develop? 
 ii 
 This dissertation uniquely employs the institutionalist approach to explain 
the above puzzles and theoretical questions in the context of Central Asia. By 
exploring the nature and dynamics of nation-formation in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, this work concludes that territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality 
have become pervasively institutionalized social and political forms in Central 
Asia as a result of the Soviet nationalities policy. The analysis of inter-ethnic strife 
in Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet empire, with a special focus on 
the Osh conflict, confirms that ethnic conflicts and inter-ethnic relations in the 
region were, and will remain, crucially framed, constituted and reconciled by 
rigidly institutionalized definitions of ethnicity and nationality. Following these 
findings, the study recommends considering institutional reforms within the 
framework of the rule of law and constitutionalism for deliberations of 
mechanisms and measures aimed at building more peaceful and secure inter-
ethnic relations in Central Asia. The dissertation therefore urges policy-makers 
and other stakeholders in the region to take fuller advantage of the benefits of such 
institutional reforms at the state-structural level with the view to controlling and 
counter-balancing the effects of institutionalized ethno-nationalism in Central 
Asia, and perhaps beyond.  
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LOOKING back at the dramatic demise of the Soviet Union, two immediate 
questions were frequently posed: what caused the collapse of the Soviet state and 
what are those new independent nations replacing it? While the first question pre-
occupied the minds of researchers and scholars, the second worried Western 
policy-makers who were anxious to learn more about the new independent nations 
and build bridges with them. Copious literature was thus produced on the former 
Soviet Union states, as well as on Central Asia in particular. They sought to 
explore and explain the nature of Central Asian nations, predict their future 
development, and propose variety of ways to better understanding them.  
In the process of that exploration, theoretical and methodological tensions 
and deficiencies increasingly pervaded the study of ethnicity and nationalism in 
Central Asia. Even though there was a growing output in the field of nationalism 
in the former Soviet Union and Central Asia, much of the literature was skewed 
and polarized between various positions and epistemologies. The predominant 
perspectives on nationality and ethnicity vacillated between primordialism and 
modernism. The primordialist perspective on Central Asia tends to define 
ethnicity and nationality as a historical determinant and substantial force with the 
efficacious potential for action. It emphasizes the deep roots, ancient origins, and 
emotive power of national attachments. 
 3 
Admittedly, few and earlier works on the region featured the primordialist 
viewpoints.1 An example of a primordialist description could be seen in the 
following description of ethnic discords in the Soviet Central Asia: “The open 
expression of hostile attitude of non-Russians against Russians, the Armenians 
against the Azeris and the Meskhetian Turks against Uzbeks is a manifestation of 
a deep resentment imbedded in the ruptured ego of suppressed nationalities; vying 
with each other to ascertain their national identities and ensure for them tenets of 
real self-determination”.2 In this context, Minogue’s metaphor of a sleeping 
beauty is worth quoting to illustrate such primordialist position.3 Accordingly, 
nation is viewed as the Sleeping Beauty who is waiting for a magical kiss from 
nationalism, the Prince, for its awakening. When reading primordialist literature, it 
is frequent to come across with such vivid phrases as ‘centuries of old 
antagonisms’ between this and that nationality in the region, or that ethno-national 
disputes have always been a major feature of the Central Asian landscape. We 
could take an instance of Bill Keller’s report on ethnic turmoil in Soviet 
Azerbaijan: “The disturbances in the south are the worst outbreak of the centuries-
old antagonism between the predominantly Islamic Azerbaijanis the mainly 
Christian Armenians since anti-Armenian riots two years ago in a Caspian Sea 
industrial city, Sumgait”.4 
                                                
1
 See, for instance, Carlisle, D. (1995). Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and Its 
Neighbours. Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. Y. Ro'i. London, Frank Cass; Dash, P. L. 
(1992). Ethnic Tussles in the Soviet Muslim Republics. Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia. K. 
Warikoo and D. Norbu. New Delhi, South Asian Publishers; and Haghayeghi, M. (1995). Islam 
and Politics in Central Asia. New York, St Martin's Press. 
2
 Dash, P. L. (1992). Ethnic Tussles in the Soviet Muslim Republics. Ethnicity and Politics in 
Central Asia. K. Warikoo and D. Norbu. New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, p. 102 
3
 See Smith, A. (1995). Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Polity Press, p. 168  
4
 Keller, B. (January 15:1990). Special: Soviet Azerbaijan in Ethnic Turmoil. The New York Times. 
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On the other hand, modernist perspectives on Central Asia reject 
primordialist claims that nations are ancient or immemorial, or that they are 
givens. They stress the fluidity and malleability of ethnicity and nationhood. 
Modernists suggest “instead of thinking of identity as an accomplished fact, which 
the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a 
‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted 
within, not outside, representation”.5 Nationhood should be treated as neither 
given nor fixed, but as determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the group 
itself and as variable according to changing circumstances. 
Modernists/constructivists maintain that the fact that nations are ‘invented’ or 
‘imagined’ does not make them ‘less real’ in the eyes of those who believe in 
them.6  
Thus, the modernist approach to Central Asia would, for example, look 
into the role of Soviet7 and post-Soviet8 authorities in controlling, harnessing and 
manipulating ethno-national categories in the region. Borrowing Suny’s analogy,9 
modernists’ standpoint reflects the ‘Bride of Frankenstein’ view on the Central 
Asian ethno-nationhood. That view understands ethnicity and nationalism as 
‘created’ and ‘imagined’ identities in the Central Asian communities. In the past, 
the modernist/constructivist school of thought had limited resonance in the Soviet 
                                                
5
 Hall, S. (1990). Cultural Identity and Diaspora. Identity: Community, Culture, and Difference. J. 
Rutherford. London, Lawrence & Wishart, p. 222 
6
 Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, p. 222 
7
 Allworth, E. (1990). The Modem Uzbeks. Stanford, Hoover; and Allworth, E., Ed. (1974). The 
Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. New York, Praeger Publishers. 
8
 Dave, B. (2004). Management of Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan: Stability without Success. The 
Legacy of the Soviet Union. W. Slater and A. Wilson, Palgrave Macmillan; Adams, L. (1999). 
“Invention, Institutionalization and Renewal in Uzbekistan's National Culture.” European Journal 
of Cultural Studies 2(3): 355-373. 
9
 See Suny, R. (1993). The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Stanford University Press., p.4 
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and Central Asian studies, but has been gaining wider adherence in recent years. 
Proponents of this approach draw parallels from European social experience and 
stress the importance of modernization.  
They emphasize the transformation of society into a new industrial society 
with the concomitant processes of political and economic centralization, 
standardization of education, and the effects of mass literacy and the mass media. 
But modernization scholars downplay a crucial aspect in explaining the invented 
nature of nations - state intervention. Changes in the society involving increased 
communication and population mobilization rarely happen without the 
intervention of a centralized state.  
The assessment of nationhood makes it evident that the ‘macro’ 
explanations of a general theory of nationalism are not possible.10 In other words, 
there can be no ‘general’ or ‘overarching’ theory of nationhood. Most theories and 
perspectives seem to point to different facets of nationhood and vary in 
significance depending on the context. It is indeed the case that “grasping 
nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories”.11 Indeed, in 
order to better understand nationalism today, it is important to challenge the 
notion that all the important questions about nations and nationalism have been 
answered. 
This study seeks to move beyond the impasse by side-stepping the 
question “what is the nation?” and focusing on the nations as a category of 
practice and institutionalized cultural and political form, following Rogers 
                                                
10
 Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, p. 225 
11
 Calhoun, C. (1999). Nationalism, Open University Press, p. 8 
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Brubaker’s institutionalist approach to nationhood.12 The dissertation will 
examine the institutional formation and development of nations in Central Asia 
and show how state institutions, both Soviet and post-Soviet, have played a crucial 
role in forming and sustaining ethno-nationalism in the region. For the first time, 
institutionalist perspective will directly be employed here to explore how ethnicity 
and nationhood as a political and cultural form became institutionalized in Central 
Asian states, and how nation works as a practical category and classificatory 
scheme in the region. It is not the intention of the author to constitute yet another 
theory of nationalism through institutionalist perspective, but rather provide an 
alternative framework to organize and explain nationalism in the historical, 
political and social contexts of Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia. As an 
organizing framework, the institutionalist perspective of the study does not seek to 
replace but to include and go beyond existing studies and approaches in 
explaining how the dual legacy of institutionalized nationhood has continued to 
shape the national question in independent Central Asia. 
The institutionalist model is hoped to make the need urgent for new 
directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. The dissertation’s test of the 
institutionalist framework against the historical evidence of Central Asia will not 
only shed new light on nation-formation and nation-building in the region, but will 
also make an original contribution to the wider scholarly development of 
theoretically informed approaches to understand better the relation between 
                                                
12
 See Brubaker, R. (2004). “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and 
Patriotism.” Citizenship Studies 8(2); and Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: 
Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
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nation-building processes and ethnic conflicts in general, and in Central Asia in 
particular.  
The study will illustrate that the institutional condensation of nationality in 
the Soviet Union was by no means an empty form or the Soviet propaganda, 
brandishing the increased indigenization and ethno-nationalization in the soviet 
national republics. Institutionally-defined nationhood not only played a role in the 
disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape and structure the national 
question in the newly-independent Central Asia. The Soviet Union organized 
Central Asian political space according to the Leninist ideology of nationhood, 
basing it on four central characteristics: common economic life, common 
language, common territory and common national character. It succeeded in 
embedding the sentiments of nationhood and ethnicity profoundly in the 
imaginations of Central Asian people.  
Post-Soviet Central Asia is the heir to the Leninist ethno-national 
territorialization. Ethnicity and nationality remain important categories and 
processes in the regional political development, and are therefore critical for 
understanding Central Asian societies today. As the legacy of the institutionalized 
ethno-nationalism was bound to have a long-term affect on political and social 
development of the local societies, the study will analyze the effect of the 
institutionalized nationhood on Central Asia in terms of ethnic conflicts. The 
increased politicization of nationhood and ethno-political tensions in Central Asia 
were the consequences of the Soviet regime’s institutional crystallization and 
codification of nationhood as the main organizing principle of the society. The 
dissertation will also address the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in 
 8 
Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of 
independence, as well as explore how the expanded political scene during 
perestroika not only allowed for greater political mobilization along national lines 
but also changed the dynamics of inter-ethnic interaction.  
The topic of ethno-national dimension of the Soviet collapse has been 
discussed and debated at great length by scholars both inside and outside the 
former USSR.13 The unfolding violent upheavals were referred to as ethnic or 
nationalistic clashes. The above-mentioned primordialist account explained the 
conflicts as an echo of ancient hatreds and struggles, which were suppressed or 
controlled by the communist regime. Even Marxist modernist Hobsbawm claimed 
that the nationalist disintegration of the Soviet state was more a consequence of 
the collapse of the regime than a cause of it.14 But Hroch rejects such conventional 
view that the turmoil is “the result of the release of irrational forces that were long 
suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were - under communism, and are now in full 
revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently superficial”.15 In their assessment of 
regionalism and ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, Hughs and Sasse 
                                                
13
 See Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, 
Cambridge University Press; Suny, R. (1993). The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, 
and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press; Tuminez, A. (2003). 
“Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies 
5(4): 81-136; Karklins, R. (1994). Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the 
USSR and Latvia. Washington, D.C., The Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Fowkes, B. (1997). The 
Disintegration of the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph of Nationalism. London, 
Macmillan.  
14
 Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 168  
15
 Hroch, M. (1996). From National Movement to Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building 
Process in Europe. Mapping the Nation. G. Balakrishnan. London, Verso, p. 89 
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contest the notion that the conflicts in the region can be primarily explained as 
resurgent ‘unfinished business’ from past nationalist or ethnic conflicts.16 
The demise of the Soviet state released conflict potential, which was 
dispersed mostly along ethno-national lines. While Gellner denied the possibility 
of a ‘third way’ for cultural pluralism between the assimilatory and the 
nationalizing state,17 a significant body of literature illustrates that deeply divided 
societies can be stabilized by political mechanisms and strategies of regulation. In 
the survey of such solutions, O’Leary identified two major instruments: first, an 
institutional approach that focuses on constitutional and institutional design with a 
preference for consociational devices, federalism, or autonomy arrangements; and 
second, a ‘group-differentiated rights’ approach.18 The analysis of Central Asian 
conflicts by this study will focus on the first approach, by exploring the 
institutional foundations of the nation-building process, which was inherited from 
the Soviet ethno-nationalized federal state. Such ‘institutionalized 
multinationality’ was the key contributing factor in the nationalization of politics 
and the ‘ethno-constitutional’ crisis during the disintegration of the USSR.19  
The thesis will therefore explore the dynamics of ethno-political clashes 
during and after the fall of the Soviet Central Asia, in particular in Osh oblast´ 
(region), south of Kyrgyzstan. It is argued here that the Soviet institutional legacy 
for regulating ethno-nationhood and how it was constructed and re-constructed 
                                                
16
 Hughes, J. and G. Sasse (2002). Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet 
Transition States. Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict. J. 
Hughes and G. Sasse. London, Frank Cass Publishers, p. 2 
17
 Gellner, E. (1997). Nationalism. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson.  
18
 O'Leary, B. (2001). Nationalism and Ethnicity: Research Agendas on Theories of Their Sources 
and Their Regulation. Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions. D. 
Chirot and M. Seligman. Washington D.C., American Psychological Association.  
 10 
during and after the demise of the Soviet state has been a crucial structural factor 
in the causation of conflicts in Central Asia. In that context, the study will also 
explore the role of institutional reforms at the state-structural level and within the 
framework of democratization and the rule of law in managing the 
institutionalized ethno-nationalism in the region.  
The unprecedented inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz majority and 
Uzbek minority groups in Osh were selected for a detailed analysis for a number 
of reasons. First, ethnic violence in Osh took place in the context of the increased 
political and ethno-national mobilization from 1986 till early 1990s in Central 
Asia. Secondly, the Osh conflict involved two national groups, Uzbek and Kyrgyz, 
whose ethno-cultural and territorial nation-formation falls under the detailed 
institutional survey of the thesis. Third, the scale of casualties and intensity of the 
Osh conflict, which shocked not only the local population but even central 
authorities in Moscow, was unsurpassed by other inter-ethnic riots in the region, 
bar the civil war in Tajikistan. And fourth, the analysis of the Osh conflict could 
inform our understanding of current inter-ethnic dynamics in the present-day south 
Kyrgyzstan.  
It is important to acknowledge several recent studies carried out on 
ethnicity, territory and conflict resolution in Central Asia, especially those that 
benefited from extensive field research. Drawing on critical social theory in 
geography, Nick Megoran looks at the non-ethnic issue of the Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan border dispute from 1999 to 2000 and examines why the border 
                                                                                                                                  
19
 Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Roeder, P. (1999). “Peoples and States after 
1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions.” Slavic Review 58(4): 854-84. 
 11 
tension occurred and how it changed the Ferghana Valley as a result.20 Megoran 
emphasizes the importance of the interaction of domestic power struggles in both 
countries, and asserts that the border acted as both a material and discursive site, 
where elites struggled to gain or retain control of power and to imprint their own 
geopolitical visions of post-Soviet space on the Valley.  
In an anthropological study of authority and space in Osh Uzbek 
community in the 1990s, Morgan Liu explores how the spatiality of everyday 
social life within Uzbek neighbourhoods (mahallas) in Osh, Kyrgyzstan produced 
tacit expectations of authority as being something spatially dispersed.21 Following 
their experience under the Soviet rule, Uzbeks in Osh expected a welfare-oriented 
role of the state in society and felt disappointed by the Kyrgyz state’s failure to 
provide for its population and to control the surge of unemployment, inflation and 
criminal activity. According to Liu, discrimination and disempowerment in the 
post-independent Kyrgyzstan prompted Uzbek men in Osh to interpret events and 
trends through a vision of an ideal authority and polity around images of the 
neighbouring Uzbekistan and its president, Islam Karimov, who was recognized 
as the idealized ‘Khan’, a benevolent despot capable of resolving their post-Soviet 
problems. They saw the post-Soviet development in terms of eventual economic 
and political liberalization, however, the actual path and pacing of reforms would 
be determined by the paternalistic state leader (like Karimov), who “would run the 
                                                
20
 Megoran, N. (2002). The Borders of Eternal Friendship? The Politics and Pain of Nationalism 
and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary, 1999-2000. University 
of Cambridge, Ph.D. 
21
 Liu, M. (2002). Recognizing the Khan: Authority, Space and Political Imagination Among 
Uzbek Men in Post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Michigan, Ph.D. 
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state with a personal moral burden of stewardship similar to that with which a 
father was supposed to run an Uzbek household”.22  
Liu’s research provides a useful insight to how the understanding of 
authority by Uzbeks in Osh shaped their vision of idealized Uzbekistan and 
unpromising Kyrgyzstan in the first decade after independence. That period was 
characterized by the prevalence of comparatively better economic and social 
conditions in Uzbekistan than in other neighbouring countries. As the socio-
economic and political situation in Uzbekistan deteriorated in the late 1990s, the 
Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan changed their perception of their idealized 
neighbour. Uzbekistan’s actions to ‘secure’ the border with Kyrgyzstan through 
aggressive patrols and checkpoints, mining of borders and the introduction of a 
visa regime led to the disenchantment and unease across the border. In a 
predicament where they found themselves unable to connect politically to 
Uzbekistan, Osh Uzbeks realized the futility of expecting Uzbekistan to address 
their concerns and needs. In fact, a small survey conducted by Fumagalli with 136 
Uzbeks from the south of Kyrgyzstan revealed that three quarters of respondents 
indicated that it was the duty if all the citizens of the republic and also of state 
institutions to look after the interests of non-titular groups.23 The findings of 
another survey done by Elebayeva, Omuraliev and Abazov suggested a 
widespread desire to be part of the new state and that most people accepted the 
                                                
22
 Liu, M. (2002). Recognizing the Khan: Authority, Space and Political Imagination Among 
Uzbek Men in Post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Michigan, Ph.D, p. 4 
23
 Fumagalli, M. (2007). “Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and 'Uzbeks 
abroad'.” Central Asian Survey 26(1), pp. 116-118 
  
 13 
reality of living in Kyrgyzstan with its advantages and disadvantages.24 According 
to Megoran’s research, the border crisis of 1999-2000 compelled Uzbeks in 
Kyrgyzstan to “confront the reality of the division of two states for the first time”, 
and that it could force them to “seek to establish a future for themselves in 
Kyrgyzstan, of seeking participatory ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’”.25  
Morgan Liu rightly points to the importance of addressing “the actualities 
of how processes of change play out on the small scales of communities and 
individuals” when interpreting “the complex post-socialist transformations 
through a grand narrative of ‘transition’ toward democracy and the market”.26 
However, it is difficult to accept that the actual processes of democratic ideas and 
institutional practices that take root, or fail to do so, in the post-Soviet Central 
Asian societies “occur in the sphere of not national politics but everyday life”.27 
Indeed, Liu’s ethnographic work in small Osh mahallas does not exclude the 
possibility of those processes taking place in national politics, but only illustrates 
how they interact on a small, local level. In that context, one could not agree more 
with Megoran who points out that “Liu’s theories about the mahalla as a field of 
power that structures responses to the nation-state are compelling and important, 
but it would be a mistake to confuse one moment in a small neighbourhood of Osh 
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for a more stable element of Uzbekness in southern Kyrgyzstan”.28 In addition, 
Liu’s research does not attempt to propose a general theory of its own. Neither 
does it address how the political imagination and recognition of an ideal Khan has 
been politicized in the post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.  
In a comparative study of ethnic minority mobilization in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan,29 Mateo Fumagalli explores how the memory of the Osh conflict and 
Tajik civil war were framed by the leaders of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and what impact they had on the course of Uzbek mobilization. 
Building on the contribution of frame analysis,30 he examines different frames 
adopted and articulated by the Uzbek elites to mobilize and demobilize the 
community and asserts that the more successful frames were less confrontational, 
and led the Uzbek groups towards a non-confrontational path with the authorities.  
Fumagalli draws four broad conclusions from his study of frames in 
Central Asia.31 First, he holds that state actors and leaders created a self-
reinforcing frame for the post-independence period to support the incumbent as 
the only purported means of maintaining inter-ethnic stability. That apparently 
resulted in the demobilization and exclusion of the Uzbek community from 
politics in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Second, he points to the significance of the 
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common legacy of the Soviet nationality policies, which conditioned the framing 
of the Uzbek question along the Soviet experience and discourses on 
internationalism and inter-ethnic harmony. Third, it is argued that frames are 
‘quintessentially relational’ that implies their concurrent utility to mobilize or 
demobilize the population. And fourth, the research adds to the previous studies 
looking into the ‘internal heterogeneity’ of the Uzbek community in both 
countries and “cautions against the assumption of internal cohesiveness of a 
community simply out of common ethnic bonds”.32  
Most of Fumagalli’s findings can be corroborated by the evidence from 
other field studies, with the exception of the demobilizing idea of the Uzbek 
community in the post-independent Kyrgyzstan. According to that idea, Uzbek 
leaders in Kyrgyzstan used the memory of the Osh conflict not only to rally 
support for state authorities and legitimize their position as intermediaries, but 
also to warn against the risks of ethnic outbidding that could politicize Uzbek 
issues and destabilize inter-ethnic relations.33 The prevention of such inter-ethnic 
destabilization was therefore achieved by the demobilization of the Uzbek 
community through “convincing ordinary Uzbeks of the consequences of creating 
an ‘Uzbek question’ in the country”.34  
While the first observation of the strategic framing of inter-ethnic issues 
rightly acknowledges the continuance of the approach adopted by the Soviet 
regime, the second conclusion of the demobilized Uzbek community in 
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Kyrgyzstan is debatable for a number of reasons. First, there is a conceptual 
confusion with the proposed concept of a demobilizing idea, which Fumagalli 
defines as “a type of frame strategically developed by elites which leads the target 
community from mobilization to demobilization”.35 Given that he understands 
mobilization in terms of Nedelmann’s broad definition that refers to “the actors’ 
attempt to influence the existing distribution of power”,36 the demobilization of 
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan would imply the absence of attempts by Uzbeks to 
influence the distribution of power in the country. Such a proposition is contrary 
to the facts that point to  numerous attempts by the leading figures of the Uzbek 
community to challenge the status quo.37 The demobilization of the group would 
also go against Fumagalli’s insistence on the ‘quintessentially relational’ nature of 
frames. 
What Fumagalli might have meant to suggest could be that the radical 
mobilizing ideas of separatism and autonomy failed to resonate with the majority 
of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan, who instead opted for less confrontational 
frames that were hoped to address their concerns and interests without aggravating 
inter-ethnic tensions. This leads us to the second point. Fumagalli’s frames-
focused research provides an interesting insight to ethnic mobilization in the south 
Kyrgyzstan, but any understanding of political mobilization among ethno-national 
groups should also draw from an assessment of structural explanations, which 
either enable or constraint opportunities for mobilization.  
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Frame theorist Gorenburg is correct to claim that: “To be successful, 
nationalist leaders had to frame their demands in language and imagery that could 
resonate with the population”.38 However, the success and development of 
political mobilization also depends on structural factors, including a critical role of 
the state, its policies and institutions, that would expand or constraint political 
opportunities. With that in mind, Tarrow famously pointed to the crucial political 
opportunity structure, which he defined as the “dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure”.39  
The structural factors (the legacy of Soviet ethno-federalism, the centrality 
of inter-ethnic stability in politics, official ban of ethnic political movements etc.) 
play an indirect background role in Fumagalli’s study, rather than taking centre 
stage. And finally, the research would also be strengthened by an assessment of 
how the cultural framing of the conflict memory affected the ethno-political 
mobilization of the ‘other’ side, the Kyrgyz or Tajik titular majority.  Ethno-
nationalism, as a rule, involves at least two groups and is often seen as a political 
contest between those groups. 
This study’s geographic focus is intentionally confined to Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek nations for a number of reasons. First, even though the review of this kind 
could benefit from extending units of analysis to include other Central Asian 
nations (Kazakh, Tajik and Turkmen) that would however come at the detriment 
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of the study’s focus and probably in contravention with the postulated space 
limitation. Second, Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations represent two historically 
prevailing kinds of social groups of the Central Asian society, namely nomadic 
and settled, respectively. Third, the relative homogeneity and historical 
commonality of Central Asia lends validity to the assessment of trends in regional 
ethno-national development through the prism of formational processes in the 
selected two countries of the region. And fourth, the two nations inhabit the 
strategic Ferghana Valley, the most volatile area in Central Asia due to complex 
borders, multi-ethnic composition, dense population and socio-economic 
hardships.  
Bearing in mind research objectives outlined above, the crucial issue is 
identifying the most appropriate form of analysis. A balanced methodological 
approach is essential, which can incorporate the advantages of differing levels of 
analysis. A qualitative and comparative assessment of the nature of ethnicity and 
nationhood would be required, as well as a wider contextual understanding of 
their functioning in Central Asia. The thesis will address research questions by 
applying the original institutional approach, so far mostly utilized in West and 
East European studies, to the understanding of ethno-nationality in Central Asia. 
The innovative use of the analytical account allows viewing nationhood not as an 
ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, but rather as a political claim. It enables 
us to see nation as a category used to change the world, transform people’s self-
perception, mobilize loyalties and articulate demands. The institutional 
perspective is the optimal medium for this study, as it is well placed to explain the 
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institutional crystallizations of nationhood in Central Asia and its effect on the 
political stability in the region.  
 The research relies mainly on the qualitative analysis of wide-ranging and 
inter-disciplinary sources. The study also draws from the primary sources of 
information, which as mainly newspapers, publications and electronic outlets in 
the original languages (Russian and Uzbek). Two short fieldtrips were carried out 
to Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek and Osh) and Uzbekistan (Tashkent) in August 2001 and 
September 2002, respectively. The brief duration of the stays in the locations 
allowed research visits to the local state and academic libraries, as well as 
academies of sciences and universities.40 In conducting the research, the author 
has been aware of any subjectivity stemming from his personal background, multi-
lingual Uzbek (Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek) originally from Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 
However, every effort has been made to ensure academic objectivity to the extent 
possible.  
 The dissertation is structurally divided into six chapters, including this 
introductory section. The next, second, chapter provides an examination of the 
existing literature to determine the origins of the term ethnicity and identify the 
nature of ethnic group and ethnic identity. The third chapter considers major 
perspectives on nationhood and ethnicity and defines key questions around which 
the debate on ethno-nationalism revolves. It also provides a robust justification 
and description of the institutionalist perspectives on nationhood, which will serve 
as a framework for analysis for consequent discussion.  The fourth chapter tests 
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the institutional approach in the context of the national formation and 
development in pre-Soviet and Soviet Central Asia. It explores the main stages of 
identity-formation in the region before the Bolsheviks and addresses the 
institutional ethno-nationalization during the Soviet rule. The fifth chapter 
examines the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia during 
the fall of the Soviet Union and describes the consequences of the national 
mobilization on the inter-ethnic relations in the region. It analyzes the dynamics of 
ethno-political clashes in Central Asia and explores specifically the Osh ethnic 
conflict in the context of institutionalized ethno-nationalism. Consequently, the 
chapter assesses the role of institutional reforms in the context of democratization 
and legitimation in managing ethno-political conflicts. The final chapter includes 
the concluding remarks from the author and the scope for further research. 
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Map 1. Central Asian nation-states today  
 
 
Source: PCL Map Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/asia.html 
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CHAPTER II, CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ETHNICITY 
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1.0 Introduction  
 
In recent seasons especially, there have been dozens of academic safaris in the field trying to track 
the snowman of ‘ethnicity’, everyone sure now that it exists and is important, more important than 
people thought, but no one sure what it looks like, much less whether it is abominable or not. 
(Harold Isaacs) 
 
 
SINCE Isaacs’ writing on ethnicity in the 1970s, a notable progress has been 
achieved in ‘tracking’ the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, due to 
bourgeoning research in the field. Academic interest in the field increased as a 
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent ethno-nationalist events. 
Despite this, the nature of ethnicity and nationalism remains complex and 
divisive. Various scholars and researchers approach ethnicity from different 
vantage points and are conditioned by the disciplinary frameworks within which 
they operate. The literature on ethnicity and nationalism still fails to yield either 
definitional precision or usable empirical referents for its study.41 The concepts 
are highly contested, and there is no agreement over their nature. No wonder than 
that the phenomena invite endless definitional arguments among contemporary 
intellectuals.42 The purpose of this chapter is therefore to outline the debate on the 
nature of ethnicity and related terms and to offer a more definitional precision of 
the concepts by presenting the plurality and commonality of views on the subject.  
The chapter will thus discuss the origins and definition of the term 
‘ethnicity’, explore how ethnic group and ethnic identity are defined, as well as 
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explain how ethnicity relates to other concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘nation’. The 
conceptualization of ethnicity will inform and feed the discussions in consequent 
chapters, which will explore how our understanding of the development of ethno-
nationalism in Central Asia can contribute to better understanding of ethnic 
conflicts in the region. It will therefore serve as crucial building blocks in the 
bigger, scholarly structure.  
 
 
2.0 Origins of ethnicity 
 
The word ‘ethnicity’ is relatively new in the English vocabulary. It only entered 
the lexicon in the 1950s. Because the origins of the word are not English, 
etymological discussion of the roots of the term and the ways it emerged in 
vernacular English can shed some light on its current usage.  
The origins of ethnicity are usually traced back to the Greek word ‘ethnos’. 
The term ethnos in the ancient times covered a variety of meanings, but in all of 
its usages it had a common denotation of a number of people who live together 
making up a clan or tribe sharing cultural attributes or biological characteristics of 
a group.43 A useful parallel can be drawn from the early Greek use of ethnos to the 
contemporary English usage of ‘tribe’ with strong aspects of “naturality, of non-
legitimate social organization, of disorganization, and of animality”.44 The use of 
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ethnos for non-structured, tribal and peripheral peoples in classical Greek seems to 
have been transmitted unaltered into Modern Greek.45   
Another usage of ethnos was implied in reference to peoples that are 
distinguishable.  Such usage was useful for the situations when there was a need to 
distinguish between own (our) people and alien (other) people. Greeks therefore 
called themselves genos Hellenon, which was used in juxtaposition to other, non-
Greek people, ethnea. That denotation could indeed be the first seed of the 
consequent development in the discourse of us/other in social landscape. The seed 
grew into a solid tree of fallacious categorization of assumed non-ethnic as us and 
ethnic as others.  Such understanding has undoubtedly had a tremendous effect on 
our perceptions in the field of ethnic studies: most, as a rule, apply the adjective 
‘ethnic’ to refer to other people (minority groups and immigrants as a norm), 
which do not constitute a majority of the total population who, in turn, are 
classified as non-ethnic citizens, countrymen or nation. This, however, is 
challenged by increasing appreciation among well-informed scholars and 
practitioners of the fact that the term ethnic is equally pertinent to the 
categorization of groups who can be the majority or minority (us and other). 
 In English, the term ‘ethnic’ had meant ‘pagan’ and ‘non-Christian’ till the 
nineteenth century, but from the mid-nineteenth century it altered its meaning 
among intellectuals to denote a group of people with shared characteristics.46 It is 
worth noting that the term ethnos was not in circulation in the English lexicon 
because the term ‘race’ was widely used instead and ethnology was perceived as 
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the study of races.47 As a result, when race discourse was politically marginalized 
after the mid-twentieth century, the English language has not had a concrete noun 
to replace the term race and engross the meaning of ethnos. Nonetheless, attempts 
have been made to fill this gap. The noun ‘ethnicity’ was chained from the root of 
the adjective ‘ethnic’, the same way as the French ‘ethnicite’ was created from 
‘ethnie’. Other scholars such as Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson tend to use 
original ethnie in their English literature.  
 The origins of the term ethnicity reveal the continuum in at least two 
connotations of ethnicity: as a characteristic of a group of people with shared 
cultural and/or biological attributes, and a phenomenon to distinguish between kin 
and other alien groups. The forthcoming section will now explore what ethnicity 
signifies in contemporary social science. 
 
 
3.0 Conceptualizing ethnicity 
 
It is a challenging task to define contemporary meanings of ethnicity. The 
literature on ethnicity shows how difficult it is to establish an agreed definition of 
the term, while the prospect for a consensus in the field is only emerging. For the 
purposes of this study however a working definition of ethnicity will be attempted 
to fathom. One way of approaching this task is by sifting theoretical advancements 
in the subject area for the relevance to our study. So the subsequent analysis of 
ethnicity should be treated as a working framework based on the summary of ideal 
types of ethnicity. 
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In contemporary social sciences, ethnicity has acquired several meanings: 
1) a field of study of classification of (ethnic) peoples and the relations and 
distinctions between such groups; 2) the essence of ethnic group or the quality of 
belonging to it (identity); and 3) characteristics of an ethnic group.48  
 So that a well-informed idea of ethnicity can be formed it is important to 
keep in mind two grand traditions of social sciences, positivism and post-
positivism, which influence our thinking of ethnicity today. Positivism is a system 
of philosophy that suggests looking into social and natural phenomena through 
empirical and scientific knowledge. The term was originally coined by Auguste 
Comte, usually dubbed as father of sociology, who sought to re-organise social 
life based on reality that can be fathomed by scientific tools. Hence the only true 
knowledge is scientific knowledge. Positivist doctrine was traditionally dominant 
in social sciences before mid-twentieth century and therefore made a significant 
contribution to our understanding of ethnicity. Positivists concentrate on 
objective, i.e. scientifically defined, attributes of ethnicity. For instance, as culture 
is a crucial factor that shapes ethnicity, one then could define ethnicity in terms of 
an objective cultural structure of society that can be scientifically and objectively 
‘measured’. This formulation, as Brown rightly suggests, encourages perceiving 
“ethnic consciousness [as] arising directly out of possession, by a group, of a 
particular and distinctive language or religion, or ‘racial’ phenotype”.49  
Positivism also treats ethnicity as just one of many available cultural bases 
for social grouping. One of the positivist assumptions is that social groups that 
possess distinctive cultural traits, such as language, religion, customs and common 
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history, would generate corresponding group consciousness. The role of a social 
scientist therefore is to explore scientifically objective cultural traits and common 
history, which as a norm trigger the formation of that group’s consciousness. 
Another tendency of positivism is to regard society as an organic and homogenous 
entity made up of groups and collectivities rather than individuals. 
The alternative doctrine, post- (anti-) positivism, on the other hand, 
debunks the idea of objective knowledge and universal truths. It is a human-
focused approach that looks into subjective dimensions of social behaviour and 
entities, which are difficult to prove objectively or scientifically. In the post-
positivist tradition, the focus of enquiry into ethnicity shifts to exploring 
subjective feelings and consciousness as key elements. Post- positivists would 
therefore maintain that the relation between subjective and objective aspects of 
ethnicity is unclear. The example of this position can be seen by the statement that 
there is “no simple deterministic relationship in which culture, on its own, caused 
ethnicity”.50 Correspondingly, post-positivism suggests that ethnicity is perceived 
in terms of a “subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and parentage 
rather than something to be measured by objectively visible present cultural 
criteria or historical facts”.51 
Although the debate over which doctrine is more pertinent to ethnicity 
studies is far from over, it is the position of this study that in exploring ethnicity 
we should learn from both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ dimensions of ethnicity. 
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The objective dimension incorporates cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic 
markers, such as language, territory and religion. The subjective of ethnicity 
includes group loyalty/identity and boundaries of that identity. If we take territory, 
for example, it is symbolically as well as actually central to maintaining ethnicity, 
although sometimes its role may be minimal.52 It is possible to say that ethnicity is 
a subjective phenomenon even though it is based on (or is perceived to be based 
on), refers to, and invokes objective cultural and historical markers.53 In the words 
of Jenkins, it is also a “world of personal identity collectively ratified and publicly 
expressed”.54 This means that ethnicity is not a homogenous notion and there is 
much diversity and variation within it. Ethnicity’s appeal and strength could vary 
between groups and their members over time and context.  
It needs to be borne in mind that ethnicity is often conceived as social 
construction. For Fenton, ethnicity is not only a social construction of descent and 
culture with the consequent meanings and implications of classification systems 
built around them, but it is also the social mobilization of descent and culture.55 
Social mobilization as a rule can, in turn, lead to group affiliation and community 
formation. Ethnicity clearly stands out as one of the most attractive choices for 
group affiliation. It may be added that by replicating family functions and 
transferring them from private to public landscape, ethnicity can successfully meet 
at least three crucial criteria in people’s choice-making for group affiliation: the 
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search for emotional security, rational utilization of access to desired resources, 
and creating circumstances with no real choice in group affiliation.56  
Ethnicity is not an exceptional social phenomenon. It is one of a few 
socially-constructed collective identifications in society.57 Ethnicity is also 
distinct, as it differs with its unique cultural reference and a sense of us and them. 
De Vos, for example, points out subjective application of the cultural reference by 
defining ethnicity in terms of “subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any 
aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups”.58 The 
differentiation nevertheless tends to apply to the other because ethnicity often 
implies the overlooking of internal differentiations. Tonkin’s cynicism is 
unmasked in his unapologetic description of ethnicity as a term that “half-
heartedly aspires to describe phenomena that involve everybody, and that 
nevertheless has settled in the vocabulary as a marker of strangeness and 
unfamiliarity”.59 
Viability of difference in ethnicity needs to be placed in the context of 
awareness of that difference. Eller, for instance, emphasizes the “consciousness of 
difference and the subjective salience of that difference”60 that plays a role in 
mobilization around conscious difference. It can thus be added that “if a group is 
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not conscious of or organized in terms of its characteristics, then there is no 
ethnicity, no matter how distinct it may be”.61  
Apart from serving as a social organization of culture difference, ethnicity 
can also encompass a contact between the groups, which are ethnically 
differentiated.62 This denotation echoes ethnicity’s ancient application in the 
society when it was used to demarcate lines of kinship between groups.  
The notion of otherness in ethnicity has often been applied as a potent 
social label. Labels, as we know, carry normative value and can be created or used 
for some purpose. Another quality of social labels is that they can be “made and 
unmade and remade”.63 
It is common that in relation to ethnicity reference is usually made to the 
past. Most definitions of ethnicity employ objective attributes and subjective 
feelings that are connected to the past. The relation between ethnicity and the past 
prompts four different but related connections: the cultural past, the past as 
history, the past as myth, and the past as resource for the present.64 
 Although ethnicity is often seen as a social problem, usually studied for its 
role in wider social structure, it has increasingly been looked into as a political 
resource open for manipulation by ruling regimes with the purposes to strengthen 
power, enhance or undermine national security, legitimise authority, or promote 
national unity.65 
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A functioning account of ethnicity will lack in complexity if two 
dimensions of ethnicity- ethnic group and ethnic identity- are left unaddressed. In 
the words of Thomas Eriksen, “when we talk of ethnicity, we indicate that groups 
and identities have developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation”.66 If one 
sees ethnicity through these dimensions, then it is natural for him to define it as 
“the state of being ethnic, or belonging to an ethnic group”.67 Burgess adds more 
flesh to the lean description of ethnicity and defines it as: 
 
the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an 
identity with and/or a consciousness of group belonging that is differentiated 
from others by symbolic markers (including cultural, biological, or territorial), 
and is rooted in bonds to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests.68  
 
 
Projection of ethnicity though identity and group membership suggests its 
categorization as a collective phenomenon, when perceived as an ethnic group, 
and as an individual phenomenon, when referring to an ethnic identity. The 
following sections will offer a more detailed exploration of the terms of ethnic 
group and ethnic identity. 
As will be shown in this study, many attempts have been made to define 
ethnic group and the sheer multitude of definitions makes it difficult to offer an 
agreed basis of what the concept should signify. It has however become apparent 
that ethnicity is just one of a few ways or methods to categorize, mobilize, and 
organize social collectivity. People can affiliate themselves or organize themselves 
around other social attributes like religion, class, culture and ideology. What is so 
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different about ethnicity, and what is an ethnic group? The forthcoming discussion 
will address these questions and assess qualities and attributes of ethnic group. 
Defining ethnic group is no easy task but it is crucial in providing a useful insight 
into how ethnicity functions and transcends social layers.  
One of the first daring attempts to describe ethnic group was made by the 
sociologist Max Weber. His definition of ethnic groups was ground-breaking for 
the time. Weber describes ethnic groups as: 
those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent 
because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of 
memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the 
propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an 
objective blood relationship exists.69  
 
 
Following Weber, it can be argued that ethnic groups are formed on the subjective 
basis of ethnicity in terms of members’ belief in shared ancestry, which is usually 
‘salad dressed’ by objective phonotypical or cultural similarities. The subjective 
aspect of ethnic group by and large plays a more crucial role than objective 
qualities, as group formation is a subjective experience undergone by group 
members themselves. So the initial conviction among scholars of the importance 
of exploring and verifying objective attributes or memories of origin and descent 
of ethnic groups has gradually evolved. A more convincing argument suggested 
that it is the consciousness or awareness of difference and shared cultural elements 
that make up the basis of ethnic group, rather than the objective quality of those 
elements. This view can be exemplified by de Vos’s approach of ethnic group as 
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self-conscious unification or ‘self-perceived inclusion’ of those who hold in 
common a set of customs and traditions not shared by others with whom they are 
in contact.70 
Ethnic self-consciousness among group members prompts an awareness of 
differences with other groups. The differences are usually drawn along real or 
putative shared culture, which is seen to exist as “memory of the true, or 
‘original’, condition of the group”.71 Difference is evident and crucial not only to 
members of the group but also to members of other groups. Greeley takes a 
cynical view of ethnic differences and claims that “if there are no differences 
supposedly rooted in common origin by which people can distinguish themselves 
from others, they will create such differences”.72  
Another intriguing issue that Max Weber raises is ethnicity’s role in group 
formation, especially formation of a political community. He sees ethnicity as 
ultimately a “political community, no matter how artificially organized that 
inspires the belief in common ethnicity”.73 Weber makes a further claim that the 
‘artificial origin’ of the belief in common ethnicity follows the pattern of “rational 
association turning into personal relationships”.74 Ethnic groups can be seen as 
movements acting upon their culture or social situation and having goals. An 
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ethnic group at rest, without an agenda, is almost a contradiction in terms.75 Ethnic 
group can thus be linked to consequences of political inspiration where a political 
community essentially invokes the belief in the ethnic of otherwise political group.  
As a result of its ancestral character, ethnic group is often dubbed as a 
kinship collectivity but due to its subjective nature some call it a pseudo-kinship 
group. Brown claims that because it is a fictive or imagined kinship group that 
lacks real ties of common ancestry, ethnic group must “display and propagate the 
myths and symbols of kinship [and] ‘advertise’ its claim to be the real thing”.76 A 
number of scholars, namely Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, emphasise the 
importance of myths, symbols and memories as primary elements of ethnically 
defined groups.  Smith, for example, defines it as “a named human population 
with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more 
common elements of common culture, including an association with a homeland 
and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites”.77  
It is interesting to note that the description seeks a compromise between 
objective attributes, namely common history and culture, and subjective qualities 
of ethnicity such as myths and memories. It seems that it is this combination that 
makes ethnic groups viable and potent in social structures. Common ancestry and 
historical memories play a crucial role in transmitting culture and forming 
identity. It is through customs, rituals and preconceptions that elements of 
common culture shape the content of culture, broadcast it, and formulate 
behavioural patterns. Popular myths, art, music and literature provide a bridge 
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with the homeland. A sense of solidarity is manifested through political and 
popular community institutions or organizations. And, as can be learnt from ethnic 
tensions, the important aspect of ethnic consciousness is that it often arises and is 
transformed in the context of power relations.78 
Although it identifies key components of ethnic group, Smith’s definition 
overlooks its segmental nature and consciousness that underpins it. Schermerhorn, 
in lieu, offers a solution to this by adding another key element to ethnic group, its 
segmentality. He, therefore, defines an ethnic group as “a collectivity within a 
larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared 
historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as 
the epitome of their peoplehood… A necessary accompaniment is some 
consciousness of kind among members of the group”.79      
The segmental nature of ethnic group can be traced back to the original 
usage of the term ‘ethnic’ in Ancient Greece when it symbolised the relation 
between Greeks and other ethnic groups.  
It is frequently assumed that ethnic group is usually a segment of a larger 
society, and it is more often than not believed to be a minority within it. 
Furthermore, in each society ethnic groups are in subordinate rather than dominant 
positions.80 If ethnic group is a culturally distinct segment of the larger society, 
then there is an interaction between such groups that implies a relational quality.81 
It is then undeniable that speaking of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd 
                                                                                                                                  
77
 Smith, A. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, p. 13 
78
 See Le Vine, V. (1997). “Conceptualizing "Ethnicity" and "Ethnic Conflict": A Controversy 
Revisited.” Studies in Comparative International Development 32(2). p.51 
79
 Shermerhorn, R. (1970). Comparative Ethnic Relations, Random House. p.12 
80
 See Shermerhorn, R. (1970). Comparative Ethnic Relations, Random House. p.12 
 37 
as speaking of the sound from one hand clapping.82 So, members of an ethnic 
group are in contact with and therefore aware of non-members. It is no surprise 
that ethnic identities are perceived and often defined in relation to whatever they 
are not- identity of other groups. As a result of inter-group contact, ethnic groups 
tend to identify and institutionalize their unique and distinct ethnicity. Such 
relational quality, however, concurrently implies both similarity and difference.83 
Thus, depending on the dynamics in relations between groups, similarities or 
differences are emphasised and employed by group members. 
Yinger, who seemingly accepts segmentality, introduces another 
interesting characteristic of ethnic groups, that of participation. According to him, 
ethnic members are expected to take part in shared activities in which “the 
common origin and culture are significant ingredients”.84 So ethnic membership 
involves not only a possession or a belief in possession of common origin and 
culture but also requires an action (participation) in shared activities, which in turn 
sustains the very belief in common ancestry.  
Thus far, we have established that ethnic group is an interesting hybrid of 
putative beliefs and shared objective characteristics. Because it operates in a larger 
social ‘reservoir’, ethnic group has to interact with other groups, which prompts 
enhancing its pseudo kinship ties. The group then acts, or participates, in shared 
cultural activities that not only symbolize ethnic bondage but also sustain the 
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putative belief. Though, something may be missing here. Perhaps purposefulness 
of such groups? Cohen responds affirmatively by defining ethnic group as “an 
informal interest group whose members are distinct from members of other groups 
in that they share a measure of … ‘compulsory institutions’ like kinship and 
religion, and can communicate among themselves relatively easily”.85 So for 
Cohen, the emphasis is placed on the instrumental nature of ethnic group; where 
interest is part of ideological transformation of the cultural to political/economic 
ends. No eyebrows raised then when one of the reasons for ethnic group being an 
effective and appealing social organization is explained by its ability to “combine 
symbolic and instrumental purposes, and coalesce an interest with an affective 
tie”.86  
Fredrik Barth, in his ground-breaking Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,87 
makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of the subjective dimension of 
ethnic groups by alerting our attention to the importance of social-psychological 
ethnic boundaries. These boundaries define lines of ethnic identity and 
membership, as well as involve questions of group inclusion and exclusion. 
Barth’s revelations instigated a shift in emphasis from objective traits of ethnic 
groups to boundaries and relations between them. Such change allowed 
conceiving ethnic groups as movements, rather than stagnant social entities, and 
suggested that while contents and membership of ethnic group change, its 
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boundary remains.88 Effective difference between ethnic groups then arguably is 
hidden in the nature and direction of the movement.   
Ethnic boundaries can be of two kinds: internal, within the ethnic group, 
and external, outside the group.89 In the internal boundaries, self-inclusion in the 
group takes place, sympathy and loyalty is set towards co-members, and the 
process of self-identity overlaps. In the external borders, membership exclusion is 
outlined and demarcation lines are laid for outsiders. According to Mash, kinship, 
commensality and a common cult - most common and pervasive ethnic boundary 
markers- constitute a basic structure of ethnic group differentiation.90  
In a multi-ethnic society, the relationship between the internal and external 
boundaries has direct influence on the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. In 
societies where different ethnic communities interact and compete, it is inevitable 
that the existence of internal boundaries can create external ethnic boundaries. 
This process, in turn, can produce the duality of self and other that has troubled 
societies since ancient times.  
As was mentioned earlier, one way of approaching ethnicity is by 
addressing its manifestation on individual level as ethnic identity. On the 
individual level, socio-psychological process creates in a person a sense of 
belonging and identity, ethnic identity. Cohen thinks that ethnicity has come to be 
regarded as “a mode of action and of representation: it refers to a decision people 
make to depict themselves or others symbolically as the bearers of a certain 
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cultural identity”.91 He further adds that in contrast to “the apparently monolithic 
or generalised character of ethnicity at the collective level”, ethnicity at a personal 
level undergoes continual reconstruction.92 It can then be argued that ethnicity is 
better understood when “experiential, subjective forces underlying ethnic identity 
and its maintenance” are taken into account because macro-cultural, or objective, 
forces alone make our understanding of ethnic persistence inadequate.93  
Besides, ethnic identity, in Guibernau’s view, provides a useful 
interpretation of “the self that establishes what and where the person is in both 
social and psychological terms”.94 Ethnic identity in an individual usually involves 
simultaneous, yet inter-independent, processes of self-identification and 
identification with a group.  
While assessing ethnic identity, Isajiw suggests distinguishing its external 
and internal aspects.95 External aspects of ethnic identity refer to social and 
cultural observable behaviour such as speaking ethnic language, practising ethnic 
traditions, participating in ethnic personal networks, participating in ethnic 
institutional organizations, contributing to ethnic voluntary associations and being 
involved in ethnic functions. External aspects constitute etic elements of ethnic 
identity. The internal aspects of ethnic identity include images, ideas, attitudes and 
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feelings. They constitute emic characteristics of ethnic identity. There are at least 
three types of internal aspects of ethnic identity: cognitive, moral and affective.96 
Cognitive element of ethnic identity includes self-images and images of one’s 
group, objective or subjective knowledge of the group’s past and heritage and 
awareness of the group’s values. Moral component deals with feelings of group 
obligations that symbolise the level of importance and commitment a member 
attaches to his ethnic group. And affective element involves feelings of attachment 
to the group.  
 It is important to remember that ethnic identities represent variables. Le 
Vine reiterates that investigations into variations in the intensity of ethnic identity 
reveal a “unique condition of identity: identities are usually multiple and 
layered”.97 If ethnic identity is a variable then it is difficult to assess it. 
Nonetheless, one way of going around this problem and conceptualizing ethnic 
identity is to view it as “existing on a continuum with (at one end) those 
individuals for whom ethnicity is the primary identifier, and at the other, those 
who emphasize other bases of identity”.98 Since ethnic identity is a variable, it is 
often conflated or confused with other social identities. In trying to define the 
individual dimension of ethnicity one should address differences between the 
ethnic and other closely related referents, such as race and nation.   
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4.0 Ethnicity, race and nation 
 
Ethnicity is often equated with terms that although closely related are not 
conceptual surrogates. The section will explore the relations between ethnicity and 
such related terms. Brian du Toit, for instance, in his Ethnicity in Modern Africa, 
explores several connotations of ethnicity.99 We shall discuss two most salient 
connotations, that of ‘race’ and ‘nation’, which are often conflated with ethnicity. 
Fenton suggests there is a commonality between the three terms by describing 
them as descent and culture communities and claiming that they share a single 
core with some important differences at the periphery.100 If there is presumably a 
single core then an attempt is made to outline commonalities and differences 
between the concepts.  
The discourse of race remains a potent background for the study of 
ethnicity today, not least because race has been widely used as a concept capable 
of classifying people into social groups. Although there are similarities of the 
usage of race and ethnicity, especially in the North-American vernacular, it is 
generally accepted that race can not be a surrogate term for ethnicity.  
The meaning of race has changed dramatically over time. In the sixteenth 
century, race in Europe earned a meaning of a group or a tribe of people regarded 
as of common stock and ancestry.101 At the time, its usage was very similar to 
ethnicity now, and they were used interchangeably. In the late eighteenth century, 
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it obtained the meaning that sought to classify humans along greater subdivisions 
of mankind. Cuvier and de Gobineau were among prominent proponents of such 
human classification into subspecies. 
By late nineteenth century, race culminated as a key concept in the quasi-
science of classifying the divisions of humankind into physically or phenotypically 
defined racial groups. Even though contemporary usage of race is primarily 
concerned with biological underpinnings, in the nineteenth century its meaning 
encompassed wider social horizons and its biological component was only a part 
of wider reference to terms like nation, culture, or tribe.102 
Race scientists had four key co-related propositions.103 Firstly, they argued 
that it is possible to classify humankind into races as defined biologically by 
physical and visible appearances. Secondly, such physical classification of humans 
implied possible categorization and distinction of unphysical qualities and 
characteristics according to physical races. Thirdly, racial inheritance, or genetic 
make-up, meant physical and moral qualities were preserved through racial 
descent. And finally, as a result of the previous two propositions, they argued that 
races had hierarchical order with some races superior to others.  
The above propositions are best exemplified through the scientific racism 
suggested by its nineteenth century founder himself, Arthur de Gobineau. He 
proposed division of the world into three races: white Caucasian, black Negroid 
and yellow Mongoloid. His claim was that every race is endowed with certain 
physical and unphysical qualities that are scientifically discernible. Thus, he 
                                                                                                                                  
101
 Banton, M. (2004). Theories of Race. Nationality and Nationalism. A. Leoussi and S. Grosby, 
I.B. Tauris, p.197 and Fenton, S. (2003). Ethnicity, Polity. p.18 
102
 Hutchinson, J. and A. Smith, Eds. (1996). Ethnicity. Oxford, Oxford University Press. p.21 
103
 Fenton, S. (2003). Ethnicity, Polity, p.20  
 44 
discerned, people of the white race had far superior intelligence, mentality and 
morality. This was allegedly evidenced in European dominant position in the 
world, where black people were on the least capable and ‘human’ end, making up 
most of the slave populace in the world. Such view may have been convincing in 
the past, but is now totally discredited on the grounds of its narrow-mindedness, 
scientific fallacy and self-fulfilling justification of the status-quo enjoyed by the 
privileged group in domestic society and in the wider world.    
It is not surprising that the term race is now largely abandoned in scientific 
discourse of ethnicity with some exception in the North-American continent. The 
desertion was due to the delayed waking up to the sense of revulsion, shame and 
guilt after the events in Europe in 1930s and 1940s, caused by the then racial 
studies, eugenics, and generated racist doctrines, specifically utilized by the Nazis. 
No wonder why experts in the field dislike viewpoints, even academic in nature, 
that describe race in terms of propositions outlined above. Hence Smith’s broad 
definition of race as “aggregates whose members are objectively distinguished 
from others by certain gross hereditary phenotypical features”.104  
Although recent attempts have been made to use genetic technology to 
improve racial assessment, such moves are received with criticism by biologists 
and geneticists who assert that phenotypical variations in human groups 
notwithstanding, it is scientifically impossible to identify clear-cut races and 
develop a race-based human classification, and that genetic diversity is great 
within people of the same race as between races.  This means, and many social 
scientists would agree, that race can be nothing more than a socially or 
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ideologically constructed ideal type with perceived, though fallacious, biological 
grounding by which people can be categorized.105 However, other experts would 
claim that even though biological evidence is contested, people’s subjective belief 
in or perception of the significance and viability of racial (physical) differences in 
society cannot be dismissed and therefore should be within academic realm of 
study. Le Vine, for instance, argues that race no longer serves any useful purpose 
as a larger referent of group identity, though it remains relevant for political 
analysis due to its historical role in structuring power relations.106 One example of 
such power relations was given by Cox, who notes that expansion of European 
colonialism and consequent increase in demand for labour created capitalist 
societies with the social structure and belief system that justified subordination of 
black people and their distinction from white populace.107 
Banton puts forward two factors to explain why people still entertain false 
racial ideas about members of other groups: 
[I]t is claimed on the one hand that processes of racial group formation can be 
explained in the same terms as those used for explaining group phenomena in 
general. On the other hand it is maintained that that the only possible theories are 
those explaining why, in particular societies and at particular times, racism 
assumes a given form.108 
 
 
Smith makes a useful distinction between race and ethnicity based on the un-
negotiability of the former: racial identity is “immutable, manifest, and normally 
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unambiguous in multi-racial societies and contexts”.109 Contrary to this is the 
view that tends to conflate the two concepts and debunk the distinction by stating 
that race’s reliance on phenotypical difference is just one element in the repertoire 
of ethnic boundary markers.110 In support for conflation, van den Berghe claims 
ethnicity is a manifestation of an adaptive nepotism between kin with essentially 
genetic foundations, therefore race can be seen as “just a special marker of 
ethnicity, a visible folk test of likely common ancestry”.111   
Conflating two concepts has been challenged on the basis of its neglecting 
the qualitative distinctions. Banton, for example, suggests that race is a 
categorization of people based on physical characteristics describing the other, 
while ethnicity is a cultural group identification denoting us.112 So ethnicity and 
race differ in their application in the discourse of us vs. them with the former 
usually referring to self-identification based on cultural distinctions and the latter 
addressing external classification based on biological traits. In addition, ethnicity 
is a matter of voluntary subscription and race is an imposed categorization. Thus, 
the perception of ethnicity among ethnic people is a positive sensation, while race 
categorization is usually perceived by ascribed people more as a stigma label. 
Tonkin makes an interesting point. While acknowledging the shared strong 
bias of race and ethnicity towards difference and otherness, he distinguishes between 
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universal possession of the racial qualities on the one hand, and exclusive or 
selective usage of ethnicity, on the other: 
‘Race’ as a term did not, so to speak, discriminate. Within the discourse of race, 
everybody had one, everyone belonged to one. In actual use, however, not 
everybody belongs to an ‘ethnic group’, or has an ‘ethnicity’.113  
 
 
As was mentioned above, race is heavily based on physiological characteristics. 
This point is reiterated by Kellas who also proposes that this makes race 
distinguishable from ethnicity because races are viewed in predominantly 
biological terms, with particular emphasis on phenotypical distinctions and 
presumed genetic distinctions.114 Rex goes further to offer a simple distinction 
that ethnic group is similar to race but without the biology.115  
There are commonalities between two concepts, mainly in their 
methodological and communitarian bases on attributes of kinship and ancestry and 
invocation of difference and otherness with other entities. However, race and 
ethnicity also differ. Race is based on biological assumptions of intrinsic physical 
qualities. Whereas ethnicity even though it may utilize phenotypical 
characteristics to emphasis internal cohesion or external difference does not rely 
on racial or physical characteristics for self sustenance. Race may even be 
employed as one of the boundary elements in ethnicity, but in the case of its 
unavailability ethnicity is abundant with other options at its disposal. 
The term ‘nation’ is a close relative to ethnicity. Both are even attributed 
to the same discipline and are often used interchangeably. Even though the co-
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relation between the two concepts undoubtedly strong it deems crucial to be aware 
of similarities and differences between the two. 
So what is nation? According to Smith, ideal type of nation can be defined 
as “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common 
myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and 
common rights and duties for all members”.116 We can see that the description 
underlines objective characteristics of nation such as a territory, language, religion, 
and common descent. Nations also involve subjective features like people’s 
awareness of its nationality and loyalty to it.117  
Nations often invoke links to states, or are even conflated with nation-
states. Although in certain circumstances a nation may mean a nation-state, one 
need to bear in mind that there are states made up of more than one nation and 
there are nations that are not states. The nature of the link between state and nation 
is explained by two conceptions: the first views nations as self-governing entities, 
and the second holds that state populace are, or result to form, a nation.118 The 
second conception prompts us to approach nation as an entity in the process of 
nation building. In many cases, however, nationhood is not only an achieved status 
but also a subjective state of mind, or imagination. This imagination, as Anderson 
explains, is not in the sense of falsehood but of psychological creativity.119 We can 
thus deduce that there is a reinforcing connection relation between objective 
national attributes and subjective national sense. Eller, for example, illustrates the 
relation by the description of nation evolving as “the product of the will-to-
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nationhood that prevails, an (often personal) imagination that becomes nation’s 
imagination”.120 Such qualitative relationship is indeed a source of stability and 
instability: this very imagination can create rival groups claiming competing 
visions of nationhood with competing evidence to that effect. 
After outlining what nation is about, it is tempting to concede that 
commonalities between ethnicity and nation are hard to miss. They equally 
represent descent and culture community. Both terms belong to the same family of 
phenomena, collective cultural identities. Nations and ethnic groups share the 
attributes of common myths and shared memories. The two types of collectivity 
are both conditioned by the past or memories of the past and their territorial 
legacy. And, ethnicity and nation similarly manifest objective and subjective 
dimensions.  
Differences, however, should not be brushed aside. The most salient 
distinction is explained by nation’s essentially political nature.121 Ethnicity, in 
contrast, lacks political referent or only has a potential for politicization. Le Vin 
reiterates the difference and claims that nation refers to political community, 
whatever the nature of the communal bonds involved, while ethnic group “needs 
no political badge to validate itself”.122 Moreover, nations are perceived as 
‘rational’ political organizations, which frequently take advantage of ethnic 
symbols for decorative rather than substantive purposes.123  
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Aspiration to the status of nationhood is another crucial difference. A 
nation must aspire to nationhood and/or be recognized as a nation. In international 
relations, nation also implies some degree of self-determination. The national attribute 
of self-determination in turn generates a single economy and common rights and 
duties, which ethnic groups as a norm would lack. However, sometimes it is not 
necessary for a nation to possess a sovereign statehood, but what can suffice is a 
vociferous aspiration for autonomy coupled with the physical occupation of its homeland 
or territory.124 In other words, for nation to be self-governing a homeland or 
territory is a required element, whereas for ethnic group’s sustainability only a 
symbolic connection to homeland is usually needed. 
In addition, the quality of group organization and consciousness also 
demarcate ethnicity and nation. Nations are to be conscious of their nationhood, 
be highly organized and institutionalized. For Eller, a nation is ultimately a fully 
mobilized, organized or institutionalized ethnic group, if it acquires the 
characteristics and the consciousness of nationhood.125 Nationalism is an 
alternative way to nationhood. Smooha suggests seeing nationalism as political 
processes in the context of the claim of ethnic groups to self-determination.126 
Therefore, when an ethnic group achieves self-determination and sovereignty 
within a certain state, it will in all probability become a nation.127 But what 
happens to those that fail in achieving self-determination? Kellas’s insight into 
how such ethnic groups are usually seen is helpful here. He claims that ethnic 
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group is often employed to describe a quasi-national minority group within a 
nation-state that has not achieved the status of a nation.128 This is in line with 
ethnic group’s quality of segmentality, mentioned earlier.  
Nationalism, as a movement or ideology, can be related to ethnicity in 
three ways: first, as a revival or protection of a well-formed, ancient but ‘decayed’ 
ethnic group; second, as an attempt of a segment of society (usually elite) to 
stimulate and organise unorganized group; and third, as a movement in search of 
constituency that may actually ‘invent’ an ethnic group where none existed 
before.129 But in cases where ethnic groups aspire to nationhood and consequently 
achieve it, the process of nation-building can significantly change them vis-à-vis 
their aims, aspirations, identity and even culture.130  
Nation and ethnicity differ also in their cultural attributes. Ethnic group 
shares cultural elements like language, religion and customs, employed for self-
inclusion and exclusion. Nation, on the other hand, develops a common public 
culture, sometimes called as high culture. The change from various memory 
traditions of ethnic groups to a codified, standardized national history is but one 
illustration of the cultural distinction.131 It is no surprise then why the 
vernacularization of the restricted high culture, its digestion and presentation to a 
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mass audience is one of the objectives of nationalism, when part of nation 
building or mobilization.132  
Besides, it is crucial for a nation to be, or seem to be, internally 
homogenous. As for a nation, it is ideologically crucial that it is, in the words of 
Eller, “internally undifferentiated as that it be sharply differentiated from other 
nations”.133 This ideological characteristic is nevertheless very similar to ethnic 
group’s insistent overlooking of internal differences, thus begging a question how 
this aspect distinguishes the two. The distinction is in what the entity does in 
regard with the difference and homogenization. Internal differences in ethnicity 
are simply overlooked and shared commonalities are emphasized to create the 
perception of oneness. Nations, on the other hand, undertake determined plan of 
action to flatten, popularize, politicize or assimilate such differences in language, 
culture and custom. Such process of homogenization in nation-building is 
continuous in nature, and most nations are still experiencing it. 
Kellas makes the point that ethnic communities are different from nations 
because they are usually smaller than nations, more clearly based on common 
ancestry and more pervasive in human history.134  
It will not be a fallacious generalization to say that ethnicity is often 
viewed through the prism of nation formation; ethnic groups are regarded as a 
foundation or root for the nation to form and ethnic group is destined to become 
the nation in the end. Thus, to illustrate the point it is worth quoting Smith that “to 
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say that the modern world is a ‘world of nations’ is to describe both reality and an 
aspiration”.135 
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5.0 Conclusion  
 
 
 
AS was shown above, the origins of the term ethnicity reveal the continuity of at 
least two connotations of ethnicity to present day. It is frequently referred to as a 
characteristic of a group of people with shared cultural and sometimes biological 
attributes, as well as a term to distinguish between kin and other alien groups. In 
short, ethnicity is the essence and characteristics of ethnic group and ethnic 
identity. And as such, it possesses two dimensions: the objective, which 
incorporates cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic markers, such as language, 
territory and religion; and the subjective dimension that includes group loyalty, 
identity, and boundaries of that identity, which are collectively ratified and 
publicly expressed. Ethnic boundaries serve to determine lines of ethnic identity 
and membership, as well as address questions of group inclusion and exclusion. 
Because of ethnic boundaries, ethnic groups are conceived as movements, rather 
than stagnant social entities.  
Ethnicity is not only a social construction of descent and culture with the 
consequent classification systems built around them, but is also the social 
mobilization of descent and culture. Social mobilization depends on the level of 
self-consciousness in an ethnic group and awareness of difference with other 
groups. Social mobilization, in turn, leads to further group affiliation and 
community formation. The notion of otherness in ethnicity, however, is often used 
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as a potent social label, which carry normative value and can be made, un-made or 
re-made. 
As was revealed in the chapter, ethnicity can be a political resource open 
for manipulation with the purposes to strengthen power, enhance or undermine 
national security, legitimise authority, or promote national unity. Ethnic group is 
ultimately a political community or political movement acting on its culture, 
social circumstances, and political goals. An ethnic group at rest and without an 
agenda is almost a contradiction in terms, a cultural community with stagnant 
present and uncertain future. A sense of solidarity in an ethnic community is 
manifested through popular, political institutions. As the history of ethnic tensions 
reveal, it is in the context of power relations that ethnic consciousness and 
mobilization often emerges and is transformed.  
But how does then ethnicity relate to nationhood? Both concepts equally 
stand for descent and culture community, and belong to the same family of 
collective cultural identities. They share the attributes of common myths and 
shared memories, similarly manifest objective and subjective dimensions, and are 
both conditioned by the past or memories of the past and their territorial legacy. 
But they also differ. Nation’s nature is essentially political. Nation is a political 
community per se, whatever the nature of its communal ties. Ethnic group, on the 
other hand, is a collectivity of descent and culture, which does not need a political 
badge to validate itself but has a potential for politicization. Nations are often 
perceived as rational political organizations that frequently utilize ethnic symbols 
for decorative rather than substantive purposes.  
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Moreover, the quality of group organization and consciousness also 
distinguish ethnicity and nationhood. Nation, conscious of its nationhood, is 
highly organized and institutionalized. It is ultimately a fully mobilized, organised 
and institutionalized ethnic group, once it acquires the characteristics and the 
consciousness of nationhood.136 A path to full nationhood for an ethnic group lies 
through the political process of nationalism (or ethno-nationalism) and its claim to 
self-determination. Thus when an ethnic group achieves self-determination and 
sovereignty, it will become a nation; but failing that, it will remain a quasi-
national minority group within a bigger nation-state. The next chapter will 
therefore present a range of perspectives seeking to explain when and how 
ethnicity and nationhood arose and developed in the world, and what role they 
played in the development of modern societies. 
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 CHAPTER III, PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNO-
NATIONALISM 
 
 
 
 58 
1.0 Introduction  
 
 
 
IF the previous section conceptualized ethnicity by explaining what it stands for, 
how it functions and ways it is related to similar societal concepts, this chapter 
will show how ethnicity and nationhood manifest themselves in society. It will 
provide a systemic overview of the main theories of nationhood and ethnicity, 
focusing mostly on post-1950s literature, as well as locate the key questions 
around which the debate on ethnicity and nationhood revolves. In a field as vast as 
this, the chapter makes no attempt to be comprehensive: its aim is to pierce 
through main issues and present dominant lines of argument on ethno-nationalism 
in a systemic and comparative manner. The study is of interdisciplinary nature, 
which reflects the characteristic of the wider scholarly debate on ethnicity and 
nationalism.  
Once the deficiencies and merits of the major perspectives and approaches are 
diagnosed, the chapter will propose an analytical framework that can be used in 
the study of the formation of nationhood in Central Asia. This framework, 
drawing from the institutionalist approach, will be applied in the consequent 
analysis of nation-building processes of Uzbek and Kyrgyz nations. 
The chapter’s analysis of the main theoretical positions towards ethno-
nationalism will start with the discussion of the perennialist approach, in line with 
the chronological order and general tendency in the field. After describing major 
tenets and two types of perennialism, our analysis will move to the different 
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versions of primordialism, namely the organic, socio-biological and culturalist 
perspectives. Then the discussion will flow to exploring the dominant modernist 
perspective, as well as description of its three competing branches, such as 
economic, socio-cultural and political modernisms. [A special attention will be 
devoted to the Marxist-Leninist theory, since it had notoriously influenced the 
thinking of the Soviet apparatus, thus warranting our interest]. Modernism will be 
followed by the assessment of the ethno-symbolist propositions on the professedly 
stronger links between ethnic groups and nations, than usually proclaimed. The 
chapter will then discuss the institutionalist approach as the most conducive to our 
understanding of how ethno-nationalism was formed in Central Asia.  
It needs to be noted at the outset that the focus of the chapter is mainly on 
the Anglo-Saxon literature, because most of the studies on nationhood and 
ethnicity are carried out in the Anglo-Saxon world and crucial books and articles 
written elsewhere are usually re-printed in English.  A student of ethno-
nationalism who is working on the theoretical advances in the field has few 
alternatives but to focus almost exclusively on the Anglo-Saxon literature. 
And finally, a caveat needs to be made on the classification of scholars in 
terms of their adherence to certain perspectives and approaches. Even though 
marking scholars in line with those is an arbitrary exercise and some authors may 
disagree with those tags, every attempt is made to apply tags that are generally 
accepted in the scholarship.  
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2.0 Perennialism 
 
One could call perennialism as the earliest theory of ethno-nationalism. This 
school of thought was most popular among scholars during the nineteenth century 
till the end of the World War II, who believed that nations had always existed in 
any given period of human history. Its inception and consequent popularity was 
prompted by a conjecture of a number of notions. The idea of social evolution 
with emphasis on gradualism, stages of progress and cultural accumulation were 
among crucial ones.137 The ubiquitous conflation of race with nation provided 
necessary perennial character to the national group. The initial equation of race 
with nation turned out to be fallacious, especially after race discourse was 
discredited by the Nazi Germany’s horrible atrocities committed in pursuance of 
racist ideology.  
In addition to the perennial nature, a perception of nations as natural 
communities was blended in. However, later it was realised that naturalness of 
nations is not a necessary requisite for the perennialist school of thought because 
conceding the antiquity of national ties is possible without conceiving them as 
natural.138  
Contemporary scholars, usually historians, still hold perennialist view and 
perceive certain nations and ethnic groups, especially their own, as perennial 
collective actors. Levi, Llobera, and Hastings are among some of prominent 
perennialists.  
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The underlying proposition of perennialism is based on historical and 
empirical observation that propagates longevity of specific nations. Most 
perennialists do not identify a specific date of birth for nationalism. The essence 
that differentiates a nation from others remains intact despite all vicissitudes of 
history.139 Perennialists see modern nations as lineal descendents of their 
medieval counterparts, and believe that nation and nationalism engender 
modernity.140 The sleeping beauty metaphor by Minogue illustrates this 
viewpoint.141 According to it, nation, the Sleeping Beauty, awaits a magical kiss 
from nationalism, the Prince, for its awakening. So perennialism would have us 
believe that origins of nations and nationalism can be traced to periods much 
earlier than modern times, the Middle Ages for example. 
For perennialists, nation is a politicized, seamless ethno-cultural 
community that stakes a claim to political recognition on its common ancestry, 
rootedness in place and time, and a historic homeland, as well as defined by 
certain qualities and the underlying principles of ancestral ties and authentic 
culture.142   
 Smith in his writings identifies two types of perennialism: continuous and 
recurrent. Proponents of continuous perennialism advocate that certain, not all, 
nations have existed for centuries and their history is therefore traceable and 
continuous. They allow for the possibility that some nations, like the Egyptian and 
Greek, are immemorial while some other nations in Asia and Africa can be more 
recent.  
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The perennialist claim of antiquity of nations is usually challenged on the 
grounds of the qualitative distinction of ethnicity in ancient and modern 
periods.143 Ethnicity in antiquity did not have the same meaning and play the same 
role as it does today. Besides, lack of conclusive evidence makes it difficult to 
clearly state when nations emerged. As Connor notes:  
Nationalism is a mass phenomenon. The fact that members of the ruling elite or 
intelligentsia manifest national sentiment is not sufficient to establish that 
national consciousness has permeated the value systems of the masses.144  
 
Recurrent perennialism, on the other hand, maintains that nations appear and 
disappear, emerge and dissolve in different places and times, but nation-in-
general as a human association is perennial and ubiquitous.145 While 
acknowledging the importance of change, time and space, this view contends that 
nation has always existed in the world and existence or absence of certain nations 
is explained by distinctive historical context. The recurrence of the same type of 
collectivity or cultural group identity can be expressed in variety of ways, places 
and times.146 Hastings, for instance, tried to corroborate the continuity of national 
identity among elites of the English, Scots and Irish prior to the Reformation.147  
The danger with recurrent perennialist approach, as Smith notes, is that it 
can impose a retrospective nationalism on communities and groups whose 
identities and consciousness may have been local, regional, and religious, but 
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barely national.148 Such retrospective imposition opens perennialism to a criticism 
of teleological bias.149 Even though the thesis of recurrent nationalism can be 
sustained by consistent definition and open-ended empirical investigation, Smith 
debunks the proposition that nations are recurrent phenomena in history and adds 
that “the nationalist ideologies and the vast majority of nations can be shown to be 
of much more recent vintage”.150 
Perennialism is also flawed by its equal conception of ethnic groups and 
nations in terms of collective associations. And finally, perennialist approach is 
reminiscent of self-fulfilling prophesy that could utilize the contemporary 
interpretation of the history. Perennialism seeks to explain the antiquity of ethnic 
groups and some nations. This is in stark contrast to the modernist view 
advocating their novelty, hence the debate over the age of ethnicity and 
nationhood raging between perennialism and modernism. 
 
 
3.0 Primordialism 
 
If perennialism considers the origins of nations and ethnic groups as antique, 
primordialism recognises them as organic givens and natural divisions of 
humanity. According to primordialists, nations are more or less fixed and 
permanent entities of the world. Primordialist school of thought primarily focuses 
on the questions of nature and strength of ethnicity and nationalism. They argue 
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that the nature of ethnic and national ties is traceable to the emotions and 
consciousness reminiscent of primordial attachments in kinship groups. The 
power of such social groups, as the theory goes, lies in their rootedness in kinship 
and genetic bases of human existence. They are said to exist in the first order of 
time and pervade subsequent processes and developments.151  
The intellectual foundation of primordialism and naturalistic spirit of 
nationalism can be traced to Rousseau and German philosophers of Romanticism 
like Herder, Hegel and Fichte, who were reaction scholars to the rationalism of 
Enlightenment. The term ‘primordial’ was first used more recently by Shils in the 
description of relationships within family, in which the strength of the primordial 
attachments among family members is not explained by social interaction but by a 
certain ineffable significance attributed to the tie of blood.152  
There are three varieties of primordialism: popular, socio-biological and 
cultural. Popular variety of primordialism, also known as organic nationalism, 
defines nations as akin to natural organisms and, therefore, subject to natural laws. 
National identities are seen as an organic part of human beings, and the nationality 
of persons is thus predetermined and fixed by nature. So nations can be forgotten 
and silent, but continue “to exist beneath the debris of history until the moment of 
their rebirth”.153  
Political and nationalist activists are common proponents of organic 
nationalism. They gain support for their views from wider masses without 
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difficulties because they substitute explanations about nation’s origins with the 
discourse and appeal of nationalism. The common claim of popular primordialists 
propagates nations as primordial entities that were “objectively identifiable 
through their distinctive way of life, their attachment to a territorial homeland, and 
their striving for political autonomy”.154  
Lieven points out that if the natural order of the world is a division of 
humanity, made up by culturally fixed groups, then the groups will tend to exclude 
others.155 Such order will also create antagonistic relations between nations and 
ethnic groups. Popular primordialism makes no distinction between ethnic groups 
and nations, and it treats nationalism as an attribute of humanity in all ages.156 It 
replaces the evidence of nation’s existence with the nationalist rhetoric in support 
for it. Organic nationalism also neglects such changes affecting nations as 
migration and colonization, and fails to explain the reasons for loss and rebirth of 
nations.157 It also overlooks and blurs the differences between ethnicity and 
nationhood.  
Socio-biological primordialists, on the other hand, stress social and 
biological intersection in ethnicity and nationhood. Van den Berghe, its leading 
exponent, tried to apply the findings of socio-biology in animal grouping and 
cooperation into the explanations of race and ethnic ties. Similar kin selection is 
responsible for human sociality as well: ethnic and racial sentiments are therefore 
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extensions of kinship sentiments.158 Ethnic and race sentiments are therefore seen 
as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection.159  
Socio-biological primordialism suggests that ethnic groups can be traced to 
the underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals and their use of 
strategies of nepotism and inclusive fitness to maximise their gene pools. As a 
result, we are told, myths of shared descent largely correspond to real biological 
ancestry.160 Socio-biological primordialism claims that human societies are 
dictated by three elements: kin selection, reciprocity and coercion.161 It also 
explains the persistence and strength of social cohesion in ethnic groups or nations 
by shared biological (genetic) heritage of group members.  
However, most scientific research and studies prove those claims to be 
unfounded.162 It is scientifically difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that the 
genetic pool of smaller social units as family and clan can be extended to larger 
groups as ethnies and nations.163 Socio-biological primordialism also generalizes 
from individual reproductive behaviour to that of political and collective action.164  
The third primordialism is the cultural one, often associated with Edward 
Shils and Clifford Geertz. There are three main postulates of cultural 
primordialism: primordial attachments are given and prior to all social experience 
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and interaction; primordial sentiments are ineffable, overpowering and coercive; 
and primordial identities are essentially a question of emotion and affect.165 
Geertz explains that the power of the primordial ties is attributed to such 
cultural givens of human existence as blood, kinship, language, custom, religion, 
and territory.166 Shils points to the attribution to the tie of blood as a source of 
‘ineffable significance’ of primordial attachments.167   
Cultural primordialism builds on the anthropological conception of 
culture, which defines it as a total way of life with the reference to a unique 
historical group past. A sense of unique peoplehood is seen as a product of a 
distinct culture, which is a system of encoding distinct historical experience into a 
set of symbolic patterns.168 Primordial attachments persist alongside modern 
secular civil ties and thus impede and dissolve civil ties of the modern state.169     
 The givenness and power of primordial ties rest on the beliefs of group 
members and their perceptions of the ties being ineffable and obligatory.170 
Cultural primordialism focuses on “the webs of meaning spun by the individuals 
themselves”.171  
Cultural primordialism is often criticised for limiting its scope to the 
description of the problem and failing to seek ways of preventing the destructive 
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potential of primordial ties.172 Moreover, as proposed by Fredrik Barth, the more 
useful understanding of ethnicity as a social force would render from the study of 
the subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and from the analysis of 
how and why ethnic boundaries are maintained and shifted.173 To understand 
ethnicity and nationhood one should go beyond studying the cultural substance of 
primordial ties and address the origins and essence of the subjective sense of 
group loyalty and analyse psycho-cultural nature of group boundaries. In other 
words, it is the ethnic boundary that defines ethnic group, not the cultural stuff 
that it encloses.  
Overall, primordialism has made a crucial contribution to the study of 
ethnicity and nationhood through highlighting the subjective aspects of 
perceptions, self-ascription and beliefs that influence human action, as well as 
illustrating the use of primordial attachments in nationalist rhetoric and its 
powerful effect on a wider society. It has its shortcomings, however.  It is often 
critiqued for its quasi-academic perspective that provides “intellectual charter for 
much ethnic chauvinism and nationalism”.174 Other criticisms are levelled against 
its three major themes: essentialism, ineffability, and mystification. The first 
points to the recent studies that show that the content and boundaries of ethnic 
identity are fluid, not fixed, and are continuously redefined and reconstructed via 
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individual choice and according to changing conditions.175 Some primordial 
attachments are thus variable and constructed ‘after-the-fact’.176 The second 
challenges the primordialist claim that ethnic and national ties are underived and 
ineffable and argue that the mere knowledge of ethnic ties is not sufficient in 
predicting the dynamics of ethnic groups.177 The use of ethnic attachments for 
political and nationalist ends can transform their very meanings. And the final 
criticism puts forward that the mystification of primordial identities can lead to the 
erroneous de-socializing of the phenomenon, and that emotional ties should be 
viewed as born in social interaction, rather than implicit in the ethnic relationship 
itself.178  
 
 
4.0 Modernism 
 
Modernism initially emerged as a reaction to primordialism and perennialism, and 
became fully formulated as an alternative perspective in the 1960s. Modernists 
considered perennialist assumptions about naturalism and immemorialism of 
nations as fallacies that were in part responsible for nationalist conflicts erupting 
in Europe and around the world.179 They see nations as wholly modern social 
constructs. The modernist model of nation-building drew many supporters at the 
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time of destabilizing events of decolonization in Asia and Africa.180 
Modernization theorists who dominated political science from 1960s to 1980s 
emphasized that increased communication would erase ethnic cleavages and result 
in the successful achievement of nation-building.181  
Modernism puts forward a number of propositions. Firstly, it supports a 
belief in the historical specificity as well as modernity of nations. Nationalism and 
nations are modern phenomena that emerged in the last two centuries, most likely 
after the French revolution. They are consequences of such modern processes as 
capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism and urbanization.182 
According to Hobsbawm, “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the 
other way round”.183 Secondly, nations are explicated through the social and 
political processes that underlie modernity. Nations were the product of 
modernity. Thirdly, modernism admits the power and unpredictability of 
nationalism, and that the multifaceted nature of nation made it impossible to 
predict the eruption or dynamic of forces of nationalism.184  
The main tenets of modernism, imbued in its nation-building model, stress 
the political side of nations and make a number of contentions.185 Nations are 
territorial political communities, conjoined with modern states to form nation-
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states, which are main political actors in the international arena. They constitute 
the chief political bond and loyalty of their citizens, which override their 
allegiance to other ties. As nations are consciously and deliberately constructed by 
their elites and citizens through a range of processes and institutions, successful 
nations depend on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive 
institutionalization of values, roles and expectations. And finally, since only 
national loyalty and nationalist ideology can mobilize the masses to deal with the 
challenges and opportunities of modernization, nations are therefore the sole 
framework, means and beneficiary of social and political development.   
Although the modernity of nations underpins the beliefs of all modernists, 
they stress different factors in their accounts of nationalism and emphasize one set 
of factors at the expense of others. This does not mean that they totally dismiss 
other factors in their theories, but that they put a greater emphasis on one set of 
factors when explaining nations. It is therefore reasonable to avoid treating 
modernism as a monolithic group and consider modernists in three rough 
categories in terms of the following key factors: economic, socio-cultural and 
political.  
 
4.1 Economic modernism  
 
Some of the early attempts to explain nationalism were causally linked to the rise 
of capitalism, and held that the emergence and spread of nations derived from the 
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social consequences of capitalism.186 This usually involved economic analysis that 
explained nationalist resurgences through the dynamics of the particular stage of 
capitalism.  
In the late 1960s, when de-colonization was unfolding, Marxist thinkers 
realised that their fight against neo-imperialism and international capital should be 
fought along national frontlines.187 Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter are two 
prominent modernists who derive nationalism from the rational workings of the 
world economy and the economic interests of individuals. 
Nairn, in his groundbreaking work, Break-up of Britain, wanted to find the 
right explanatory framework within which nationalism can be assessed in 
materialist terms. 188 The roots of nationalism, in his view, are to be sought beyond 
internal dynamics of societies, and are therefore “determined by certain features of 
the world political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial 
Revolutions and the present day”.189 The main characteristic of the capitalist 
development process since the eighteenth century was its uneven development, 
which created a vast gap between the core (developed) and periphery (under-
developed) countries. Since mass mobilization was only possible in terms of 
national identity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination, “the new middle-class 
intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the 
invitation card had to be written in a language they understood”.190 After 
nationalism emerged in the peripheral countries as a result of uneven development 
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and became the new global force, the core countries grew equally affected by 
nationalism. Nationalisms can thus be ‘good’ and bound for progress, and ‘bad’, 
heading to regress.  
 Nairn’s theory was met with two key criticisms: firstly, nationalism 
originated in Europe before the emergence of colonial empires, and therefore 
European nationalism predates anti-colonial nationalisms;191 and secondly, 
locating the origins of nationalism in the periphery rather that in the core often 
constitutes a historical error.192 
Michael Hechter is another prominent modernist who stresses the 
importance of economic transformation in nation-formation and addresses inter-
group relations at a micro-social level. In his Internal Colonialism: The Celtic 
Fringe in British National Development, Hechter analysed the problems of ethnic 
conflict and assimilation that troubled American politics in 1960s and questioned 
the validity of dominant assimilationist perspective on resolving those problems. 
Assimilationism has roots in the diffusion model of development, which posits 
that industrialization and the consequent increased interaction of the periphery 
with the modernizing will bring commonality, and the institutions of the 
developing core will eventually diffuse into the periphery.193 Therefore, in the 
long run, as regional wealth is equalised and political bases of ethnic 
differentiations cease, the core and the periphery will become culturally 
homogenous.194  
                                                                                                                                  
190
 Nairn, T. (1981). The Break-up of Britain:Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. London, Verso, p. 340 
191
 Breuilly, J. (1993). Nationalism and the State, Manchester University Press, p. 412  
192
 Smith, A. (1983). Theories of Nationalism. London, Duckworth, p. xvii  
193
 Hechter, M. (1975). Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 
1536-1966. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.7 
194
 Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism, Palgrave, p.98 
 74 
Hechter sees the diffusion thesis as ‘over-optimistic’ model of social 
change, and puts forward an alternative, internal colonial model. It claims that 
industrialization in most cases will not lead to national development and, as a 
result, the nature of the core’s relation to the periphery will be that of a political 
domination and economical exploitation.195 Hechter argues that the initial wave of 
modernization over the national state creates ‘advanced’ and ‘less advanced’ 
groups with the former trying to “stabilize and monopolize its advantages through 
policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system”.196 
The stratification system, dubbed as the ‘cultural division of labour’, pushes 
citizens to identify themselves with their groups and leads to the development of 
distinctive ethnic identification. Hechter maintained that modernization in the 
society and increased contact between ethnic groups within a state will not 
necessarily bring about ethnic unity, but may well instead lead to ethnic 
conflict.197  
Hechter’s critics, however, claimed that his model is reductionist because 
it describes ethnic sentiments and cultural cleavages through purely economic and 
spatial characteristics.198 It reduces ethnic conflict and nationalism to discontent 
caused by regional inequalities and economic exploitation. Moreover, it fails to 
explain why national revival has occurred in places where the impact of capitalism 
or industrialization has been minimal, or why no ethnic revival or nationalist 
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movement has been absent in economically backward areas of capitalist 
societies.199 
 
4.2 Socio-cultural modernism 
 
The works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson illustrate how 
modernism explains national phenomena through socio-cultural transformations. 
Gellner explores nationalism through three stages of human social history (hunter-
gatherer, the agro-literate and the industrial) and traces it to the modern world, 
when it became a sociological necessity. He explains the emergence of nations in 
industrial societies by analysing the relationship between power and culture. If in 
agro-literate societies culture merely emphasises structure and strengthens existing 
loyalties, in industrial societies “a high culture pervades the whole society, defines 
it, and needs to be sustained by the polity”.200 The transition from an agro-literate 
to an industrial society is marked by the replacement of ‘low’ by ‘high’ cultures. 
For Gellner, a nation is a high culture society, which is a cultivated, standardized, 
education-based, literate culture.201 That is why he calls them ‘garden’ cultures. 
The main role of nationalism in the industrializing society is to impose the 
successful new high culture of the state on the population, employing the old low 
cultures.202 According to Gellner: 
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though 
long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes 
                                                
199
 Smith, A. (1983). Theories of Nationalism, London, Duckworth, p.xvi 
200
 Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford, Blackwell, p.18 
201
 Smith, A. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations 
and Nationalism, Routledge, p. 32 
202
 Smith, A. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations 
and Nationalism, Routledge, p. 33 
 76 
pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and 
often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in 
general an inescapable one.203 
 
 
Nationalism was successful because it was appropriate and well-equipped for the 
needs of the time, rather than as an ideology that could be accepted or rejected 
intellectually in competition with other ideologies.204 
  Gellner concludes that it is nationalism that “engenders nations, and not 
the other way around”.205 For him, nationalism is primarily a political principle 
that holds that “the political and national unit should be congruent”206 and a 
movement that conceives “the natural object of human loyalty to be a fairly large 
anonymous unit defined by shared language and culture”.207 In short, nationalism 
is a product of industrial social organization, and nations are functional for 
industrial society. And nationalism is strong because “it determines the norm for 
the legitimacy of political units in the modern world”.208 
Nonetheless, Gellner’s critics point to three major weaknesses in his 
theory. Firstly, Gellner’s model is said to be too functionalist: it explains 
nationalism on the basis of historical consequences that follow it.209 Secondly, 
Gellner’s assumptions on the relationship between industrialization and 
nationalism are challenged on the basis that many nationalist movements ante-
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dated industrialization,210 and, conversely, nationalism was not a concomitant of 
the process of industrialization in many other cases.211 And finally, Gellner’s 
theory cannot explain the emotional power of nationalism, or in Perry Anderson’s 
words: “where Weber was so bewitched by its spell that he was never able to 
theorize nationalism, Gellner had theorized nationalism without detecting the 
spell”.212 
Benedict Anderson is another influential figure in socio-cultural 
modernism. His ground-breaking Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism was a result of the search to explain why every 
revolution since World War II was defined in national terms and to understand 
transformations of consciousness that made present nations thinkable.213  
Anderson approaches nationality and nationalism as particular cultural 
artefacts. He suggests going beyond treating nationalism as an ideological 
construct and, instead, seeing it as akin to kinship, ethnicity or religion. For 
Anderson, the real challenge is not identifying the objective factors, political or 
cultural, that facilitate the development of nations, but illustrating why and how 
nationalism can generate such deep, subjective, attachments.214 He defines the 
nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign”, and further qualifies that it is an imagined community 
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because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion”.215 The nation is imagined as limited because of 
its boundaries and as sovereign because of its freedom.  
There is a need to clarify what Anderson mean by ‘imagining’ of the 
nation lest to give a misrepresented description of his perspective. ‘Imagining’ 
does not mean ‘falsity’. He criticizes Gellner’s reference to ‘invention’ as 
fabrication or falsity, rather than to creation, which is to say that nationalism is a 
ploy for deception.216 All types of communities are imagined, and communities 
should not therefore be judged by their falsity/genuineness, but by the way in 
which they are imagined.217 In other words, the nation is in the eye of the 
beholder, and the task of the social scientists should be to identify how the nation 
is visualized by its members. 
Anderson also acknowledges the nation’s feature as a ‘deep, horizontal 
comradeship’, which is the reason why many people have been willing to sacrifice 
their lives for their nation.218 An imagined political community can, and must be, 
re-presented, if it is not to remain in the private realm of the individual’s 
psyche.219 Imagination means ‘creation’, and the ‘inventions of the imagination’ 
include national communities and their ways of representation in art and media.  
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Anderson locates the cultural origins of the modern nation historically at 
the junction of three developments: a change in the conception of time, the decline 
of religious communities and of dynastic realms.220 The process was facilitated by 
print capitalism that enabled rapidly growing numbers of people in Europe to 
think of themselves in profoundly new ways.221 As a result, print-languages laid 
the bases for national consciousness in three ways: first, by creating unified fields 
of exchange and communication; second, by providing a new fixity to language 
that helped to build the image of antiquity, key to the idea of the nation; and third, 
by creating languages-of-power of a kind different from the earlier administrative 
vernaculars.222  
Two major objections are usually raised in regard to Anderson’s account. 
The first holds that it is culturally reductionist, exaggerates the importance of 
cultural nationalism and underestimates the political dimension of nationalism in 
nineteenth century Europe.223 The second objection notes that Anderson’s thesis 
concerning the relationship between nationalism and religion does not work for all 
cases, and that religion is not always replaced by nationalism.224  
 
4.3 Political modernism 
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A third variant of modernism, political modernism, emphasizes the 
primacy of political factors in explaining nationalism. In the West, ince the French 
Revolution nation-state has been the predominant and the only legitimate form of 
political organization and the main method of collective identity, which initially 
spread to the areas colonized by the European powers and later to the rest of the 
world due to the superior power of the West. This history has led many theorists225 
to view the modern, bureaucratic state as the source and framework of modern 
nations and nationalism, and regard political and military forces and institutions as 
the keys to explaining their emergence.226 Among such prominent political 
modernist are Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly, who focus on the relationship 
of nationalism to such sources of power as war, elites, and the modern state.  
John Breuilly in his Nationalism and the State proposes a new perspective 
on nationalism as a form of politics. As for him, “the only starting point for a 
general understanding of nationalism is to take its form of politics seriously”, 
through comparative historical survey.227 Breuilly adopts a two-pronged approach 
is: he develops a typology of nationalism because each type of nationalism would 
require different method of analysis, and then he investigates each type of 
nationalism by the method of comparative history.228 Thus, he is able to compare 
and contrast various types of nationalism systematically.  
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 Breuilly defines nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising 
state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments”.229 These 
nationalist arguments are built on three assertions: 1) there is a nation with an 
explicit and peculiar character; 2) the interests and values of the nation have 
priority over all other interests and values; and 3) the nation must be independent, 
or at least politically sovereign. Breuilly’s thesis is based on a simple, yet 
powerful logic – nationalism is above all about politics, and politics is about 
power. By continuation of that logic, Breuilly contends that “power, in the modern 
world, is principally about control of the state”, and therefore, the challenge is “to 
relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power”.230 A 
central task is to understand why nationalism has become central in achieving and 
using state power. And another related task is to examine the relation of 
nationalism to the process of modernization by focusing on the development of 
the modern state.  
Breuilly perceives the development of nationalism closely bound up with 
the nature of political modernization in nineteenth-century Europe, and its 
settlement areas and imperial spread overseas. He therefore proposes that 
nationalism should be seen in this specific, political context, not as “an intellectual 
invention to be unmasked, nor as an irrational force erupting in history, much less 
as the solution propounded by nationalists themselves to a deep human need for 
identity”.231  
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In his analysis, Breiully focuses on two aspects of nationalist movements. 
The first deals with the relationship between nationalist movement and the state to 
which it either opposes or controls. The second concerns the goals of nationalist 
movements, such as separation, reform, or unification.232 He also identifies three 
different functions of nationalist ideas: coordination, mobilization and legitimacy. 
Coordination means that “nationalist ideas are used to promote the idea of 
common interests amongst a number of elites which otherwise have rather distinct 
interests in opposing the existing state”.233 Mobilization is described as “the use of 
nationalist ideas to generate support for the political movement from broad groups 
hitherto excluded from the political process”.234 Legitimacy is defined as “the use 
of nationalist ideas to justify the goals of the political movement both to the state 
it opposes and also to powerful external agents, such as foreign states and their 
public opinions”. 235  In part because it performs those functions, nationalism has 
spread across the world and remained a powerful force for the last two centuries.  
 Breuilly’s assessment of the role of political transformation on nationalism 
has inevitably drawn some opposition. For example, Smith warns against 
exaggerating the role of the modern state in the formation of nationalism and 
criticizes the confusion of state-building with the formation of national identity 
among culturally homogenous populations, as the establishment of state 
institutions do not guarantee that the population will identify with these 
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institutions and the national messages they propagate.236 While Conversi points to 
tautology in Breuilly’s claim that failures in state-building cause distinctive 
nationalist politics, which risks reifying the state into the ultimate arbiter of all 
social processes, and argues that that ethnic nationalism has often been  reinforced 
by state intervention.237  
Anthony Giddens in his book, the Nation-State and Violence, concentrates 
on the rise of territorially bounded nation-state and its links with military power. 
Underlying his work is the perception of the nation-state formation as a product of 
the dislocated modern history, conditioned by industrial capitalism that led to 
massive changes in the society. Giddens’s primary concern is not nationalism, 
however, but its function in reinforcing the territorial cohesion and reflexive 
qualities of the nation-state. In this connection, Giddens states that: 
The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of 
institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a 
territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law 
and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.238  
 
 
For Giddens, nationalist movements are “distinctive properties of modern states”, 
and a nation is defined as “a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated 
territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both 
by the internal state apparatus and those of other states”.239 Calhoun points out 
that the key is not just the identification of state with nation, but the structural 
changes involved in the rise of the modern state, which made it possible to 
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conceive of the nation as unitary.240 Previous political forms neither demarcated 
clear boundaries nor fostered internal integration and homogenization. That is why 
a nation “only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the 
territory over which its sovereignty is claimed”.241 Such usage of the term ‘nation’ 
implies that the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is coincidental. In 
other words, it is the modern state that defines nationhood, and pre-existing ethnic 
relations are revised to coincide with its boundaries or to constitute the basis of 
counter-state movements for the formation of new states.242 Giddens associates 
cultural explanations of nationalism with accounts concentrating on pre-existing 
ethnic solidarities and differences. 
 The origins of early nationalist sentiments lay in the state’s mobilization of 
different classes and strata to fight against a common enemy. Nationalism was the 
ideology that could mobilize mass population, enabling the state to invoke a 
common identity for its subjects in opposition to the other, which was seen as 
intrinsically hostile and dangerous.243  
While nationalism is perceived by Giddens as primarily a political 
movement, he still acknowledges its psychological character. In this regard he 
points to the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising 
commonality among the members of a political order.244 He then qualifies his 
position by noting that any postulated need for identity is too vague and cannot 
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explain the connection with states.245 The emergence of the nation-state in most 
cases stimulates oppositional nationalisms, the origin of which, Giddens suggests, 
must be sought less in regional economic disparities than in “the disruption of 
traditional modes of behaviour that encourage historicity and the claim to 
administrative sovereignty”.246 For that reason, Giddens proposes that all 
nationalist movements are necessarily political, because nationalism is “inherently 
linked to the achievement of administrative autonomy of the modern form”.247  
There are two general criticisms of Giddens’ model of political 
transformation.248 The first concerns the problem of definitional reduction because 
the nation is subsumed within the state and has no independent conceptual role 
outside the link with the state. This can prevent independent analysis of the nation 
and nationalism. The second is his characterization of nationalism as a 
psychological phenomenon. This reduces nationalism’s importance and creates a 
gulf between the structure of the nation-state and the subjectivity of nationalism, 
which can only be bridged by subordinating the latter to the former.  
 
 
5.0 Ethno-symbolism 
 
Ethno-symbolism, driven by tireless efforts of such scholars as Anthony Smith, 
John Armstrong and John Hutchinson, has tried to prove that nationalism has 
stronger roots in pre-modern ethnicity than modernists would like to accept. 
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Ethno-symbolism attacks the modernist argument on its circular nature because 
modernism “presumes the modernity of a phenomenon which it then declares to 
be the product of modernisation, and hence to fit the modernist thesis of its 
modernity, both temporally and sociologically”.249 The modernists, on the other 
hand, downplay the term altogether and approach ethno-symbolism as a less 
radical version of primordialism.250 Smith brought the end to confusion by clearly 
acknowledging and defining the term a decade ago.251 Accordingly, the term 
‘ethno-symbolist’ is used to denote scholars whose objective is to uncover the 
symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today’s nations.252 
Ethno-symbolists share a common reverence for the past of the nation. 
They believe the formation of nations should be examined in la longue duree, in 
other words, a “time dimension of many centuries”, because an understanding of 
ethnic precursors is essential for our proper assessment of the emergence of 
present nations.253 In other words, and as Hutchinson suggests, the formation of 
nations needs to be contextualised within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity that 
shaped them.254 Thus, ethno-symbolists claim that they reject the stark continuism 
of perennialists and give due credit to the transformations wrought by modernity, 
while rejecting modernists’ assertion arguing for the existence of greater 
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continuity between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ eras.255 Ethno-symbolists are also 
critical of the modernist failure to grasp the recurring nature of ethno-symbolic 
ties and to ground their understanding of modern nations in the longue duree and 
in earlier ethnic myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.256  
So that one can unfold the underlying thesis of ethno-symbolism, an 
assessment of ethno-symbolist theory of Anthony Smith, most prominent ethno-
symbolist, is deemed helpful. Smith acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as 
primordial or natural but, nonetheless, claims that they are rooted in relatively 
ancient histories and in perduring ethnic consciousness. He agrees that 
nationalism, as ideology and movement, dates only from the later eighteenth 
century, but notes that the ethnic origins of nations are much older. 257  
For Smith, the foundation of the concept of nation and of particular nations 
is based on the thesis that: 
Myths, symbols, memories and values are ‘carried’ in and by forms and genres of 
artefacts and activities which change only very slowly, so ethnie, once formed 
tend to be exceptionally durable under ‘normal’ vicissitudes, and to persist over 
many generations, even centuries, forming ‘moulds’ within which all kinds of 
social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of 
circumstances and pressures can exert and impact.258 
 
 
The origins of modern nationalism therefore lie in the successful bureaucratization 
of aristocratic ethnie, ethnic communities with their myths and symbols, which 
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were able to transform themselves into genuine nations only in the West.259 Thus, 
what makes ethnic and then national identity is the power of collective memory.260 
In the modern arena, ethnic communities are compelled to become 
political and “in order to survive, ethnie must take on some of the attributes of 
nationhood, and adopt a civic model”.261 On the other hand, nations, rooted in 
ethnicity, are long-term processes, continually re-enacted and re-constructed, and 
they require ethnic homelands, heroes, and golden ages if they are to survive. 262 
According to Smith, modern nations and nationalism have only extended 
and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. 
Nationalism has universalized such structures and ideals, but modern ‘civic’ 
nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments.263 
There are five main charges against ethno-symbolist perspective. The first 
holds that ethno-symbolist scholars are conceptually confused and their arguments 
indicate a state of ‘terminological chaos’.264 The second asserts that ethno-
symbolists underestimate the differences between modern nations and ancient 
ethnic communities.265 Breuilly points to the difference between modern 
nationhood and ancient ethnic communities by stressing the lack of institutional 
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basis in pre-modern identities.266 The third claims that it is impossible to speak of 
nations and nationhood in pre-modern times.267 The fourth criticizes ethno-
symbolism for its downplaying the fluidity and malleability of ethnic identities. 
Thus, Kedourie states that ethnic identity is not an inert or stable object, but has 
proved itself as highly fluid and susceptible to changes.268 And the final charge 
holds that ethno-symbolist analysis of the process of ethnic formation is 
misleading: Western nation-states’ success and endurance in forming national 
identities were based on the process of centralization and institutionalization, 
while ethnicity and cultural homogeneity were the products of these processes and 
not their determinants.269 
 
 
6.0 Institutionalism 
 
As was described in previous sections, modernization theorists hold that economic 
and political development promotes integration of ethnic groups based on national 
identities, which override and displace primordial attachments. All modernists 
agree that the ‘inventing’ or ‘imagining’ of nations became possible due to the 
transformation of economic, political or social conditions. Primordialists, on the 
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other hand, emphasize the deep roots, ancient origins, and emotive power of 
national attachments. Primordialists and some modernists treat nations as real, 
substantial collectivities.270 Such conventional ‘substantialist’ accounts of 
nationalism reify the nation and consider it as an enduring collectivity. Brubaker 
challenges the associated dominant ‘groupism’ - “a tendency to take bounded 
groups as fundamental units of analysis (and basic constituents of the social 
world)”.271 He laments that, despite decades of prevailing constructivist thought, 
the overwhelming majority of studies published in the field of ethnicity and 
nationalism continues to suffer from the groupist syndrome.272 
 That groupist tendency should be placed, however, in the context of the 
actual world of identifications and distinctions, where “a belief in sharp and 
relatively fixed distinctions between groups and predictable harmonies and 
homogeneities within groups gives a person an easy and reliable map of a 
complex and changing world”.273 This ‘mental map’ has a number of 
ramifications in an insecure world: it provides a degree of predictability and 
allows different forms of treatment of group members and outsiders. As Yael 
Tamir puts it: 
Nationhood promotes fraternity both among fellow members and across 
generations. It endows human action with meaning that endures over time, thus 
carrying a promise of immortality.274  
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Suny, in his exploration of the tension between investigations by scholars of the 
historical formation of national identities and the actual practice of identity-
constructing nationalists, points to the disjuncture between the modernist 
assumptions of nationalism and the belief of nationalists in real and essential 
nationhood, which is not easily resolved by an exposure of the processes by which 
national histories and group distinctions are constructed.275 The power of the 
national identity lies within the discourse of the nation that justifies both territorial 
possession and statehood to those with prior and exclusive claims, based on 
language, culture, and ethnicity. In that context, he notes that: 
In a world of competitors for territory and political power, primordialism was a 
practical, even necessary, solution to the difficulty of establishing such prior or 
exclusive claims. Since prenational ethnic and religious communities do not map 
neatly with modern nations, and since nations themselves are inherently unstable 
categories, primordialism and essentialism do the hard work of reifying the 
nation. Identities might be fluid, but in the real world of politics the players act 
as if they are immutable, both for strategic reasons and emotional satisfaction.276 
 
 
In an increasingly globalized world, nationalists fear the loss or erosion of identity 
and try actively to intervene and save it. Nation and national identity are reified, 
made and re-made into something real. However, the quest for meaning, mental 
maps, or effective boundaries and collective commitments for social polities can 
only partially explain the power of nationhood and the primordialist discourse. 
Suny emphasizes the complex nature of identity and asserts that: “People may act 
rationally to realize their preferences, but those preferences are intimately tied to 
the identities that people have constructed or that have been constituted for 
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them”.277 In line with the views of Gellner and Anderson, he cautions against 
reducing the construction of primordial identity to “a mistake, a self-deception, or 
false consciousness”, because national identity, more often than not, is conceived 
as “an act of subscription to a continuous community with a past and a future, a 
shared destiny”.278 
Nonetheless, if a nation sees itself as real, ancient, and continuous, then its 
claim to national sovereignty would be unique, uncontested, and not to be shared. 
We are often reminded that national identity construction has most powerfully 
been about a single, unitary identity, not a multiplicity of self-understandings, 
embedded in a long history and attached to a specific territory.279 The attempts to 
achieve an exclusivist and homogeneous nationhood in the context of ethnically 
pluralist and fluid world could, and have, lead to despicable acts of mass 
deportation, ethnic cleansing or even genocide. Perhaps, that is the reasoning 
behind Brubaker’s assertion that there are very few scholars who continue to 
subscribe to the primordialist view that that nations are primordial and immune to 
change.280 Indeed most scholars would now agree that the general assumptions of 
modernism are fundamentally correct. In the words of Ozkirimli, we are told that: 
“Almost everybody admits that nations are born at a particular period of history, 
notwithstanding disagreements on the precise date for their emergence or the 
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relative weight of pre-modern traditions and modern transformations in their 
formation”.281  
Constructivists/modernists, on the other hand, propose a more open 
alternative view of national construction. Suny describes that position in the 
following way: “If the lines between peoples are blurred and shifting, if many 
possible claimants to a particular piece of the world’s real estate are allowed, then 
we can conceive of political communities in the future that permit cohabitation 
with shared sovereignties in a ‘national’ space”.282 Along the same lines, Hall puts 
forward that “instead of thinking of identity as an accomplished fact, which the 
new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a 
‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted 
within, not outside, representation”.283 Nationhood is therefore neither given nor 
fixed, but is determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the group itself and 
varies according to changing circumstances. And the fact that nations are 
‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ does not make them ‘less real’ in the eyes of those who 
believe in them.284  
 In analyzing nationhood, it is evident that we deal with heterogeneous 
objects of analysis, not with a single, unitary phenomenon. Hence Ozkirimli’s 
observation that the ‘macro’ explanations of a general theory of nationalism are 
not possible.285 In other words, there can be no ‘general’ or ‘overarching’ theory 
of nationhood. Most theories and perspectives seem to point to different facets of 
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nationhood and vary in significance depending on the context. It is indeed the case 
that “grasping nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple 
theories”.286  
Given that nationhood is one of the most important forces in international 
relations and we need to deal with it, Ozkirimli proposes two strategies to better 
understand it in the current world.287 The first is to address the issues neglected or 
ignored by the mainstream literature, while acknowledging the merits and gains of 
the past insights, which would help to formulate a series of ‘partial theories’, each 
illuminating a particular aspect of national phenomenon. The second strategy is to 
produce ‘theoretically informed’ comparative histories, which will also test the 
theories concerned against historical evidence. Guided by that sagacious 
proposition, it is reasonable to proceed with considering the institutionalist 
perspective on nationhood, which is rarely reflected in the mainstream literature 
on nationalism. Testing institutionalist framework against the historical evidence 
of Central Asia will not only shed new light on nation-formation and nation-
building in the region, but could also contribute to the development of 
theoretically informed approaches to understand better the relation between the 
nation-building processes and ethnic conflicts in the region.  
 So how is nationhood conceived according to institutionalism? One should 
start answering that question with addressing crucial assumptions of 
institutionalism.288 Institutionalists emphasize the primacy of political institutions 
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in national transformation. Lowndes provides a useful baseline definition of 
institutions based on the following three elements.289 The first holds that 
institution is a middle-level concept, devised by individuals but in turn 
constraining their action. Institutions are part of the broad social fabric, as well as 
the medium through which day-to-day decisions and actions are taken. Apart from 
shaping human action imposing constraints, institutions also provide 
opportunities. The second element posits that institutions involve formal rules, but 
also informal norms and customs. Unlike formal institutions, informal institutions 
are not consciously designed nor neatly specified, but are part of habitual action. 
In other words, institutions may be expressed in organizational form, but also 
relate to processes. And the final aspect suggests that institutions possess 
legitimacy beyond the preferences of individual actors and show stability over 
time. Institutions may gain their legitimacy either because of their relative stability 
over time, or because of their link with a sense of belonging. 
Political institutions are not equated to political organizations. Institution 
is conceived more broadly to refer to a “stable, recurring pattern of behaviour”.290 
In fact, March and Olsen assert that political institutions are political actors in 
their own right.291 But political institutions are not independent entities, existing 
out of space and time. They are ‘embedded’ in particular contexts.292  
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Institutions are understood as models or scripts for behaviour. In other 
words, they represent ‘the rules of the game’ and provide moral or cognitive 
templates for interpretation and action. Institutions are not things, but processes.293 
Institutions are therefore expected to continually evolve. Lowndes explains that 
rules are seen as producing variation and deviation as well as conformity and 
standardization, because “there are always areas of ambiguity in the interpretation 
and application of rules, and because rules are adapted by actors seeking to make 
sense of changing environments”.294 
As institutionalism is concerned with the informal conventions of political 
life and formal constitutions and organizational structures, institutionalists 
consider not only the impact of institutions on individuals, but also the interaction 
between institutions and individuals.295 In the words of Hall and Taylor, the 
individual is seen as “an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, 
composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for 
interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is 
constructed”.296 While the structure of governance – “the inclusion or exclusion of 
different actors and the selection of instruments” - is embedded in, and sustains, 
political values.297  
In stressing that political institutions influence actors’ behaviour by 
shaping their values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs, March and Olsen note 
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that seemingly neutral rules and structures actually embody values and power 
relations, and determine appropriate behaviour within given settings.298 
Institutions simplify political life by ensuring that certain things are taken for 
granted in deciding other things. Thus, it is evident that institutions not only 
provide strategically-useful information, but they also affect the very identities, 
self-images and preferences of the actors.299 
Institutionalists emphasize the way in which institutions influence 
behaviour by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models, which are 
indispensable for action.300 The relationship between the individual and the 
institution is built on a kind of ‘practical reasoning’, whereby the individual works 
with and reworks the available institutional templates to devise a course of 
action.301 It is also observed that in many cases institutions provide the very terms 
through which meanings are assigned in social life.302  
In a world where individuals or organizations seek to define and express 
their identity in socially appropriate ways, organizations embrace specific 
institutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued within a 
broader cultural environment.303 According to Clemens and Cooks, 
institutionalism has become predominantly associated with the constitutive role of 
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culturally legitimate models of organization and action.304 Institutionalists 
therefore seek to identify the diverse ways in which institutions embody and shape 
societal values, which may in turn be contested and in flux.305  
That is why institutionalist arguments against the realist and substantialist 
approach to nations do not imply to dispute the reality of nationhood, but rather to 
re-conceptualize that reality, and to decouple the study of nationhood and 
nationness from the study of nations as substantial entities or collectivities.306 It is 
necessary to approach nationhood as a conceptual variable, and treat nation “not 
as substance but as institutionalised form; not as collectivity but as practical 
category; not as entity but as contingent event”.307 This way the possibility to 
understand the reality of nationhood and the real power of nationalism, “without 
invoking in our theories the very ‘political fiction’ of ‘the nation’, whose potency 
in practice we wish to explain”.308 And instead of the groupist discourse, scholars 
are urged to operate with more dynamic concepts of group formation.309 The 
reason being is that since group membership is not a fixed state but a variable, it 
should not be assumed that collective action stems from ascribed collective 
designation.  
A question “what is a nation”, which often bogs down scholarly 
discussions on nationhood, loses its potency. Throughout his works, which have 
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been crucial in exploring institutionalized definitions of nationhood and their 
political consequences, Brubaker stresses the urgency of asking other questions, 
such as: How is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within 
and among states? How does nation work as practical category, as classificatory 
scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against 
states more or less resonant or effective? What makes the nation-evoking, nation-
invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?  
Putting the questions this way, he suggests, displaces our everyday 
understanding of nations as collectivities and entities, and suggests that one should 
start instead by considering nation as a category or a term, and nationalism as a 
particular language, a political idiom, a way of using that category.310 For 
Brubaker, nationhood is not an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, but 
rather a political claim, a claim on people’s loyalty and their solidarity. 
Nationhood is not used to describe a world independent of the language used to 
describe it, but rather, to change the world, to change the way people see 
themselves, to mobilize loyalties, and articulate demands.311  
Nation is first and foremost a category of practice, not a category of 
analysis. And as a category of practice, nationhood can be instanced in diverse 
circumstances.312 In some contexts, when national community does not coincide 
with the territory or citizenry of the state, claims to nationhood can challenge the 
existing territorial and political order, by expressing the demand for a change in 
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the political map. In other contexts, the category nation is used to create a sense of 
national unity for a given polity. It is this nation-building work that was 
undertaken by leaders of post-colonial states, who had achieved independence, but 
whose populations were deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious lines. Even in circumstances like this, nationhood category can also be 
used in a different way. Rather than appealing to a unified national identity, it can 
assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a core ethno-cultural nation, distinct 
from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and re-define the state as the state of and 
for that core nation.313  
However, the category ‘nation’ can also function in an inclusive way by 
mobilizing mutual solidarity among members of the whole nation, defined to 
include all citizens of the state. Brubaker notes that to invoke nationhood, in this 
sense, is “to attempt to transcend or at least relativise internal differences and 
distinctions”, as well as “to get people to think of themselves - to formulate their 
identities and their interests - as members of that nation”.314 
While acknowledging the value of debunking groupist discourse, Malesevic 
notes a pronounced weakness persisting in Brubaker’s position in that regard, 
namely that it is not completely clear how one can avoid it altogether when 
dealing with particular empirical material or when attempting to disseminate 
knowledge to a wider, non-academic audience.315 Even Brubaker himself is not 
impervious to slipping into groupist language when in the empirical work in his 
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Ethnicity without Borders, for example, references are made to certain ethnic 
groups or people. One could also query if groupist terms such as ‘society’ or ‘race’ 
should be put under the same treatment as are those of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’. 
Malesevic, quite rightly, cautions that with such overemphasis on the conceptual 
exterior a problem may occur that one could easily mistake form for substance, 
and prompts that it is possible to remain a firm essentialist even within the full 
acceptance of constructivist language.316 
Brubaker’s approach to nations differs from Anthony Smith’s perception 
of the world as ‘a world of nations’.317 Brubaker’s world is “a world in which 
nationhood is pervasively institutionalized in the practice of states and the 
workings of the state system”.318 It is a world in which nation is widely, if 
unevenly, available and resonant as a category of “social vision and division”, to 
borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s phrase.319 Nonetheless, Smith agrees that the modern 
state, like the wider inter-state system, provides a powerful context and constraint 
on the formation of nations and nationalisms, but he cautions that to say that the 
state also constitutes both interests and actors seriously limits the field of 
theoretical analysis and precludes alternative possibilities.320  
In speaking of nationness as event, Brubaker signals a double contrast: the 
first is between nation as entity and nationness as a variable property of groups, of 
relationships, and of relational settings; and the second contrast is between 
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thinking of nationhood as something that develops, and as something that 
happens.321 Under the second contrast, developmentalist perspective is 
exemplified through the vast literature on nationalism that traces the long-term 
political, economic, and cultural changes, which led to the gradual emergence of 
nationness. In that sense, the works by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and 
Anthony Smith, which were discussed earlier, can be defined as developmentalist. 
Brubaker claims that there is a lack of theoretically sophisticated eventful analyses 
of nationalism. Studies conducted by sociologists and political scientists have 
tended to abstract from events in their search for generalized structural or cultural 
explanations, while historians, taking for granted the significance of contingent 
events, have not been inclined to theorize them.322  
Brubaker’s confinement of the nation’s referents to form, practice and event 
is opposed by Smith, who notes that this leads to stripping nation of those 
attributes that give it so much of its potency and appeal.323 There is no reason 
however why a strong theoretical case cannot be made for an eventful approach to 
nationness. For example, Craig Calhoun also argued that identity should be 
understood as a “changeable product of collective action”, not as its stable 
underlying cause.324 Brubaker points out that the same thing could be said about 
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nationness, and a theoretically sophisticated eventful perspective on nationness 
and nationalism is today urgently needed.325 
That urgency was brought to our attention after the end of Cold War, when 
most tragic events related to nationalism and demonization of the national other 
unfolded to the surprise of many experts. Brubaker laments that we know well 
that this happened, but we know too little about how it happened. This is where he 
suggests that we need an eventful perspective and must give serious theoretical 
attention to contingent events and to their trans-formative consequences.326 
Through this method, it may be possible to understand the ‘processual dynamics’ 
of nationalism. Indeed, historical contingencies play a crucial part in the formation 
of nationalism, which is a protean phenomenon, capable of taking on multiple 
forms depending on the historical, political and social context over which it 
reigns.327 
In a context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the national conflicts 
in the successor states, the temptation to adopt a nation-centred perspective was 
understandable. Yet Brubaker urges that the temptation should be resisted, 
because nationalism is not engendered by nations, but produced or induced by 
‘political fields’ of particular kinds.328 As institutions are ‘embedded’ in particular 
contexts, the Soviet and post-Soviet nationalisms serve as useful examples to 
illustrate institutionalist approach.  
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In the survey of resurgent national movements in the post-Soviet Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia, Brubaker identifies four distinct kinds of nationalism that 
have flourished in the post-communist countries as a result of the re-organization 
of political space along national lines.329 The first is the ‘nationalizing’ 
nationalism of newly independent states. Nationalizing nationalisms involve 
claims made in the name of a core nation or titular nationality, which is defined in 
ethno-cultural terms and distinct from the citizenry as a whole.330 The core nation 
is perceived as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is understood as the state 
of and for the core nation. In spite of this, the core nation is conceived as being in 
a weak cultural, economic or demographic position within the state, which 
justifies the remedial programme of using state power to promote the interests of 
the core nation.  
The second type is trans-border nationalism of external national 
homelands, which directly challenges nationalizing nationalism. Trans-border 
homeland nationalisms are oriented to ethno-national kin who are residents and 
citizens of other states. It asserts a state’s right and its obligation to monitor the 
condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect 
the interests of their ethno-national kin in other states, especially when they are 
seen as threatened by the nationalizing polices and practices of the state in which 
they live.331 Nazi Germany and present-day Russia could be considered as 
examples of trans-border nationalism. 
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Caught between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms are the national 
minorities, who have their own, the third type of nationalism. They too make 
claims on the grounds of their nationality, which makes them a national minority 
in turn. National minority involves a self-understanding in specifically national 
rather than merely ethnic terms, a “demand for state recognition of their distinct 
ethno-cultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based 
cultural or political rights”.332 Nationalism of minority, like trans-border 
nationalism or nationalizing state, designates a political stance, rather than an 
ethno-demographic fact.  
The fourth form of flourishing nationalism is a defensive, national-populist 
nationalism that aims to protect the national economy, language, culture against 
alleged threats from outside. Such threats are seen to stem from diverse sources 
but can include among others foreign capital, trans-national organizations, 
immigrants, and foreign cultural influences. This kind of nationalism often brands 
its political opponents as anti-national, and is critical of the various ills of the 
West and/or of modernity. That is because the social and economic dislocations 
resulting from liberal market reforms - unemployment, inflation, decline of social 
welfare, etc. - create fertile soil for using such national populist idioms as a 
legitimation strategy by governments or as a mobilization strategy by 
oppositions.333 
Gellner and some other scholars believed that the Soviet Union had 
effectively contained and ‘frozen’ nationalism, so that the nationalisms that 
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emerged in 1991 were essentially the late nineteenth-century forms of nationalism, 
in which the ‘one nation one state’ principle predominated.334 The efforts of the 
Soviet Union in containing nationalism were applauded by Hobsbawm in the 
following way:  
Hence, as we can now see in melancholy retrospect, it was the great achievement 
of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous 
effects of nationalism within them . . . The USSR’s potential for disruption, so 
long kept in check (except during World War II), is now patent. In fact, the 
‘discrimination’ or even ‘oppression’ against which champions of various Soviet 
nationalities abroad used to protest, was far less than the consequences of the 
withdrawal of Soviet power.335 
 
 
In his assessment of post-Soviet national movements, Brubaker challenges the 
primordialist view and asserts that:  
To see these as the struggles of nations, of real, solidary groups who somehow 
survived despite Soviet attempts to crush them, is to get things exactly 
backwards. This perspective suggests that nations and nationalism flourish today 
despite the Soviet regime's ruthlessly antinational policies.336 
 
 
Miroslav Hroch agrees that it cannot simply be assumed that the Soviet state was 
always effective in its nation-building and posits that: “The conventional view that 
current turmoil is the result of the release of irrational forces that were long 
suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were - under communism, and are now in full 
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revival after a lapse of fifty years, is evidently superficial. Such a conception is 
extravagant - closer to the world of fairy-tales than of historical processes”.337  
With that in mind, Brubaker puts forward the alternative view that 
nationhood and nationalism flourish today in the post-Soviet world largely 
because of the regime’s policies, and that those policies, although anti-nationalist, 
were anything but anti-national.338 He traces how the Soviet regime used the 
construct of nationality - as an attribute of both persons and places - to organize 
the administration of its ethnically heterogeneous territories.339 In fact, the policies 
and methods of the Soviet regime gradually institutionalized the territorial and 
ethnic republics.  
Nationalist practices were formed and sustained by Soviet political 
institutions. Far from ruthlessly suppressing nationhood, the Soviet regime 
pervasively institutionalized it.340 The regime repressed national sentiments, but at 
the same time it advanced the institutionalization of territorial nationhood and 
ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories. In doing so, the Soviet state 
involuntarily created a political field conducive to nationalism. Drawing on 
institutionalism, Brubaker proposes that those national categories were by no 
means empty. Even though the Soviet regime consistently and effectively 
repressed all signs of overt political nationalism, the repression of nationalism was 
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concurrent with the establishment and consolidation of nationhood and nationality 
as fundamental cognitive and social forms.341 
Brubaker focuses on two different modes in which nationhood and 
nationality were institutionalized in the Soviet Union: territorial and political on 
the one hand, ethno-cultural and personal on the other hand.342 On the one hand, 
the Soviet regime divided up the Soviet state into more than fifty national 
territories. Each territory was explicitly defined as the homeland of and for a 
particular ethno-national group, while the top-level national territories were 
determined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own territories, 
constitutions, legislatures, administration and cultural institutions. Slezkhine 
emphasizes that the Soviet Union was the world’s first state to institutionalize 
ethno-territorial federalism, which was more than just a tool for propaganda: 
“Uncompromisingly hostile to individual rights, they eagerly, deliberately and 
quite consistently promoted group rights that did not always coincide with those of 
the proletariat”.343  
On the other hand, the regime divided the citizenry into a set of 
comprehensive and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalities. Through this state 
classification system, ethnic nationality served both as a statistical category, and as 
an obligatory ascribed status.344 Thus, ethnic nationality was assigned by the state 
at birth on the basis of descent, which was registered in passports and recorded in 
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almost all bureaucratic documentations and official transactions. Nationality was 
also used to manipulate access to higher education and to certain jobs. In a 
thorough and insightful historical assessment of the Soviet Union as an 
‘affirmative action empire’ (1923-1939), Terry Martin argues that: “Russia’s new 
revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic states to 
confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting 
the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many 
of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state”.345  
Even before perestroika, territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality were 
already pervasively institutionalized social and cultural forms in the Soviet Union. 
Highlighting the institutional constitution of both interests and actors, Brubaker 
holds that the Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality 
constituted “a pervasive system of social classification, and organizing principles 
of vision and division of the social world, a standardized scheme of social 
accounting, and interpretative grid of public and private identities, and when 
political space expanded under Gorbachev, a ready-made template for claims to 
sovereignty”.346 And when reforms during perestroika enlarged political horizons 
in the Soviet state, nationalism fulfilled a number of functions: it constituted 
elementary forms of political understanding, political discourse, political interest, 
and political identity; provided a ready template for claims to sovereignty; and 
made certain political actions conceivable.347 And although the Soviet Union itself 
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was not organized as a nation state, that national template for identity was 
outsourced to regional and ethnic identities and eventually served as fuel for its 
thoroughly nationalist disintegration.348 
Nationhood is often employed in the creation and maintenance of political 
legitimacy. Institutionalized nations endure because those institutional models 
become taken for granted through repeated use and interaction, or they in turn 
become legitimate through the endorsement of some authoritative or powerful 
individual or organization. However, Goshulak reminds that the tools used for 
creating a national identity are not always effective, because “the legitimacy 
process itself is conditioned by the struggles that take place both within and 
between the state and society. How the nation is conceived, therefore, is an object 
of struggle and accommodation”.349 It is worth noting further that political 
institutions are durable to the extent that these models are “reinforced through 
socialization or interaction or legitimation while alternative scripts remain 
unimaginable”.350  
Institutional definitions of nationhood in the Soviet Union therefore did 
not so much constrain action but constituted “basic categories of political 
understanding, central parameters of political rhetoric, specific types of political 
action conceivable, plausible, even compelling, transforming the collapse of a 
regime into the disintegration of a state”.351 In other words, they constitute the 
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rules of the game and serve as models that provide substantive guides for practical 
action. 
The institutional formation of nationhood and nationality in the Soviet 
Union were therefore by no means empty forms or legal fictions, as previously 
viewed by many Sovietologists.352 Institutionalized definitions of nationhood not 
only played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continue to 
shape and structure the national questions in the successor states. Moreover, 
institutionally-defined nationalism continues to constitute elementary forms of 
political understanding and political action in the successor states, including those 
in Central Asia. Following Smith, one could see the result of the breakdown of the 
Soviet system as not a struggle of post-Soviet nations, but of institutionally 
constituted national elites.353 Suny makes an insightful observation that: 
If the irony of Soviet nationality development was that an antinationalist state 
helped create nations within it, the irony of post-Soviet states is that their 
determined efforts at creating national histories and identities are resolutely 
carried on as if a real past can be recovered, as if a continuous, unbroken 
existence of a coherent nation has come down through time.354 
 
 
Thus, institutionalist answer to the question of “how should we think about 
nationhood and nationness?” would propose to focus on nation as a category of 
practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political form, and 
nationness as a contingent event or happening.355  Some would suggest that the 
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task at hand is to think about nationalism without nations. In order to understand 
the power of nationalism, one does not need to invoke nations, but nor should 
nationhood, at the other extreme, be dismissed altogether. Brubaker suggests 
decoupling categories of analysis from categories of practice, “retaining as 
analytically indispensable the notions of nation as practical category, nationhood 
as institutionalized form, and nationness as event, but leaving ‘the nation’ as 
enduring community to nationalists”. 356  
In order to better understand nationalism today, it is important to challenge 
the notion that all the important questions about nations and nationalism have 
been answered. Through institutionalist perspective, it is not intended to constitute 
yet another theory of nationalism, but rather provide a framework for organizing 
and explaining nationalism in the historical, political and social contexts of Soviet 
and post-Soviet  Central Asia. Institutionalist model is important because it points 
to the need for new directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. As an 
organizing framework, institutionalist approach does not seek to replace but to 
include and go beyond existing studies and approaches in explaining how the dual 
legacy of institutionalized nationhood has continued to shape the national question 
in the successor states, in particular those of Central Asia. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
 
 
THIS chapter has shown how ethnicity and nationhood are manifested in society, 
and provided a systemic overview of the main theories of nationhood and 
ethnicity. It has analysed the key questions around which the debate on ethnicity 
and nationhood revolves. Thus, perennialist scholars approach modern nations as 
lineal descendents of their medieval counterparts, and for them it is nation and 
nationalism that engender modernity. The sleeping beauty metaphor catches the 
gist of the perennialist perspective. It describes nation as the Sleeping Beauty 
waiting for a magical kiss from nationalism, its Prince, for its awakening or re-
awakening. Notwithstanding its appeal to broad masses and populist nationalists, 
perennialism is flawed for it signifies a self-fulfilling prophesy that takes 
advantage of the contemporary interpretation of the history. It also imposes a 
retrospective nationalism on groups whose identities and consciousness may have 
been not national, but local, regional, and religious. Such retrospective imposition 
is evidently laden with teleological bias.  
If perennialism considers the origins of nations as antique, primordialism 
recognises them as organic givens, which are fixed and permanent entities of the 
world. Primordialists mainly focus on the nature and strength of ethnicity and 
nationalism, and argue that the nature of ethno-national ties is traceable to the 
emotions and consciousness similar to primordial attachments in kinship groups. 
But the three major themes of primordialism- essentialism, ineffability, and 
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mystification- are often charged as deficient. Thus, recent studies showing that the 
content and boundaries of ethno-national identity are fluid, not fixed, and are 
constantly re-defined and re-constructed have challenged the essentialist fallacy of 
primordialism. Moreover, the claim that ethno-national ties are ineffable is in 
contradiction to the facts, which indicate the frequent use of ethno-nationalism for 
political and nationalist ends that in turn can transform their very meanings. And 
the mystification of primordial identities can lead to their erroneous de-socialising 
and provide an ‘intellectual charter’ for the chauvinist ethno-nationalism.  
Ethno-symbolists, on the other hand, try to uncover the symbolic legacy of 
pre-modern ethnic identities for modern nations, and they share a common 
reverence for the past of nation. They believe that the formation of nations needs 
to be contextualised within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity that purportedly 
shaped them. But ethno-symbolist framework is flawed on a number of accounts 
that include conceptual confusion, underestimation of the differences between 
modern nations and ancient ethnic groups, fallacy of referencing nations in pre-
modern times and the downplaying of the fluidity of ethnic identities.  
Modernism suggests a more reasonable way of looking at nations as 
wholly modern, social constructs of modernity. Nations are consequences of such 
modern processes as capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratization, secularism 
and urbanization. Nations can therefore be explained through the social and 
political processes underlying modernity. Modernists astutely stress the political 
side of nations and contend that: nations are territorial political communities and 
main political actors in the international arena; they constitute the main political 
loyalty of their citizens that override their other allegiances; their success depends 
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on the infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive 
institutionalization of values, roles and expectations; and nations are the sole 
framework and beneficiary of social and political development.  
Although the modernity of nations underpins the beliefs of all modernists, 
there is little else in common amongst them. They tend to emphasise different 
factors in their accounts of nationhood or prioritise one set of factors at the 
expense of others. But this is not a deficiency, but rather a reflection of social 
reality. As was shown, there can be no grand theory of nationalism, only partial 
theories concentrating on specific aspects. Various dimensions of modern social, 
cultural and political change serve to make both nationhood and ethnicity salient.  
Ethnicity and nationhood are not just social problems but a political resource, 
which is often used in a variety of political strategies. Hence it is reasonable to 
heed institutionalist suggestion to focus on nationhood as a conceptual variable, 
and treat it not as substance but as institutionalized form, see it not as collectivity 
but as practical category, and study it not as entity but as contingent event. 
Because group membership is not a fixed state but a variable, one should not 
assume that collective action stems from ascribed collective designation. That is 
why institutionalist approach calls for an eventful perspective and theoretical 
attention to contingent events and to their transformative consequences. This is 
relevant to our understanding of nation-formation in Central Asia. Through the 
institutional perspective, it becomes possible to understand the processual 
dynamics of nationhood, and learn how nation works as practical category and 
classificatory scheme. Those are the questions that will be addressed in detail by 
 116 
the next chapter, which will test the institutionalist perspective in the context of 
the discussion on the development of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia. 
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CHAPTER IV, ETHNICITY AND NATIONHOOD IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
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1.0 Introduction  
 
 
 
IF the previous chapter has shown the institutionalist perspective as the most 
suitable for understanding how ethnicity and nationhood has developed in the 
former Soviet Union, this section will employ the institutionalist framework in 
contextualizing and exploring the formation and development of ethnicity and 
nationhood in Central Asia. It will treat nation as a category of practice, 
institutionalized cultural and political form, and a contingent event.  
The objective of this chapter is to present a new way of looking into the 
history, present and future of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia. This new 
perspective suggests that state institutions played a crucial role in forming and 
sustaining ethno-nationalism in the region, and that the legacy of such 
institutionalized ethno-nationalism will have a long-term affect on political and 
social development of the local societies. The chapter will therefore explain how 
the Soviet institutions ingrained the sentiments of nationhood and ethnicity deeply 
in the imaginations of Central Asian population, and why it has a direct relation to 
the current developments in ethno-nationalist politics in the region. 
A note needs to be made on the choice of Uzbek and Kyrgyz nations for 
our comparative and systemic investigation. There are a number of reasons that 
justify the choice. Firstly, even though the review of this kind could benefit from 
extending units of analysis to include other nations, such as Kazakh, Tajik and 
Turkmen, that would however come at the detriment of the chapter’s focus and 
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space limitation. Secondly, Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities represent two kinds 
of groups present in the Central Asian society, nomadic and settled 
correspondingly. Thirdly, the relative homogeneity and historical commonality of 
the whole region renders the assessment of general trends in ethno-national 
development of Central Asia through the prism of formational processes in the 
selected two countries appropriate. Fourthly, both ethno-national groups inhabit 
the strategic Ferghana Valley, which is seen to be the most volatile area in Central 
Asia due to complex, disputed borders, multi-ethnic composition, dense 
population and socio-economic hardships. Thus the informed decision was made 
to concentrate on the cases of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations in discussing the 
formation and development of nationhood and ethnicity in Central Asia. 
The chapter therefore explores ethnicity in pre-Soviet Central Asia and 
explains further development of ethnicity and nationhood in Central Asia during 
the Soviet period. The forthcoming section will start by outlining the nature of 
Central Asian ethnicity prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 
 
 
2.0 Ethnicity in pre-Soviet Central Asia 
 
 
2.1 Central Asia before tsarist colonization  
 
Up to the twelfth century, only a passing reference can be found to a group known 
as the Kyrgyz, and their origins remain the subject of controversy. Some of their 
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ancestors may have lived on the banks of the Upper Yenisei River in Siberia until 
the tenth century. Under pressure from various tribal confederations and 
threatened by the Mongol advances, they were gradually forced to emigrate 
southwards. They settled in the Tien Shan region but were unable to escape 
Mongol domination. During the thirteenth century the early Kyrgyz tribes found 
themselves in the territory of Chingiz Khan’s second son, Chaghatay.  
In the fifteenth century, various Kyrgyz tribes seem to have created the 
first independent khanate with some degree of autonomy from the weakened 
Mongol overlords. The Soviet historians claim that it was during this period that 
the Kyrgyz developed a distinctive language and acquired a sense of nationhood. 
However, their social organization and political order remained centred around 
tribal and kinship ties, and did not resemble modern nations. Later in the 
seventeenth century, many Kyrgyz groups were forced to move again to the 
Ferghana Valley region, further south to what today is northern Tajikistan, or to 
eastern Turkestan, now part of China. 
By eighteenth century, Kyrgyz society had developed around a flexible 
political-administrative structure, based on independent family and tribal 
associations and rooted in the nomadic way of life. In the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the Kyrgyz territories fell under the influence of the Chinese, who left 
their nomadic lifestyle largely untouched. However, by the end of that century first 
the southern and then the northern territories came under the Kokand Khanate’s 
control. By 1830 all of the Kyrgyz tribes were paying formal tribute to the 
khanate. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, many of the Kazakh tribes 
were also subordinated to Tashkent rule.  
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During the Kokand domination, Islam took a deeper hold within Kyrgyz 
tribes. That was especially the case in the south of the country. Yet one should 
note that even during this period many Kyrgyz, similar to other Central Asian 
nomadic groups, remained loyal to their traditional customs. Their new religion 
combined allegiance to Islam with strong faith in holy places, saints and evil 
spirits. In the north, the influence of Islam remained limited till the end of the 
nineteenth century when the Russian invaders helped strengthen the institutional 
basis of Islam.357  
Though local leaders preserved most of their privileges under the new 
Kokand rulers, a perceived weakening of khanate’s power in the 1840s led to a 
series of rebellions. For example, in 1845 the Kyrgyz in Osh took advantage of the 
absence of the regular garrison and rebelled against the harsh tax policies of the 
Kokand Khanate. Further revolts took place in 1870, led by Kurmanjan-datka, the 
widow of a Kyrgyz aristocrat and a leader of various mountain tribes. The revolts, 
however, had little impact on Kokand, and it still retained a strong regional 
position. Moreover, the Khanate proved especially skilful in dividing and ruling, 
which kept the Kyrgyz fighting each other and unable to liberate from Kokand’s 
power grasp. This had been the case until Kokand’s position became, in turn, 
undermined by the growing Russian presence in Central Asia. 
The formation of the Uzbek and Kazakh collectivity began in the fifteenth 
century when Abul Khayr (1412-68) tried to regroup his tribes of the Kipchak 
linguistic group. Those tribal groups then divided into Kazakhs, who left the 
confederation and continued their nomadic way of life in the steppes of today’s 
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Kazakhstan, and to Uzbeks, whose confederation of around 92 tribes migrated to 
Transoxiana and carried out its conquest under the leadership of Sheybani Khan 
(1451-1510). The origin of the collective term ‘Uzbek’ is however linked to 
Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks and most probably originates from the name of Uzbek-
khan (1312-1340), the ninth overlord of Djuchi House (Chenghiz-Khan’s elder 
son). The Uzbek rulers used Persian and Chaghatay languages and borrowed 
Timurids’ culture and state apparatus. 
The following three identity layers contributed to the formation of the 
Uzbek ethnicity: (1) Dashti-Kipchak nomadic Uzbeks, who mainly migrated to 
Central Asia in early sixteenth century; (2) Local Turkic tribes and clans, which 
joined the former, from the so-called Chaghatay and Oghuz Turkic tribes and 
clans; and (3) Sarts, including the settled urban Turkic population, who abandoned 
nomadism and lost their tribal affiliation, and turkified Tajiks.358 But it is 
important to distinguish between the ethnicity of modern Uzbeks and that of the 
Uzbek communities of the nineteenth century. At that time and prior to the 
national delimitation of 1924, the Uzbeks had a distinct set of ethnic, social and 
cultural characteristics, although by other characteristics they were close to other 
Turkic people of the region and even gradually assimilating with them.359 
Until the end of nineteenth century, Uzbeks were perceived mainly as 
direct descendents of the Dashti-Kipchak nomadic tribes, who migrated to Central 
Asia in the early sixteenth century and settled there during the period of the 
Sheybanid dynasty, and of local Turkic tribes that joined the above at a later date. 
In the mid-fifteenth century, the word ‘Uzbek’ began to be associated with the 
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names of a new group of Turkic-Mongol dynastic leaders, whose dated back not to 
Uzbek-khan but to Sheybani-khan, Djuchi’ s younger son. In the early sixteenth 
century, Uzbek tribes under the leadership of Sheybani conquered the central part 
of the region, and since then the Uzbek khans have reigned over the territory of 
Central Asia, gradually shifting from a nomadic to a sedentary way of life.  
In the thirteenth century, Chenghiz-khan’s son, Chaghatay, conquered the 
region and governed it through the local aristocracy, who became to be known as 
Chaghataids. In the fourteenth century, Tamerlane of the Barlos tribe defeated the 
Chaghatay ulus and founded his own dynasty that survived until the arrival of 
nomadic Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks in the region. In the same way as the subjects of 
the Uzbek-khan identified themselves as Uzbeks, the peoples of Transoxiana 
during and after the rule of Chaghatay ulus, irrespective of their tribal affiliation, 
began to be known as Chaghataids. Thus, the word ‘Chaghatay’ originally was 
used to refer to all the peoples of Mauverannahr360 during the Temurid dynasty 
and was distinct from the term ‘Uzbek’. As a consequence of the Temurids’ exile, 
the use of ‘Chaghatay’ largely decreased. Later, the boundaries between the two 
terms became blurred and merged eventually in the second half of the twentieth 
century.361  
Sarts represented the third group that is thought to contribute to the 
identity of contemporary Uzbeks. However, at the time of the term’s usage in the 
late nineteenth century, there was no consensus among scholars on Sarts’ identity 
and their ethno-genesis. The disagreements on that issue could be classified to 
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three categories.362 The first drew on the ancient sources as well as indigenous 
self-ascription to acknowledge the reality of the Sart identity. The second held that 
the term did not relate to a distinct ethnic group but was used to refer to sedentary 
Uzbeks, and sometimes to Tajiks. Finally, the third view refused the validity of 
the term ‘Sart’ in relation to Central Asian peoples and asserted that there was no 
distinct community called ‘Sart’, as no special Sart language existed.  
It is important to note that the debate over Sart identity took place at the 
sensitive time, when Russian orientalists and Turkestani Jadids (reformers) 
engaged in a political struggle over the status and future of the region. The Sart 
label usually referred to sedentary, non-tribalized peasants and tradesmen of 
Central Asia, whatever language they spoke. However, the term that defined a 
social, economic and cultural category, was accorded an ethnic classification by 
some Russian anthropologists in the late nineteenth century. For example, 
Andreev’s chronicles of Central Asia referred to Sarts as one of the four ethnic 
groups making up Khiva population, whose total number equalled to 100,000 and 
who were occupied in trade or in agriculture.363 Allworth points to a different 
conclusion and stresses the urban and sedentary character of the term Sart by 
asserting that it became prevalent at that time because, it suited the ethnic mixture 
of Central Asian urban areas and was also embraced by numerous settled 
communities, irrespective of origin or subgroup links.364 
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Most Russian travellers to Central Asia in the nineteenth century had a 
limited and subjective perception of the political order in Central Asia. For 
example, privy councillor A. Levshin in his Opisanie kirgiz-kazakhskikh ord i 
stepey (Description of Kyrgyz-Kazakh horde and steppes) was puzzled by the 
question of how order could be possible within a nomadic Kazakh society, if none 
of its members seems to be committed to a public weal. He describes Kazakhs’ 
opportunistic attitude towards their own superiors in the following way: 
They deal with their own chiefs in the same way and change their obedience 
according to the circumstances. If a chief who has secured homage and loyalty 
calls someone to account for an assault, the latter will leave the former and join 
someone else. If that one refuses to hide him, he will go to a third or fourth 
person. ... What kind of order can be found by a commander, if his subjects will 
submit only when circumstances afford it, if they will not be prepared to sacrifice 
themselves for the general public good, if they will only aim at satisfying their 
own predatory inclinations and if each of them wants to command, when there is 
the slightest opportunity to do so? 365 
 
 
According to Levshin, if political order refers to a code of authority, which 
regulates the commitment of a superior in the legitimate use of power and the 
obedience of a follower, then if tribesmen only obey when circumstances afford it 
they would not share such a code of authority and participate in a common 
political order. However, Levshin and other fellow Russian observers did not fully 
take into consideration that mobility and flexibility were important to the survival 
of nomadic tribes.  
Russian officials primarily perceived Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other nomadic 
political orders from the standpoint of a settled civilization, and through the 
perspective of a representative of the tsarist empire, which was constantly 
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threatened by invasions of nomads from its borderlands.366 The tribal political 
order was therefore perceived as lack of order or total disorder in the nomadic 
steppe. Such view was held, erroneously, by scholars such as Becker in relation to 
the Turkmen as well.367 Geiss disagrees and asserts that the shifting of tribal 
loyalties does not exclude the existence of political order within these societies.368 
The important point to keep in mind is that political order of tribal and non-tribal 
societies are of a different kind. What seems to be chaos and anarchy from the 
perspective of a centralized state power might turn out to be quite ordered patterns 
of tribal authority relations. Geiss notes that such conflated outsider perception of 
the political order in Central Asia was not limited only to tribal societies.369  
The main linguistic groups in Central Asia were Persian and Turkic. 
Persian groups were predominantly located in the oasis belt, valleys and 
mountains of the south-east and had a settled way of life with occupations in 
agriculture, trade and craft. The Turkic language groups were represented by 
nomads living in steppes of the north and the deserts of the south. However, after 
some time of assimilation some of those nomadic pastoralists became bi-lingual 
and acquired sedentary culture.370  
The Turkic languages of Central Asia consisted of three branches: the 
Karluk or East Turkic group; the Kipchak or central group (also known as 
Chaghatay); and the Oguz group. In addition to that, there were many local 
variations of those. The written scripts varied throughout the history of Central 
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Asia. When the Arabs conquered Central Asia, they brought with them the Arabic 
script. The Chaghatay language was first promoted as a literary language by the 
Timurid dynasty at the end of the fourteenth century and became the language of 
the educated class in Central Asia. Chaghatay was written in the Arabic script. 
Over the years, Chaghatay grew removed from the common vernacular and was 
mostly used in official documents. The Persian language, on the other hand, was 
taught in all the religious schools and was an established state language. 
Nonetheless, the use of both Persian and Chaghatay in local 
administrations meant that the majority of indigenous intellectuals were at least 
bilingual. The accounts by travellers to the region point to the apolitical role of 
local languages and described kishlaks (villages) where Uzbeks and Tajiks shared 
the social and religious functions between themselves.371  
In terms of socio-cultural institutions, Islam became the dominant force 
after the introduction by the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries. The 
religion of almost all Central Asians was Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School, which 
made the local populations conscious of belonging to the greater community of 
Muslims (Umma). The Islamic identity was one of the strongest over-arching 
identities. On the other hand, because different tribes and groups converted to 
Islam at different periods, the intensity and practice of their religion varied from 
highly conservative groups, to Sufi brotherhoods, and to religious practices mixed 
with shamanist rites.   
                                                                                                                                  
370
 See Subtelny, M. E. (1994). The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik. Central Asia in Historical 
Perspective. B. Manz. Oxford, Westview Press, pp. 45-61 
371
 See Olufsen, O. (1911). The Emir of Bukhara and his Country. London, Heinemann Publishers, 
p. 286  
 128 
The nineteenth-century observer Eugene Schuyler noted that the native 
population saw the whole society as divided into two classes: settled and 
nomadic.372 In the local vernacular, the nomads were often called Kazakh, while 
the settled population was frequently referred to as Sart.373 Those groups should 
be seen as more economic and social entities, rather than ethnic, and much less 
national ones. In settled areas and especially in cities, there was a large 
functioning Muslim establishment, which included legal Islamic experts of 
various denominations, teachers attached to schools (maktab) or colleges 
(madrasa), mosque functionaries (imam, muezzin, etc), Sufi orders and dervishes. 
Amongst the nomadic groups, the religious establishment was represented 
primarily by a local spiritual leader (ishan), who had moral authority in the 
community and a close alliance with the local tribal leader. Islam in those nomad 
communities did not resemble the text-based urban orthodoxy but was more 
syncretic in nature, strongly influenced by customary law (adat) and traditional 
shamanistic practices.374  
In regard to the features of administration, the dynastic and military 
organization was conditioned by the Mongol legacy to which most ruling families, 
both nomadic and settled, traced their ancestry since the fourteenth century.375 
Even though variation existed in the details of the social organization, one could 
point to the features common to Central Asia as a whole. The social structure 
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resembled a pyramid, formed of hierarchically ranked levels of authority, bound 
together by chains of loyalty and responsibility and centred around the patriarchal 
family, who lived in a single tent in nomad communities, or in an enclosed 
courtyard in settled areas.376 Those cellular units were inter-connected horizontally 
and vertically to form larger pyramids, constituting parts of more complex 
groupings, which culminated ultimately in tribal confederations, headed by the 
supreme Khan.  
A highly developed sense of genealogy reinforced the nomadic groups, 
which helped to maintain awareness of not only historical continuity, but also of 
the family as a defining feature of identity. The structural subdivision of nomad 
society could be classified as tribes and sub-tribes. The nomads of Central Asia 
most strongly identified with their genealogical linkages, either in the tribal 
confederation (zhuz) or in smaller groups (ru or taipa), rather than ascribing to any 
notion of nation.377 The organization of the Kyrgyz communities, as well as other 
nomadic tribes in the region, was around kinship ties and every Kyrgyz was 
expected to be able to trace their ancestors back at least seven generations. Each 
family belonged to a larger clan group. And each of the clan was part of a wider 
tribal confederation. Even though the Kyrgyz were mostly nomadic peoples, each 
of these communities had a territorial base and was dominated by an aristocracy. 
Aristocratic class was defined largely in the terms of the size of cattle, which in 
turn determined levels of access to the most favourable pastures.  
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As many contemporary Kyrgyz observers like to point out, tribal life was 
characterized by a degree of debate and consultation, which was less possible in 
the settled oases to the west. The election of khans and resolution of conflicts 
through tribal discussion was arguably a reason for more ‘democratic’ nature of 
Kyrgyz politics during the 1990s.378 However, it is important to bear in mind that 
leadership remained, as a rule, with certain families. And most Kyrgyz were 
suspicious of strong authority figures, and for much of the year their individual 
villages (auls) were self-governed. 
Each clan or tribal group had its own myths about legendary ancestors and 
great events of the past. One of these, the story of Manas, was later turned into a 
national epic by the Soviet scholars and re-instated as such by contemporary 
Kyrgyz nationalists. And although the epic stressed the unity of the Kyrgyz, most 
of their history was indisputably one of disunity and internal struggle. The history 
of the region showed that because regional and tribal groupings struggled for 
dominance rather than pooled sovereignty against greater external threat, the 
Kyrgyz tribes could not generate a meaningful resistance to the Mongol invasions 
from the north. Moreover, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a split took 
place between northern and southern tribal groups. This split continues to play a 
divisive role in Kyrgyz politics to this day. But despite the importance of blood 
ties and the impression of rigidity, the tribal boundaries were far from 
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homogenous, fixed structures and constantly evolved and changed according to 
circumstances.379  
 In settled communities, the key element of identity was based on the place 
of residence, rather than clan or tribal affiliation. However kinship networks also 
played an important part and should therefore not be dismissed. The structure of 
settled societies was based on regional administrative divisions that extended 
upwards from the village (kishlak) or urban quarter (mahalla) units through 
districts and provinces to the over-arching khanate formation.380  
There is no doubt that the political entities in Central Asia were built on 
loyalty to dynasties/clans and fidelity to Islam. The political formations were built 
on dynasties whose tribal legitimacy transformed into dynastic legitimacy, which 
was then reinforced by a religious legitimacy, able to maintain sway over very 
varied populations thanks to a stat apparatus that was inherited from the Persian 
tradition.381  
The local communities accepted the political framework of multi-cultural 
and generally bilingual khanates, in which the competition for power was based 
on dynasties, clans and tribes rather than their identities. Even if the rulers were 
Uzbek, the Persian language was the court language in Bukhara and Kokand and 
was also the main cultured language at the time. The idea of associating a territory 
with an ethnic group defined language was alien to the political ideas of the 
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Muslims in Central Asia.382 Even though the terms such as Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik 
or Turkmen were definitely used then, they were not politically or socially laden 
identities and did not take into account the complex interplay of identities. Glenn 
maintains that the development of pre-revolutionary Central Asia gave it “a 
mutual historical experience; a common Arabic script; a common Turkic language 
base (bar the Tadzhiks); and the same religion, Sunni Islam (except in Easter 
Tadzhikistan), which bound them to the greater religious community (the Umma). 
This resulted in a cultural interfusion within the region to the extent that two 
literary languages, Chagatai and Farsi, were in operation throughout”.383  
On the eve of the Tsarist conquest of the region, the principal territorial 
formations were the three Khanates of Central Asia,384 the three Kazakh Hordes 
(zhus) of the northern tier, and the Turkmen tribes of the south-west.385 Within 
those governance formations, there was no clear division along nomad or 
sedentary lines.386 Even though the main power base of the khanates was in settled 
areas, they included high proportions of nomadic groups who were seen as an 
important military asset. In a similar fashion, the Kazakh and Turkmen tribes 
followed nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life, but they were linked with 
sedentary population who were crucial to their sustenance. The three khanates 
were ruled by Uzbek dynasties presiding over a multi-ethnic population, which 
would be difficult to identify with present-day ethnic groups with clear 
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distinctions and politicized characteristics. Vamberi, who visited the region in the 
mid-nineteenth century, wrote that Uzbek tribes dominated in the Kokand and 
Khiva Khanates and Bukhara Emirate, and were then united into 32 principal 
tribes.387 Kyrgyz tribes at the time were grouped in two confederations, Otuz Uul 
and Ich Kilik.  
Spiritual, legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers in the Emirate 
of Bukhara were concentrated in the hands of the emir. The senior officers of 
government and religion were appointed by, and answerable directly and solely to, 
the emir. The state apparatus consisted of administrative-financial, judiciary and 
military ministries, which were headed by kushbegi, the right-hand man of the 
emir. Later, a putative Consultative Council was established, but its functions 
were little more than nominal. The consequence of such a highly personalized 
nature of authority was on-going rivalry and intrigue, and chronic instability in 
government circles.388   
In terms of administrative-territorial governance, there was considerable 
devolution of power in the khanates.389 The largest sub-division was province 
(vilayat or beklik), headed by a Hakim or Bek, who was appointed by khan and 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within his own territory. The administrative 
apparatus in the province was self-contained and similar in structure to that of the 
central government. Hakim appointed administrative officials that were dependent 
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on his patronage and goodwill. Among the nomadic groups, there was a similar 
balance of subordination and autonomy, with clan and tribal leaders exercising 
absolute power within their own units, while accepting, at least nominally, the 
authority of the overall khan.390 
The intellectual life of Central Asia began to decline in nineteenth century, 
and the accounts of foreign visitors indicate that poverty, corruption and religious 
hypocrisy were endemic. For example, Logofet, in his monograph Country 
without Law also describes the unjust and despotic nature of politics in the 
Emirate of Bukhara.391 Thus, the Emirate of Bukhara, as well as other khanates, 
was at the time described by travellers and explorers as a “land of poverty and 
persecution and slavery, of oppressive taxes, of public tortures and drawn-out 
executions, a place where curious non-Muslim visitors could be (and sometimes 
were) clapped into the emir’s siyah chah, his black hole, and eventually put to 
death”.392   
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Map 2. Central Asia before Tsarist conquest  
 
 
Source: Soucek, S. (2000). A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
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2.2 Russian conquest of Central Asia  
 
The shifting of Russia’s border from the northern Siberia to Central Asia was 
gradual.393 The time and the manner of the Russian conquest of Central Asia can 
be divided into two stages. In the first stage (1730-1848), Russia acquired the 
greater part of Kazakh lands, except for its southernmost segments. Peter the 
Great initiated the drive to conquer the Kazakh territory, which ended around 
1825. This period of Russian conquest was prolonged and rather gradual in nature. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, various Kyrgyz delegations 
were sent to the Russian authorities in Siberia. Under the influence of the Kazakh 
Greater Horde’s decision to accept Russian suzerainty, Kyrgyz tribes sought the 
Russian protection against the Khanate of Kokand. As Kokand’s position 
declined, the northern Kyrgyz tribes sent numerous letters to the Siberian 
authorities appealing for help. During the 1850s and 1860s, a number of tribes 
declared their allegiance to the tsar. In 1862, some Kyrgyz soldiers fought 
alongside Russians to take the fort of Pishpek (Bishkek). By the time when the 
Kokand Khanate was finally destroyed in 1876, all of the Kyrgyz tribes had 
formally submitted to the Russian rule. Russian troops conquered Kokand city in 
the important Ferghana Valley as early as 1853. However, Russia at that time 
considered the region to be of only marginal economic or strategic value until it 
suffered the great defeat in the Crimean War (1854-1856). 
In the second stage of the Russian conquest (1855-1884), the remaining 
parts of Kazakhstan (Semirechie and Syr Daria) and the rest of Central Asian 
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territories (present-day Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) 
were conquered or subjugated. Russia’s move into Central Asia was reportedly 
aimed to counter the British gains on the Indian subcontinent and to offset the 
dwindling of cotton imports to Russia’s textile industry from the United States, 
which was going through the civil war of 1861-1865. After that, Russia’s 
competition with Britain appeared to become much more urgent in the context of 
the Great Game, and Russia set out to capture as much of Central Asia as possible.  
The second stage of the conquest was relatively brief and decisive. It 
consisted of several military campaigns between 1855 and 1884. In 1855, a 
military Russian convoy occupied Turkeston, Chimkent and other parts of 
Kazakhstan’s southern region. After winning the battle on the hills of Kattakurgan 
(near Samarkand) in 1868, the Russians fought with the emir of Bukhara and, 
consequently, annexed a substantial part of the Emirate’s territory, including 
Samarkand. But they let the rest of Bukharan Emirate’s territory to exist as a de 
facto Russian protectorate. In 1869, Russian troops from the Caucasus 
disembarked on the shores of Khiva and established the port of Krasnovodsk. 
They then took over the Turkmen coastline and reached the Iranian border. 
Several years later in 1873, the Russian army defeated the khan of Khiva and 
annexed much of his territory, leaving the rest as a Russian protectorate. By 1876, 
the Khanate of Kokand was also occupied, together with the Ferghana Valley.  
Only the territory roughly the size of modern Turkmenistan remained 
briefly un-subjugated. But five years later in 1881, the desert region of present-day 
Turkmenistan because the last Central Asian area brought under the Russian 
control, after a fierce battle in January of that year at the ancient fortress of Geok-
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tepe (near Ashgabat) ended with the massacre of the native population by the 
invading Russian army. At that point though, formal reaction from Britain 
compelled Russians to recognize the Iranian and Afghan borders, and Afghanistan 
was established as a buffer zone between the two great powers.  
Following the siege of Geok-tepe, the Russian occupation faced local 
resistance in the form of endemic, yet unsuccessful rebellions. Serious revolts took 
place in 1885 in the Ferghana Valley, led by Dervish Khan Tore, and in 1891 in 
Namangan and Tashkent. Yet the most serious challenge to the Russian regime 
was the uprising organized by the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood and led by Ishan, 
who declared holy war and attacked the Russian garrison in Andijan.  
Partly in response to the rebellions, the Kokand Khanate and a part of the 
Emirate of Bukhara were incorporated into the Turkestan general-governorate in 
1886, which was established to govern those areas and was under the 
administrative control of tsarist Russia. Thus, the territorial re-structuring of 
Central Asia by St. Petersburg went through several stages and modifications that 
could be divided into the fall of Tashkent in 1865, the defeat of the Emirate of 
Bukhara in 1868 and of the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, the liquidation of the 
Khanate of Kokand in 1876, and the completion of the overall conquest with the 
fall of Merv in 1884. 
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Map 3. Tsarist conquest of Central Asia  
 
 
Source: Geiss, P. (2005). Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia. London, Routledge 
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2.3 Tsarist rule in Central Asia  
 
The first formal administrative decision of the tsarist rule in Central Asia 
was established shortly after the tsarist decree of 1867, which created the 
Turkestanskoe General-Gubernatorstvo (Turkestan governorate-general) to 
govern the conquered land and people. As a result, a new political structure 
appeared in the region. The governorate-general of Turkestan was administered by 
the Russian military governor, who resided in Tashkent and reported to the 
Russian ministry of defence. The governorate-general was divided into five oblast´ 
(region) and two protectorates. The regions included Syr Daria with the centre in 
Tashkent, Semirechie with the centre in Vernyi, Ferghana with the centre in 
Skobelev, Samarkand with the centre in Samarkand, and Zakaspie with the centre 
in Ashgabat. The protectorates consisted of the Emirate of Bukhara and the 
Khanate of Khiva. Under the agreement of protectorate, Khiva and Bukhara were 
barred from having independent foreign affairs and were levied huge taxes. The 
tsarist military were available to the rulers for suppressing revolts.  
That tsarist decree in fact established a two-tiered administrative 
arrangement, which was typical of other Russian colonies as well. It recognized a 
firm distinction between the cultural lives of the indigenous Muslim populations 
and the colonizing Russians. In the beginning, Russian overlords sought not to 
interfere with local customs. For example, the Russians initially proved satisfied 
with political and military dominance and interfered only to a limited extent in the 
affairs of the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Communication and interaction between the 
native population and the Russian settlers was discouraged. Central Asians were 
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not encouraged to learn Russian, unless it was necessary for the purposes of 
minimal communication. In general, the Russians remained ignorant of, and 
indifferent to, the culture of the locals, and vice-versa. 
In terms of the administrative structure, the Russian rule in Central Asia 
was marked by constant re-organization. For instance, the majority of the Kyrgyz 
territory in the first instance was allocated to the Semirechie oblast´ (region) 
within the Turkestan governorate-general. But in 1882 that oblast´ was transferred 
to the Steppe Administration, and then again it was brought back under 
Turkestan’s jurisdiction. During the same period, the south of the Kyrgyz lands 
was located within the Ferghana and Syr Daria regions, each of which was in turn 
divided into uezd (district). The governorate-general expanded from three 
provinces in 1886 (Syr Daria, Ferghana and Samarkand) to five in 1898, through 
the addition of Semirechie from present-day Kazakhstan and the Transcaspian 
province from the Turkmen side. At the end of the nineteenth century, Central 
Asia under tsarist control was divided into four entities: the governorate of the 
Steppes (the north-eastern Kazakhstan), the governorate of Turkestan (Tashkent, 
Samarkand, and the north and east of Tajikistan), which included the Transcaspian 
province (present-day Turkmenistan), and the protectorates of Khiva and 
Bukhara.394 
Throughout most of the tsarist period, each region within Central Asia 
remained under the rule of the military governors. However, at the level of uezd 
there were parallel Russian and local authority structures, whereby Russian rulers 
relied on traditional elites to maintain order. This division had the advantage for 
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the Russians. Unpopular decisions were left to be executed by local leaders, who 
then had to bear the brunt of mass displeasure that, in turn, was favourable to the 
popularity of the Russian authorities. 
Despite the initial hands-off policy in the early years of tsarist rule, it was 
inevitable that clashes and conflicts would emerge as the colonization of the 
region progressed. In particular, the ideas and projects brought from Russia about 
agriculture and land use were bound to provoke tensions. For instance, Russian 
settlers shared to impose private ownership of land and settled farming on 
nomadic groups, who had the opposite idea of the land as the property of all. 
Therefore, the land statutes of 1867 and 1891 made the practice of nomadism 
problematic, especially because Russian settlers were given land in locations, 
which often obstructed the ancient pattern of cattle herding.  
From the 1860s onwards, the numbers of the Russian and Ukrainian 
settlers initially trickled and then flooded in a bigger scale into the northern 
territories of Central Asia. An estimated 3,500 families arrived by the early 
1880s.395 Russians authorities even established Russkoe imperatorskoe 
politicheskoe agenstvo (Russian imperial political agency) in Khiva to protect the 
interests of Russian subjects. Thus, the initial policy of non-interference changed 
and tsarist overlords tried to achieve Russification of nomadic groups in Central 
Asia through the settlement of Russian citizens on those lands at the expense of 
the local tribes. To illustrate with figures the result of that policy, it is worth 
mentioning that only in Semirechie province Kazakh tribes lost 2.4 million of 
                                                
395
 Anderson, J. (1999). Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy?, Harwood Academic 
Publishers, p. 5 
 143 
hectares, while Kyrgyz 4 million hectares to settlers.396 The appropriation of the 
best land by settlers for agricultural purposes meant fewer pastoral opportunities 
for the nomadic communities, which was one of the causes for the gradual 
transformation of some nomadic groups to sedentary way of life.   
There was a strong opposition to the settlement policy. In 1898, during the 
Andijan rebellion the Kyrgyz fought the incursion of Russian colonial settlers into 
the best lands of the Ferghana Valley. At some point in the mid-1890s, the fear of 
the nomad resentment and the problems of poorly developed irrigation convinced 
the Russian authorities to curtail immigration. But after 1905, the Russian 
settlement resumed again on a much larger scale mainly because of the booming 
industry in the imperial Russia. 
The form of inter-state structures that tsarist Russia envisaged for its 
relations with the peoples of Central Asia was an important element for the 
consequent nation-formational processes in the region. After Central Asia became 
part of the tsarist empire by the end of nineteenth century, the relations between 
Russia and Central Asia became similar to those between the metropolis and 
periphery like in other colonial empires. According to Suny, an empire is defined 
as “a large state made up of many peoples or nationalities, ruled by a central 
power that usually represents one people holding a privileged position in the 
political and social hierarchy of the empire”.397 
 
                                                
396
 Inoiatov, K. (1978). Pobeda Sovetskoi Vlasti v Turkestane. Moscow, Mysl', p. 19  
397
 Suny, R. (1992). State, Civil Society and Ethnic Cultural Consolidation in the USSR: Roots of 
the National Question. The Soviet System in Crisis. A. Dallin and G. Lapidus, Westview Press., p. 
414-415 
 144 
Map 4. Central Asia after tsarist conquest 
 
 
Source: Soucek, S. (2000). A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
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 In fact, Russia was built on the imperial expansion and chose to 
incorporate its Muslim populations by assimilation or cooptation, depending both 
on the strategic context and the cultural setting of the particular period.398 The 
relationship between tsarist Russia and Central Asia represented an inequitable 
arrangement and that of subordination and hierarchical treatment of the newly 
colonized groups. The occupation of Central Asia was implemented by Russians 
in a similar fashion to the British and French colonisation of the time. Settler 
colonies were set up in the Kazakh territories, an administrative and military 
occupation of Turkestan eliminated the traditional political authorities but left the 
local elite structures intact, and protectorates were established in other areas.399   
The Russian policy toward Central Asia from the conquest to the first 
revolution of 1905 may have been hesitant and confused, but there was one 
definite principle behind it: “Manage the population without interfering in its 
affairs; above all render the machinery of colonial domination progressively 
lighter and less costly”.400 Thus, Russians were conscious of the strength of Islam 
in Turkestan and let the native people to continue to be organized under Islamic 
and customary laws. Turkestan’s population was therefore not conditioned by 
forced Russification. The most notable Russian presence was evidenced in the 
industrial transformation of a cotton monoculture, which also led to the 
establishment of urban Russian settlements. But that should be seen in the context 
of the overall desirability among tsarist authorities for Russification to take hold in 
the Muslim populations of the empire. The report of the Ministry of Public 
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Education in 1870 emphasizes the role of the Russian language in bringing people 
together (sblizhenie), which would be followed by fusion (sliianie) and a stronger 
Russification.401    
As an upshot of non-interference policy, however, the indigenous peoples 
of Central Asia were not considered citizens of the Russian imperial state. They 
were classified as aliens (inorodtsi). That is possibly the background to Suny’s 
general observation that empire is in contrast to nation, and the two are mutually 
exclusive and subversive of one another.402 
In the Kazakh lands and the southern part of Central Asia, Russia did not 
try to integrate the local people but simply control them. They were also exempt 
from military service. But the Russian authorities in the governorate of the 
Steppes attempted to break the traditional tribal system through the direct 
administration of the indigenous Kazakh groups. They also tried to destroy the 
prestige of the local authorities and break up the existing units through constant 
modifications and changing of the political map. A settlement policy had an effect 
too, leading to an increase of the Russian population from 20 percent in 1887 to 
40 percent in 1911.403  
The policy of breaking up the existing system in the Kazakh lands was not 
successful though. The Reaction to that policy led to a more rapid reinforcement 
of Islam at the expense of customary nomadic law. In response to the worsening 
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colonial conditions, a series of uprisings took place that combined defences of 
land, nomadism and autonomy.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the introduction of the tsarist 
civil-military administration headed by governors-general and oblast´ and uezd 
commanders led to the establishment of patrimonial state structures in all parts of 
Central Asia. From that time on, tribesmen were unable to secure their own 
political integration and had to rely on good relations with tsarist officials.404 
Indigenous patrimonial state structures survived only within the Emirate of 
Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, but as tsarist protectorates they were still 
obliged to cede various territories to Russia and were confined in their freedom of 
action.  
A series of events toward the end of the nineteenth century convinced the 
Russian military and administrators that Central Asian provinces were too distant 
to be effectively governed with the two-tiered system. A number of scandals 
involving the Russian administration led to a government commission of inquiry, 
which found that flagrant abuses of authority were extensive.405 Carrere 
d’Encausse writes that in Turkestan “each local Russian leader tended to behave 
as a petty king whose power was not limited by any authority; this provoked 
frequent clashes with the Muslim populations”.406 A series of popular revolts 
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broke out in 1889, which prompted another commission of inquiry that produced a 
report criticizing the Russian policy of non-interference in cultural affairs.407  
The political alliance between the local elite and Russian authorities also 
created a legitimacy problem. Faced with the choice between a tribal and an 
Islamic bias to governance, which either secured the support of tribal followers or 
that of sedentary subjects, the Bukharan emir increasingly based his authority on 
Islamic political heritage and relied on the support of the settled population.408 
Even though emir’s alliance with the Russian tsar boosted his military power and 
extended his influence over rebellious provinces in eastern Bukhara, it also 
discredited him as an Islamic ruler and damaged the legitimacy of his rule. 
Similarly, in the Khanate of Khiva, the political alliance with tsarist overlords 
undermined the fragile political relations between tribal and sedentary 
populations. It also caused a declining cooperation between two groups. In that 
context, it can be argued that patrimonial state structures in Central Asia under the 
tsarist regime were based on domination rather than authority, due to the lack of 
shared legal and political community structures.409 The normative political order 
therefore became more fragile during the period of tsarist rule in Central Asia.  
In the first decades of the twentieth century, an intellectual battle took 
place within the Central Asian elite, between representatives of the modernist 
movement and regional conservatives. The conservative elites, Qadimists (qadim, 
old), were the dominant group but felt under threat from the new order. The most 
influential of the modernist group was ‘Jadid’, named from the Arabic usul jadid 
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(new method). It was a cultural movement aimed to educate Russia’s Muslim 
populations in the modern fashion and raise awareness of their common Muslim 
identity.  Jadids argued in favour of incorporating some elements of Western and 
Russian values to address the issues of political and economic stagnation and to 
bring about the modernizing transformation of Central Asia.410 They tried to 
achieve that objective by setting up new schools and newspapers in order to 
propagate pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism among the Muslim populations in the 
Russian empire. Their pan-Islamist ideas conceived of uniting the Turkic peoples 
under the Russian dominion as one Muslim nation (millat). Jadids sought to 
achieve recognition of a de-territorialized, religious and cultural entity compatible 
with the structures of the Russian empire and without reference to independence 
or a state.411 As they were not seeking political nationalist objectives, Jadid 
reformists could not be considered as a nationalist movement in the modern 
conception of the term.  
Since the vast majority of Muslims in the Russian empire were Turkic, the 
expression of pan-Islamism was bound to have pan-Turkic elements. At the start 
of the twentieth century, pan-Turkic movements supported the Ottoman caliphate 
as the commander of all Muslims. That support explains why pan-Turkism was 
the linguistic face of pan-Islamism in Central Asia. The political parties of Central 
Asia, such as the international Jadid movement or regional Young Bukharan and 
Young Khivan movements, were therefore formed along pan-Islamic/pan-Turkic 
lines and reflected supra-ethnic and supra-national identities. However, the 1908 
Young Turk revolution in Turkey triggered a split in the joint movements of pan-
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Islamism and pan-Turkism, after Turkish nationalists sought to establish a secular 
Turkish state and thus shifted pan-Turkism to a purely ethnic and racial direction, 
dismissing its previous Islamic dimension. 
Even though the Russian authorities initially supported modernists, they 
grew to see the civil unrest, which erupted in Central Asia after the 1905 
revolution, as rooted in the modernist movement most influenced by Russia. The 
initial support by Russian authorities inadvertently promoted political liberalism 
in Central Asia and boosted the interests of the Ottoman empire, one of Russia’s 
principal nemesis at the time. So tsarist officials came to perceive the Jadids of 
Central Asia as a threat to the maintenance of the Russian imperial administration. 
The long-standing Russian principle of non-interference was thus replaced by 
policies, which allied the Russian imperial power with the most conservative 
elements of the local power structures, Qadimists. In order to limit Jadid influence 
in the region, the Russian authorities collaborated with the emir of Bukhara, who 
resisted any religious reforms and relied on the body of introverted religious 
experts. By the end of the empire, the tsarist regime was growingly led by its own 
ignorance and fears into supporting those groups, who were least friendly to the 
continuation of Russian administration.412 Thus, Jadids in Bukhara and Khiva 
remained underground till they managed to take power in alliance with the 
Bolsheviks in the 1920s.   
In addition to the political manoeuvring between Jadids and Qadimists, 
Russians also discreetly introduced even less successful policy of ethnic 
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nationalism in Central Asia. Olivier Roy explains the reasoning of the Russian 
authorities in the following way: 
It may appear strange to have a tsarist government supporting ethnic nationalism. 
The aim was not, of course, to encourage independence movements, but to 
defuse what Russia viewed as the most important threat, that of a synthesis 
between pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, because it hung on an external threat, 
that of the Ottoman empire, whereas the development of an ethnic identity could 
only take place within the framework of the empire.413 
  
 
In the context of the growing pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, it is understandable 
that ethno-nationalization had only few supporters among a minority of the 
Muslim intellectuals and elite. They tried however to affirm national identity 
around ethnic lines through creating a modern written language on the basis of 
vernacular languages and replacing overarching identities, such as Turkicness, by 
ethnic ones like Kazakhness or Uzbekness.  
The government bulletin Turkestan vilayatining gazeti was initially 
produced in Tashkent both in Kazakh and Chaghatay languages for twelve years. 
The publications of bulletins in Chaghatay and Kazakh resulted in “reinforcing the 
newly created Turkestan unity while bolstering the nearly nonexistent Kazakh 
writtten language and literature, distinguishing it from the powerful Chaghatay 
literary heritage that in the past had dominated Kazakh, Tatar, Uzbek, and related 
writings”.414 Chaghatay language was replaced by the colloquial languages of 
Central Asia in the early 1920s. In the early twentieth century, a tsarist decree was 
issued to ban the import of materials printed in the Arabic alphabet.  
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Even though ethno-nationalizing attempts were boosted by the tireless 
work of Russian scientists and orientalists that emphasized ethnic components 
within the Muslim groups in Central Asia, they did not result in significant ethno-
nationalist transformation in the region. That was partly because the support of the 
Russian authorities was only a half-hearted and tactical move to counter-balance 
the greater threat of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. The efforts to ethno-
nationalize regional and local identities during the tsarist rule were only 
disconcerted trials of a variety of tactics aimed to balance various threats and 
preserve the Russian colonial regime in the region. They were carried out in the 
institutionalized context of societal transformation leading to ethno-
nationalization of the local populations. The fusion of Tsarist policies of non-
interference in the traditional settled structures, ethno-nationalization of some 
nomads and Russification through settlements, was applied in Central Asia 
without intentions of establishing relevant institutions, which were deemed 
unnecessary since modernization of the region was not a tsarist priority.  
In total, eleven men served as governors-general of Turkestan, starting 
with General Romanovskiy (1865-67) and ending with General Kuropatkin (1914-
17). Governor-general had significant powers, including the right to appoint 
provincial governors and expel persons from Turkestan on the basis of their 
unfavourable political affiliation. Local people would even call governors-general 
iarim posho (half-king). 
 Central Asia under tsarist control experienced an economic development 
that benefited the Russian state and harmed the native population through the loss 
of land to settlers, growth of detrimental cotton monoculture, and dependence on 
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food imports and finished products from Russia. The indigenous people of the 
region were treated by the tsarist Russia as what today would be termed as 
‘second-class citizens’ because of their official status as inorodtsi. Moreover, the 
new electoral law of 1907 issued before the elections of the third State Duma 
referred to Central Asian, as well as Polish and Caucasian, peoples as ‘politically 
immature’, thus ruling out any political representation at the Russian centre 
level.415  
The fact that the local male population was not required to perform 
military service turned out to be an advantage when the First World War broke 
out. Local young men were not recalled to distant battlefields in Europe. 
Nonetheless, official reports pointed to the increasing alarm at the anti-
government mood of certain sections of the population in the years before the 
outbreak of the war. Native farmers protested against land seizures or tax burdens, 
whilst new settlers were increasingly critical of the administration. The indirect 
rule of Central Asia granted limited autonomy and self-government to some 
territories, while the tsarist authority ruled through local elites. Lands inhabited by 
local people were appropriated, a system of taxes and levies was imposed and the 
practice of non-equivalent good exchanges was introduced. The demographic 
policy of the imperial Russia towards the region was one of cultural assimilation 
and social oppression.416 
The difficulties caused by the war only increased resentment, especially as 
prices rose, shortages increased, and some Russian settlers were drafted into the 
army. Even though initially the indigenous population was excluded from military 
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service, Russia became more desperate to boost its troop numbers and the Russian 
government issued a decree in 1916 instructing that large numbers of Central 
Asian men be drafted for labour behind the battle lines. The insulting nature of 
that decree and widespread rumours provoked a number of uprisings in Central 
Asia against tsarist authorities and Russian settlers. Many of them were also 
unhappy about getting recruited into a war in which one of the enemies was 
Turkey, the guardian of the holy places of Islam at that time. The revolt also 
reflected deep seated grievances that had built up over previous years as local 
farmers and nomads became impoverished by excessive demands and the Russian 
settlement policy.  
In mid-July of 1916, some 10,000 people gathered in Osh city chanting 
“we will not fight” and “we will not give our sons”. 417 By August of that year, the 
revolt had reached the northern areas. Russian authorities were taken by surprise 
and were baffled by serious casualties on their side. They were able to suppress 
the revolts by November, but with the staggering loss of life among the local 
population. They Kyrgyz were especially hard hit, because their attacks on the 
Russian settlers in the vicinity of the lake Issyk Kul were particularly violent, and 
the resulting repression was that much harsher.418 Russian forces burnt down 
Kyrgyz settlements and around a third of the Kyrgyz population fled across the 
border to the Uighur Sinkiang in eastern Turkestan. In addition to the 100,000 
Kyrgyz deaths, the revolt had major economic consequences because rural labour 
forces were depleted by population loss and conscription. All these factors further 
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added to the tense relations between the Russians and Kyrgyz, and also fed into 
the revolutionary fervour of 1917.  
As Kuropatkin, the last governor-general of Turkestan, planned for the 
aftermath of the rebellion and looked forward to taking advantage of the vacated 
land by the fleeing Kyrgyz, tsarist Russia began to crumble at the centre. Although 
the attitude of the Russian provisional government led by Kerenskiy after the 
February 1917 revolution was ambiguous with respect to Central Asia, the change 
in the centre provided the native people with some liberties they had not enjoyed 
before.419 During that time, Central Asian populations could form their own 
organizations, freely publish newspapers, and make political demands. Thus, later 
in April 1917 the first congress of Turkestan Muslims was held in Tashkent that 
created the Turkestan Musliman Merkezi Shurasi (Central Council of 
Turkestanian Muslims) and elected Mustafa Chokay as its president. 
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Map 5. Tsarist Central Asia in 1917 
 
 
Source: Geiss, P. (2005). Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia. London, Routledge 
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3.0 Ethnicity and nationality in Soviet Central Asia  
 
 
3.1 Marxist-Leninist perspective on nationhood  
 
Before going to the discussion of the Bolshevik and Soviet policies in regard to 
nationhood in Central Asia, a brief assessment of the original Marxist and Leninist 
perspectives on ‘the national question’ could provide a useful background. 
Marxism rejected the perennialist idea of the nation as a natural category, 
proposing instead that the concept of nation was a historical construct. The 
traditional Marxist debate on nationalism approached the concept in terms of the 
struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism. This dichotomy reflected the 
action of capitalist classes and native bourgeoisie pursuing their economic interest 
under the cover of an instrumental national ideology.  
For Marxists, the term ‘nation’ was seen as anathema, because Marxism 
aspired to the creation of a new, universal, supra-national community. Nationhood 
represented a form of false consciousness that masked the class character of 
society, and therefore to focus on ethnicity or nationality would be to miss the real 
driving force behind political conflicts. The Communist Manifesto boldly stated 
that the ‘worker has no country’. The Marxist emphasis on the constructedness of 
the nation resembles broader assumptions underlying the constructivist 
perspective on nationhood of today, except for its narrow focus on capitalism as 
the key factor. Marxism holds that the development of capitalism brought with it 
the creation of modern nations. Modern nations are so dependent on capitalism 
that the end of capitalism would mean the beginning of the end of modern nations 
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too. Considering nations as by-products of capitalism, Marxists ruled out any 
space for these categories in the new socialist world order. According to Marxism, 
the concept of nationhood had no value in itself. Class could only be the only 
legitimate organizing principle in the socialist state.  
Lenin and the Russian Social Democrats largely concurred and supported 
the Marxist interpretation of the national question. They developed it further and 
modified in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Social Democrats saw 
nationality as middle-class phenomenon opposite to the interests of the proletariat. 
They rejected federalism and preferred large centralized state. The worker’s 
allegiance must be to the higher community of proletarians rather than to that of 
the nation. The teachings of Lenin predicted that nations were destined to die, 
passing into history and replaced by a new form of socialist internationalism. 
After the national question in the tsarist Russia gained prominence in the 
second decade of the twentieth century, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had to 
increase their attention to it and re-think their approach. Lenin claimed that 
capitalist mode of production, economic specialization, increased trade and 
improved communication led to the unification of national economy and the 
centralization of national state. Stalin, on the behest of Lenin, wrote that: 
Modern nations are a product of a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. 
The process of the abolition of feudalism and the development of capitalism was 
also the process of formation of people into nations.420  
 
 
As Leninism considers all questions in their historical settings, it views ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’ under the given historical conditions. The national movement 
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emerges at the time when feudalism is disintegrating and capitalism is asserting 
itself, and coincides with the formation of nations. Accordingly, in the early 
period of capitalism, the national movement led by the bourgeoisie had as its 
objective the struggle against oppression by other nations and the creation of a 
national state. At the later stage, such nationalism existed in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries.  
The ruling classes of Europe established the imperialist system of colonial 
and semi-colonial oppression in many undeveloped countries, where bourgeois 
nationalism took hold.421 It is because European imperialism had conquered many 
regions before modern capitalist nations emerged, nations had to develop in those 
regions under the conditions of imperialist rule. According to Leninist, these 
‘oppressed nationalities’ therefore acquired the characteristics of nationhood 
under the adverse conditions in which national economic and political 
development is distorted by the needs and strain of imperialism. Stalin vividly 
described national oppression as “the system of exploitation and robbery of 
oppressed peoples, the measures of forcible restriction of the rights of oppressed 
nationalities, resorted to by imperialist circles”.422  
Leninist theory of nationalism viewed nationhood in precise, scientific 
terms. Stalin defined nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.423 The existence of a 
nation was therefore objective, rather than subjective matter. The Bolshevik 
regime held that a nation must have four basic characteristics: common economic 
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life, common language, common territory and common national character. Even 
though Stalin defined the nation in historically contingent terms, the definition 
itself includes elements of a primordialist approach, which was a departure from 
the original constructivist position of the Social Democrats. That may have been 
the reason why, according to Suny, the consequent Soviet state practices devoted 
significant time and energy to connect specific peoples to specific territories, 
primordialize nationalities by employing anthropologists and historians in order to 
establish the original moment of ethno-genesis.424 
Lenin and Stalin opposed the idea that regionally dispersed people 
constituted a nation because they would not possess the four basic characteristics 
of a nation. Thus, they believed that the Jewish people, for example, could not act 
as a nation for that reason. In this regard, Stalin was unequivocal:  
For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists 
of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of 
which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), 
inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act 
together, whether in time of peace or in time of war? 425 
 
 
According to Lenin, there were two tendencies in the national question under 
capitalism.426 The first is the awakening and growth of national movements, the 
struggle against national oppression and the creation of national states. The second 
is the establishment of economic and other ties between nations and the break-
down of national barriers. The aim of the Leninist solution of the national question 
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is to bring about the international unity of the proletariat in the struggle for 
socialism. The indispensable condition for achieving that goal is the struggle for 
the complete equality of all nations. Lenin described the Marxist-Leninist program 
on the national question as follows: 
As democrats we are irreconcilably hostile to any, however slight, oppression of 
any nationality and to any privileges for any nationalities. As democrats, we 
demand the right of nations to self-determination in the political sense of that 
term... We demand unconditional equality for all nations in the state and the 
unconditional protection of the rights of every national minority.427  
 
 
Lenin’s slogan of self-determination of nations was a pragmatic move, as he grew 
conscious of the potential of national liberation movements to become temporary 
allies in the revolutionary struggle.428 The tactical nature of Lenin’s self-
determination ideas was evidence in the fact that the national question was 
formally understood as the problem of abolishing national oppression and national 
inequality, freeing the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries 
from the imperialist yoke, and establishing national equality and fraternal 
cooperation between peoples.429 Liberation from imperialist oppression was seen 
as not only a matter for the people of the country fighting for its liberation, but 
also in the interest of the whole international proletariat.  
Having considered the above assessment of the Leninist approach to the 
nationality question, it is striking to realize that the state that emerged from the 
October Revolution adopted nationhood as a major organizing principle and 
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institutionalized ethnicity and nationality. Suny describes the consequences of the 
crucial change in policy in the following way:  
Nationality was institutionalized into the Soviet system as a category of identity, 
a passport to privilege (or discrimination), and a claim to political power in 
national republics. Moreover, the idea of nationness fluctuated between a more 
contingent understanding of nationality as the product of historical development 
to a more primordial sense that nationality was deeply rooted in the culture, 
experience, mentality, even biology of individuals.430  
 
 
Leninist theorists held contradictory views, for example assuming the possibility 
of having nations without nationalism, and they tried to introduce incompatible 
policies of promoting nationalism and communism, which made the Soviet 
solution of the national question contradictory and unsuccessful in the end. The 
following sections will illustrate how the institutionalizing policies of nationalities 
were established, implemented and became rooted in the Soviet Central Asia. 
 
 
3.2 The Bolshevik regime in Central Asia  
 
In Tashkent, the Bolshevik Revolution was replicated only a few days after the 
events had occurred in Petrograd. On 15 November 1917, the third Regional 
Congress of the Soviets proclaimed the authority of the new regime in Central 
Asia. This authority was to be administered by the local government, 
Turkestanskii Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Turkestan Council of People's 
Commissars, or Turksovnarkom). Local people did not participate in the 
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revolution. The Bolsheviks were viewed the Russian and colonial power, and only 
the Jadids of Bukhara and Khiva joined the Bolshevik camp, after the bitter 
experience of persecuted under the previous regime. The tsarist stereotypes about 
local populations persisted in the minds of the Bolshevik leadership, who tended 
to see Muslims as culturally backward, politically immature for communist 
membership and requiring big brother’s tutelage. For example, one party member 
tried to explain the lack of Muslim representation in the Soviets by asserting that: 
“It was not that the political leadership ignored the Muslims – it was simply that 
they were culturally more backward than the rest of the population, and thus the 
revolutionary groups had no influence over them”.431 The Bolsheviks continued to 
speak the tsarist language juxtaposing ‘backward’ and ‘civilized’ nations, 
‘peasant’ and ‘proletarian’ peoples, while Russians were held among the more 
civilized and proletarian.432 
The Bolshevik leadership war aware of the risk that Central Asians could 
become hostile to the new regime and promised liberation and self-determination 
of all the occupied peoples of the former tsarist empire. That intention was 
explicitly reflected in two proclamations of Turksovnarkom, issued on 2 and 20 
November 1917, as well as in Lenin’s appeal to ‘all Muslim workers of Russian 
and the East’ of 24 November 1917. For the first year, instructions from the centre 
that native population should be recruited into the Party, government and the Red 
Army were ignored at the local level. That can be explained by the ravaging civil 
war at the time, which separated Turkestan from Russia and made insubordination 
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possible. But the priority for the Bolsheviks was to win over the local population 
to the revolution, and therefore they did not attack local Islamic and tribal 
institutions directly. Roy puts forward other crucial reasons for the initial hands-
off approach of the Bolsheviks: “The repression of the national Muslim 
movements in the first quarter of 1918, and the resulting alliance between 
Muslims and the Whites; the revolt of the basmachis; the risk of Bolshevik power 
coming to be seen as colonialism; and finally the hope of being able to use 
Muslim go-betweens as a way of promoting political agitation in British India, 
Persia and Turkey – all those were instrumental factors in persuading Lenin to put 
a break on outright Bolshevisation”.433  
Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin discounted the importance of 
nationalism and supported a policy of regional autonomy, where political-
administrative institutions are not based on ethnic lines.434 After the revolution, 
however, as some of the nations gained independence from tsarist Russia and were 
opposed to an imperial centre, Lenin realized that the formation of a union state 
would require substantial concessions to national rights.435 He found himself 
between two poles: needing some national assimilation for state survival but 
unwilling to assuage the national crisis through substantive action for fear of 
destabilizing the union.436  
In the period between the October Revolution and 1924, the Bolsheviks 
treated the peoples of Central Asia as one Muslim Turkestanian nation. That is 
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why Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was established 
on 30 April 1918, at the end of the fifth Regional Congress of the Soviets of 
Turkestan. That was in line with the instructions brought from Moscow by P. A. 
Kobozev who later became chairman of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK). 
The Bolsheviks initially seemed to have accepted the pre-revolutionary tribal 
definitions.  The Kyrgyz were considered a distinctive tribal group within the 
Kazakh nomadic community (then known as Kyrgyz), which is why they referred 
to the Kyrgyz as ‘Kara-Kyrgyz’. The territory of the Kyrgyz populations was also 
included in the new TASSR.  
After the initial years of the Bolshevik rule in Central Asia, Russians were 
undecided if Turkestan should become a monolithic politico-ethnic entity or 
whether it should be divided up into smaller segments. That dilemma transcended 
the administrative and political borders of Turkestan, because many Muslim 
leaders viewed the whole of Central Asia in its broadest sense as Turkestan, which 
included Kazakhstan, Bashqurtistan, and Tatarstan.437  
At the fifth Regional Communist Party Congress, held in Tashkent in 
January 1920, local members of the Party scored the greatest political victory they 
would ever attain within the Communist Party framework. On 17 January 1920, 
the Congress adopted the following resolution: 
In the interest of the international unity of workers and oppressed peoples, be it 
resolved that we shall oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of 
Turkic nationals to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, 
Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Uzbeks and others, and to establish small separate 
republics. Instead, with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples who 
so far have not been included within the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic), it is proposed to unify them within a Turkic Soviet Republic, 
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and wherever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different 
Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity.438 
 
 
The resolution had far-reaching implications for Central Asia. Even though close 
ties with Russia were not disputed, the Central Asian delegates envisioned a 
Turkic Soviet Republic of vast size and with the common Turkic/Muslim identity. 
Further to that resolution, the Ryskulov group made a number of other demands: 
1) renaming of TASSR as the Turkic Republic; 2) replacing the Communist Party 
of Turkestan with the Communist Party of the Turkic Peoples; and 3) dissolving 
of the Turkkomissiia on the grounds that it had violated the autonomy of 
Turkestan. Even though such demands by local nationalists may in retrospect 
appear idealistic, they were the result of a majority vote of the Communist Party of 
Turkestan that reflected the ethnic composition of the area.  
The communist authorities became increasingly aware that Muslim 
nationalism in Turkestan might challenge the socialist unity, as envisaged by the 
Leninist formula. Moscow leaders became fearful of the popular appeal of 
champions of pan-Turkic national unity and charismatic figures such as Sultan 
Galiev, Turar Ryskulov, Mustafa Chokai, and Enver Pasha. The Bolshevik 
authorities realized that, if they allowed supra-national sentiment to further 
develop in Turkestan, they might not be able to control and re-channel it into the 
preferred proletarian ideology. It was at the point of the growing pan-Turkic 
movement in Central Asia, the Communist Party and the Red Army intervened 
and resolved to break up the unification movements of pan-Turks.  
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The Bolsheviks started to think of ways to prevent the formation of pan-
Turkic sentiments by preventing the establishment of political or territorial entities 
and facilitating smaller national units. The Muslim Socialist Communist Party was 
dissolved in November 1918. On 8 March 1920, Moscow sent unambiguous 
instructions, according to which the Communist Party of Turkestan were to 
become a part of the Communist Party of Russia with the status of a regional 
branch. The instructions also stated that there could be no question of a Turkic 
republic. In regard to the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the 
commissariats of defence, foreign affairs, railroads, finances, and postal services 
had to fall under the jurisdiction of their federal counterparts.439 The communist 
ethnographer Ian Rudzutak commented on the change in Moscow’s perspective in 
the following way: “I cannot agree with the decision to create a Turkic republic. 
This decision was reached under the influence of nationalists. In any event, a 
single Turkic people does not exist; there are Turkmen, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and 
Uzbeks”.440  
Such was the resolution of the political struggle for Turkestan. The 
Bolsheviks were able to first neutralize the insubordinate Russian elements who 
failed to treat politically acceptable natives as equals, and then to design the future 
of the former tsarist colony according to its Leninist ideas and wishes and against 
those of the local population. Some Russian functionaries at the local level and 
pan-Turks were upset by the dissolution of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic. For example, Paskutskii, the Chairman of the Central Asian 
Economic Council, wanted all three Central Asian Republics to be joined into a 
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single unit.441 When Russians of pro-Turkestan bias argued that it was 
economically unsound to divide the large unit to a series of smaller republics, they 
would be silenced by the charge of Russian chauvinism and be reassured that 
economic plans would be coordinated. 
After the Red Army won a military victory in Central Asia, the Bolsheviks 
faced an acute problem of establishing a stable political order and had to deal with 
the nationalist dilemma. They still believed that socialism demanded equality 
between nations, but also felt that the reunion of most, if not all, of the tsar’s 
dominions under the Soviet flag served the strategic interests of socialism.442 
Those calculations by Russian Communists conditioned the formative years of the 
Soviet Union.   
The Bolsheviks hoped that the new political order would be supported by 
the local populations in the region, and therefore decide to create a façade of 
equality and sovereignty of nations by establishing a federal Soviet Union based 
on the Marxist-Leninist dictum -‘national in form but socialist in content’. The 
directive was clear: nations were to be seen but not heard. The communist elite 
consequently used three strategies in order to reinforce the ‘national forms’ as well 
as to prevent their spilling over into ‘content’. Those strategies included language 
policy, the recruiting and purging of elites, as well as the re-distribution and 
gerrymandering of national groups.443  
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Slezkine points to a tension in the following summary of Lenin’s views of 
nations as present but disappearing entities: “Nations might not be helpful and 
they might not last, but they were here and they were real”.444  But, he adds that: 
“Insofar as national culture was a reality, it was about language and a few 
‘domestic arrangements’: nationality was ‘form.’ ‘National form’ was acceptable 
because there was no such thing as national content”.445 
Further, as Connor’s analysis of theoretical and policy implications of the 
national in form and socialist in content formula in the communist states 
persuasively illustrates, the form became the father of content.446 In addition, in 
the ideological competition between nationalism and Marxism, as the demise of 
the Soviet Union vividly exemplifies, the former decisively won. In the words of 
Connor:  
“When communism and nationalism have been wedded in the popular mind, 
Communist movements have found broad acceptance. When communism and 
nationalism have been perceived as at odds, such movements have tended to be 
spurned”.447   
 
 
Fuelled by apprehension that proletarianism was not well developed in Central 
Asia, Lenin championed the principle of national self-determination. This was 
justified on the grounds that national self-promotion, if directed by the Bolsheviks, 
would accelerate the transition to socialism. Lenin believed that the elemental 
forces of nationalism could be harnessed to the goals of socialist revolution. The 
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Marxist-Leninist rationale expected a small role for peasants and nomads in the 
new socialist society. And when Central Asia fell to the Soviet dominion as a 
spoil of war against the monarchist opposition, Lenin saw the creation of artificial 
national communities as a stage-skipping step toward revolutionary 
transformation in Central Asia. 
In pursuit of that policy, Bolsheviks included what they perceived as 
culturally similar population groups in newly created administrative units and 
developed literary languages for each of those units. They promoted newly 
created, codified languages by introducing compulsory education on the basis of 
these languages. In addition, Bolsheviks established cultural institutions for the 
discovery and protection of primordial cultural traditions of the newly-formulated 
nations. Through such state institutions the Soviets tried to mainstream the 
socialist interpretation of these cultural and ethnic traditions. They also used 
nationality as an administrative principle in order to achieve socialist goals in the 
society. 
It is important to address the continuity between tsarism and Bolshevism in 
three fundamental areas of policy: Islam, ethno-national grouping and 
rearrangement of administrative borders. A three-fold approach to Islam was 
pursued under both the tsarists and the Bolsheviks; repression, utilisation of 
‘progressive’ mullahs, and the organization of the world of Islam through 
conservative and functionarized clergy.448 Islam was seen as a threat by both the 
tsarist and Soviet regime, hence the constant drive to repress it. As tsarist 
authorities supported the modernizing influence of Tatar Muslims in Central Asia, 
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the Bolsheviks tried to promote red, Jadid mullahs between 1921 and 1927. Both 
regimes used the official religious groups to support and legitimate the ruling 
policy. In terms of the functionarized clergy, the tsars and the Soviets ruled out the 
idea of one single mufti for the whole Muslims population of the empire, and 
instead opted for multiple functional muftiyyas in separate administrative 
divisions but with a supra-national constituency.   
In regard to ethno-nationalization, the Bolsheviks were far advanced in 
their achievements, but they followed the lead of their tsarist counterparts. Even 
though tsarist did not succeed in the facilitation of nation-construction in Central 
Asia, they had tangible results in promoting Tatar ethnicity based on the belief that 
an ethnic entity was defined by its language. Having recognized a Tatar language 
and culture, the tsarist authorities created a Cyrillic alphabet for the Tatars who 
converted to Orthodox Christianity, thus bringing them closer to Tatar nationhood. 
But tsarist ethno-nationalizing policy of the Tatars was paradoxical: “Tatar was 
being promoted as a ‘national’ language and destroyed as a vehicular language; it 
was forbidden in Kazakhstan at the same time as it was being institutionalised in 
Tatarstan”.449 That paradox is explicated by the constant pressure of pan-Turkism 
and pan-Islamism, which applied equally to tsarists and Bolsheviks. The second 
method of ethno-nationalization was to encourage the division of Muslims into 
smaller, national groups and strengthen their respective identities. Tsarist Russia 
tried that with the tribal groups in Central Asia but had limited success. In fact, the 
Soviets continued to implement the tsarist invention of the ethnic census primarily 
defined by language. Roy points out that there was a similarity in the methodology 
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employed by tsarism and Bolshevism to institutionalize nationhood: “The 
instrument of this ‘nationalities’ policy under both the tsars and the Soviets were 
ethnography and linguistics. Soviet ethnography in its empirical version was a 
direct inheritance from the Russian ethnography of the nineteenth century, as was 
Soviet linguistics”.450  
The division of the existing territorial entities and the artificial creation, 
and re-alignment, of new political territorial entities were the two policies first 
exercised by tsarists and then continued by Soviets. As was mentioned previously, 
the tsarist administration made much use of administrative division in Central 
Asia for political ends. As will be described in consequent sections, the Soviet 
regime will perfect the policy in the national delimitation of Central Asia. 
Moreover, the nature of the administrative structure of tsarist Russia and the 
Bolshevik state was inherently colonial, with all its consequences. In that context, 
Suny describes the following hierarchical tendencies:   
Instead of equality, two kinds of hierarchy developed in the USSR: an imperial 
relationship between the Soviet center and the non-Russian peoples, in which the 
increasingly territorialized nations remained subordinate to the dictates and 
requirements of Moscow’s all-Union goals; and what Jeremy Smith has called a 
‘national hierarchisation’, in which certain nationalities, like the titular 
nationalities of the republics, were considered superior to others within the 
republic and in which Russians often held a special place of privilege no matter 
where they lived.451  
 
 
With regard to the prevailing form of political community, there was little 
variation in the new regime in comparison to pre-Soviet patrimonialism in Central 
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Asia.452 If during tsarist era the political order in Central Asia was based on 
relations of subservience and political loyalty between the local beg and the 
supreme khan/emir or between the military commander and the tsar, then such 
relations continued to exist in the Soviet Union between first secretaries of the 
raion (district) and oblast´ (province) party committees, and between first 
secretaries of oblast´ committees and those of the republics’ central committees.  
The Bolshevik regime encountered local resistance from what they called 
‘Basmachi’ (bandit) movement. The movement leaders were seen however by 
much of the indigenous population as popular national heroes. Basmachi rebels 
enjoyed considerable popular support and virtually controlled the Ferghana Valley 
for a while. In late 1919, armed groups were able to take over Osh, Jalalabad and 
Naryn, but gradually they were pushed back due to internal squabbles and in part 
by the successful Bolshevik strategy of carrot and stick.  
In the summer of 1919, Mikhail Frunze was sent to lead the Red Army in 
Central Asia. Together with the newly created Turkestan Commission, Frunze 
brought the fighting to an end and pledged that the Bolsheviks would 
accommodate traditional ways of life of the local peoples. Under such terms and 
promises, the Basmachi campaign gradually weakened and its leaders eventually 
gave themselves up or fled into exile.  
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3.3 Ethno-nationalization in Soviet Central Asia   
 
 
3.3.1 Soviet nationalities policy 
 
There were two elements to the soviet nationalities policy. The first explains the 
Soviet emphasis on nationality as power politics and a strategy to secure Russia’s 
dominance in Central Asia. The second relates ethno-nationalization to 
modernization and societal transformation in the region. Following the logic of 
power-politics, the Bolshevik’s promotion of nationality as an organizing 
principle was a tactical concession to the local populations, which were intended 
as a “temporary solution only, as a transitional stage to a completely centralized 
and a supra-national world-wide Soviet state”.453 The concessions were formal 
rather than real, because the real power remained within the central Communist 
Party. However in the Central Asian context, the strategy of the divide and rule 
dictated the destruction of genuine national movements in the form of pan-
Turkism and pan-Islamism and their replacement with the newly-invented national 
identities.  
Moreover, Connor identifies four international concerns that drove the 
Soviet nationalities policy.454 First, the national entities satisfied the national 
aspirations in the borderland of the Soviet Union. Second, it galvanized support 
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from the peoples of the colonial world by demonstrating the liberated status of the 
former tsarist colonies. Third, it was meant to appeal to the ethnic kinsmen of the 
borderland groups outside the Soviet state. Fourth, it served as international 
propaganda to prove the Soviet respect for national rights of self-determination, 
which was featuring heavily in the global politics at the time.  
 The Soviet nationalities policy was also connected to societal 
transformation triggered by the Bolshevik regime. Slezkine identifies three main 
factors that led to the adoption of transformational ethno-nationalization by 
Bolsheviks.455 First, they believed that it was necessary to ‘preach’ in the local 
languages, and that language was a transparent medium, without any connection to 
a ‘national form’. Second, the promotion of national identities was considered 
necessary in order to overcome national mistrust among the non-Russian groups, 
hence Lenin’s emphasis on the ‘bad’ nationalism of Russian chauvinism. Third, 
the promotion of nationality was aimed to ‘catch-up’ economically, socially and 
culturally with the Russian nation.  
 In Affirmative Action Empire, Terry Martin argues that the Bolsheviks 
considered the nation as a historically inevitable stage of the wider modernization 
process, and claims that Lenin and Stalin, being aware of the development of 
defensive minority nationalism, promoted national identities to the point of 
affirmative action in favour of the potential minority nationalists.456 Hirsch takes a 
step further and asserts that the Soviet nationalities policy was a modernization 
and development strategy aimed to modernize backward peoples and organize 
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them into nations in the context of a ‘unified state with a colonial type 
economy’.457 Such ‘state-sponsored evolutionism’ tried to develop ‘double 
assimilation’, national affiliation within a more fundamental allegiance to the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, Jeremy Smith maintains that the national framework 
became to be seen by the Bolsheviks as part of a solution in the short term, 
enabling them to consolidate their regime through the means of national loyalties, 
as well as in the long term by achieving modernization, improving local 
conditions in backward regions, and establish the grounds required for 
socialism.458 
 The nationalities policy shortly after the October Revolution resulted in the 
reorganization of administrative borders. Shifting his initial course, Lenin set 
about dividing the Turkic peoples of Central Asia into smaller segments in an 
effort to prevent the development of a nationalist coalition antagonistic to 
socialism.459 That policy became to be known as natsional΄noe razmezhevanie 
(national territorial delimitation). In October 1919, a special Turkestan 
Commission was established to explore the national delimitation of the region 
based on ‘the ethnographic and economic circumstances of the territory’.460  
In the 1920s, the goal of Soviet nationalities policies in Central Asia was 
to create separate national republics through natsional΄noe razmezhevanie, based 
mainly on ethno-linguistic criteria. Central Asian people had justified fears that 
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Moscow’s strategy was designed to split the Turkic peoples and to fragment the 
economy in an effort to divide and rule.461 Despite their objections, national 
delimitation was carried out, and Central Asia was divided into several Soviet 
socialist republics none of which had an independent existence as nation-states 
prior to the Soviet rule. Bhavna Dave asserts that the delimitation indeed “forged a 
sense of territorial nationhood by identifying distinct nationalities from a plethora 
of ethnic, sub-ethnic, clan and religious groupings”.462  
In implementing the policy of territorial delimitation, Soviet ethnographers 
had to deal with a number of problems. The ethno-linguistic situation in Central 
Asia was extremely confused and complex. The delimitation did not therefore 
uniformly contribute to ethno-national territorialization in Central Asia, which is 
why “the category ‘Uzbek’ underwent considerable expansion through the 
assimilation of numerous ethnic groups located on its territories, evolving into a 
new identity discontinuous from the ‘historical’ Uzbek identity.463 For example, in 
some areas such as the present-day southern Uzbekistan and southern Tajikistan, 
Uzbeks and Tajiks had become so inter-mixed that it was difficult to distinguish 
between them.464 As was earlier described, there was no sense of ethnic or 
national identity in Central Asia at the time. Local population often did ascribe 
themselves in ethnic terms, not to mention nationally, because their identities were 
based on the tribal name, the name of their town (Bukhoroli, Samarqandli, etc.), or 
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the religion. The term ‘Sart’ was not an ethnic term and could refer to both 
Uzbeks and Tajiks. A distinct territorial identity was also weak. Given those 
crucial difficulties, the solutions that the Bolsheviks adopted were far-fetched and 
eventually created a whole new set of problems, which resurfaced later on during 
glasnost΄ era. Since Sart was not an ethnic category and acquired a pejorative 
bourgeois connotation, it was banned from use. Thus, Sarts were no longer listed 
in the official 1926 population census, and the term was replaced by the all-
encompassing term Uzbek on the grounds that there was little difference between 
Sart and Uzbek communities and languages.465  
It is difficult to pinpoint the specific authors of the national delimitation 
strategy, but it is clear that Stalin played a substantial role. In Central Asia, 
Faizulla Khozhaev and his allies could be singled out as major proponents of the 
delimitation. The 1920 proposal for a division of Turkestan might have provided 
the basic outline for it, but the proposal had to be augmented by Faizulla 
Khozhaev's recommendations on ways of dealing with Bukhara and Khiva.466 
Notably, there was a local opposition to Faizulla Khozhaev’s vision. Turar 
Ryskulov and his supporters called for larger multinational units and were 
strongly opposed to a partition in 1924.  
Still in 1922, when the treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union was 
signed, no ethnic group in Central Asia had a national/republican status. So in the 
early 1920s, there was also considerable discussion of the administrative and 
territorial structures to be devised for the new state in the Kyrgyz land. 
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Considerable debate took place as to whether the region of present-day Kyrgyzstan 
should be included in Turkestan, Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation (RSFSR). 
Stalin was in favour of the principle ‘autonomization’, the transformation of 
certain republics into autonomous republics of Russia, but Lenin rejected such 
‘autonomization’ and favoured a federation of equal republics. During the national 
demarcation of 1924, subordination to Russia was the final decision and the area 
became the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast΄.467 Later in 1936, the republic 
acquired the formal title of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) within 
the Soviet Union. 
Also in 1924, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR) was created 
with an autonomous Tajik republic within it. In 1929, Tajikistan achieved the 
status of a national republic, and became formally called the Tajik Soviet Socialist 
Republic (TSSR). In general, the territorial delimitation seemed to favour the 
dominant Uzbek majority over the Tajik minority. In the official interpretation, the 
ancestors of the modern Uzbek nation were all the sedentary peoples who used to 
inhabit the territory of the UzSSR. But the link to the nomadic Turkic-Mongolian 
tribes who came into Central Asia in the late 15th and early 16th centuries under 
the leadership of Sheibani Khan was often omitted. For example, the official 
Istoriia UzSSR (History of the UzSSR) states that:  
The Uzbek ethnic group (narodnost΄) is composed not of the fairly recently 
arrived nomadic ‘Uzbeks’ of the fifteenth century Kipchak Steppe, but of the 
ancient inhabitants of Soghdiana, Ferghana and Khorezm. From the earliest 
times they led a settled life and were occupied in cultivating the soil.468  
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The official line further added that Uzbeks descended not from the Turkic-
Mongolian group, but from the same Aryan base as the Tajiks because both had 
inhabited the same land.469 Similarly, Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda (History of 
the Tajik People) writes that Uzbeks and Tajiks have the same ethno-genetic 
roots, and maintains that: “the history of these two peoples may be graphically 
compared to two great branches emerging from the trunk of a single tree”.470 But 
there were visible differences between the two groups, language being one of 
them. Such differences were acknowledged by the Soviet ethnographers, and one 
explanation read that “an insignificant percentage of elements from another, 
Mongoloid, race, to which Turks and Mongols belonged, was deposited onto the 
Europoid base of the Uzbek population”.471 Meanwhile Tajiks constituted that part 
of the earlier population which, “to a lesser degree was subject to assimilation 
with Turkic tribes and preserved its language”.472  
On founding the Soviet Central Asian republics, state structures were re-
established in the region. Even though Europeans dominated the upper echelons of 
the state apparatus, native people who decided to become political allies of 
Bolsheviks could hold high positions in the Soviet government. On the other 
hand, local committees such as sovet aksakalov (soviets of elders) in mahallas and 
tribal villages were run by traditional elites, which was similar to the arrangement 
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during the tsarist rule. Even the Kazakh nationalists of Alash Orda (Horde of 
Alash), who initially opposed the Bolsheviks and tried to form an independent 
Kazakh government, joined the Kazakh Communist Party.473 In the period of New 
Economic Policy (NEP), local elites regained political influence on a regional 
level. 
As a result of the national territorial delimitation, the main losers were the 
idea of pan-Turkestan and Turkestan's politicians, while those who benefited were 
Bukhara and its Jadid leaders. Some scholars dubbed the Soviet delimitation 
policy in Central Asia as “parcelization of their ancient territory into artificial 
‘tribal republics’”.474 In his assessment of Moscow’s policies, Alexandre 
Bennigsen wrote that:  
There is little doubt that the wish to forestall the fashioning of a pan-Turkestan 
national consciousness around the hub of a common language – Chagatay - was 
central to the 1924 decision. One need only to recall that the Bolshevik leaders 
had to combat at the same period the ideas of Sultangaliev and his followers on 
the union of all Turks of Russia into a single republic, Turan.475 
 
 
The Soviet centre may have indeed exaggerated the threat from pan-Turkic 
nationalism, since it did not constitute a political mass movement, but rather 
remained a political discourse of the Jadid intelligentsia or the native 
Communists. Central Asian peoples did not have a chance to have become 
attached to the Soviet Turkestan, and no strong patriotism had emerged in 
response to Moscow's fragmentation and reformation scheme. This was primarily 
because local loyalties had never been linked to formal political boundaries drawn 
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by tsarist officials or by their Communist successors. Collective identities 
flourished at local or tribal levels instead. For settled population, they were 
manifested in the mahalla (urban community) and kishlak (village), and were 
expressed in a powerful Islamic identification. Since the Bolshevik delimitation 
policy mounted no direct attack against Islam or local traditions, there was no 
widespread mass opposition as a result. Therefore, the shared religious ties uniting 
Central Asian peoples had limited political relevance in regard to the Soviet 
delimitation experiment, unless they were directly to be tested and challenged by 
inept Russian policies.  
The relative ease with which the national territorial division was carried 
out indicated the longer-term difficulties that each republic would confront in 
internal integration and in creating a viable national cohesion. The grouping of 
diverse people with primarily local loyalties under one label resulted in 
circumscribing them within boundaries of a national republic of which they had 
little awareness. It drew together under one umbrella many people who shared 
‘objective’ common traits, while ‘subjective’ consciousness was lacking. This 
national amalgamation process did not and could not automatically erase the 
tribal, historical, and regional cleavages that had divided native communities. Nor 
could it eradicate shared religious loyalties reaching across the new boundaries. 
Tribal and clan feuds, which were crucial in the defeat of the Basmachi 
movement, would continue hindering the future Communist and in fact post-
communist nation-building in Central Asia. Thus, in her analysis of the 2004 
parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, Dave points to the “salience of informal 
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connections and networks, possibly mediated by clan and kinship factors, 
especially in the southern regions”.476 It is also interesting to recollect the article 
from the local newspaper Pravda vostoka, which reports the 1937 celebrations of 
the achievements of the Soviet nationalities policy and cites Uzbekistan's 
Communist leader, Akmal Ikramov, who describes how in 1924 the Soviet regime 
was trying to simplify the ethnic terrain through national consolidation in the 
following words: 
The Uzbek people up to the October socialist revolution were not yet fully 
developed and consolidated as a nation. The Uzbek toiling masses had not then 
recognized themselves as a single nationality. The Ferghana uzbeks usually were 
called kokandists, according to the name of the khanate; the Zarafshan, Kashka 
Darya, and Surkhan Darya peoples were not considered uzbeks (by the Uzbeks of 
that time). Khorezmians, for example, when travelling elsewhere were for some 
reason called Tajiks. And the Russian colonialists called all of them Sarts.477 
 
 
It is notable that through the policy of national delineation the Soviets contributed 
to the process of ethno-national differentiation in Central Asia. New political and 
educational elites were trained, who rejected the idea of a unified Turkestan and 
were more interested in the separate political existence of their ethnic groups. The 
relative ease with which the national delimitation was accomplished could 
indicate that some of the ethnic preconditions had already existed before the 
Bolshevik revolution, and therefore Khazanov suggests that calling this policy as 
artificial ethnic engineering may be unwarranted.478  
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In 1923, the twelfth Party Congress adopted the policy of korenizatsiia 
(indigenization), increasing the role of the national languages and seeking roots in 
the minority populations by recruiting national (indigenous) cadres to run national 
republics. Korenizatsiia was designed to bring about equality among nations by 
designating members of the titular nations for preferential treatment in their home 
republics. In the context of the confederal structure of the Soviet Union, it 
promoted consolidation around the nations whose members were given a 
privileged status, particularly in regions where a strong sense of national identity 
was lacking. On top of that, korenizatsiia policies encouraged not only a growing 
‘sense of spatial identity’ among native population toward their home republics 
but also a ‘sense of exclusiveness’ regarding their proper place in the national 
homeland.479  
The deference to newly-formed Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen 
nations symbolized more a goal of the Bolsheviks than it was a Bolshevik 
response to local reality and native demands. Thus, it would be more accurate to 
characterize the korenizational process as the establishment of national units in 
order to encourage invented nations rather than to claim that it was only a reaction 
to simmering Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, and Kyrgyz national consciousness. 
The policies of korenizatsiia were expected to ensure that the national 
problem would become more intractable over time, even with such equalization. 
They also guaranteed that nationalists would use territoriality as the primary 
strategy in the attempt to establish their control over the destiny of the nation. 
There is no doubt that that nationhood in the Soviet context became the essential 
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equivalent of national territoriality. For that reason, Terry Martin refers to the 
Soviet Union of korenizatsiia period as an ‘affirmative action empire’, and argues 
that one of the unique features of the Soviet Union was its ability to draw upon the 
experiences of the Habsburg empire in dealing with the nationalities question: 
“Russia’s new revolutionary government was the first of the old European 
multiethnic states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by 
systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and 
establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-
state”.480  
In the 1930s, central authorities realized that nationalism was 
strengthening at the expense of internationalism as a result of their nationalities 
policy and the socio-economic development. Politically, the Stalin years were 
most notable for the pervasive atmosphere of purge and terror. From the early 
1930s, Stalin sought to ensure central control over the republics and 
considerations of efficiency and loyalty took priority over previously asserted 
affirmative action. The intensity of external control of the state apparatus in 
Central Asia culminated during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. The purging of 
indigenous elites on spurious charges of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was increasing 
throughout the decade, culminating in the Great Purge of 1937-38.  
As it happened in other Soviet republics, Stalin ordered the purging of 
Central Asian national elites, including influential native communists. Some of 
the prominent victims of Stalin’s purges included the chairman of the Turkmen 
Supreme Soviet, Nederbai Aitakov; Kazakh historian, Turar Ryskulov; Uzbek 
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prime minister, Faizulla Khodzhayev; and the First Secretary of the Uzbek 
Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov.481 A renewed purge of party ranks was 
launched in late 1933. Over the course of two years it reduced membership of the 
Kyrgyz party from 19,932 to 6,385.482 Many others disappeared into the camps 
and execution cellars, or had their lives ruined as a result of kinship or friendship 
with ‘enemies of the people’. 
It is striking that as nationalist local elites were purged by the central 
authorities, the policy of mass-based korenizatsiia and the nationalization of the 
republics carried on. The authorities emphasized their best efforts to distinguish 
between the nationalistic elites, who should be treated as anti-communist deviants 
that must be eliminated, and the titular masses, whose national consolidation 
should be promoted further. Nonetheless, a shift in nationality policies was 
noticeable during the 1930s, which increasingly favoured Russians in the Soviet 
Union. And after 1938 and till 1953, the Russians were lauded as the ‘first among 
equals’, and this became the most prominent element in nationality policy of the 
Soviet state.  
Apart from the contradiction between the promotion of indigenization and 
the Russification simultaneously, but Stalin’s anti-nationalist programs of the 
Great Terror became counter-productive for the overall Soviet Union’s efforts to 
solve the national question. Stalin’s divergence from Lenin’s original policy was 
decried both by socialist reformers and nationalist elites during the late 1980s. The 
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dissatisfaction with that policy direction served as a catalyst in the political 
mobilization of the masses in favour of political decentralization and ultimately 
national independence.483 
In the post-war period, the notion of nations as identity communities 
within national homelands became mainstreamed. The nationality question facing 
the Soviet leaders in the last forty years of the Soviet Union’s existence was 
fundamentally different from that one which Lenin or Stalin had to deal with. 
During this period, the Soviet authorities and ethnographers wrote extensively 
about the next stage of national development, sblizhenie (drawing together) of 
nations. They also proclaimed that the national question had been resolved 
through international equalization. Although it was evident the national dialectic 
predicting the sovietization of the peoples through social modernization and 
international equalization did not realize. The process of national consolidation 
was described by Soviet ethnographers in terms of a national rastsvet (flowering) 
that accompanied socio-economic development. But according to the national 
dialectic, national consolidation was essentially complete and was being replaced 
by the internationalization of the masses.  
The international sblizhenie of nations was said to be creating a unique 
Soviet people, whose primary loyalty lay with the socialist state, even though they 
also ascribed to their national communities. The synthesis resulting from this 
dialectical process was defined as the sliianie (merger) of nations. That meant an 
actual end to national communities leading to edinstvo (unity) of the populations 
into one Soviet citizenry. In many official Soviet writing on the nationality 
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question, there was a trend indicating that the consolidation of nations was 
finalized, nations were drawing closer together, and it was only a matter of time 
before they disappeared entirely.  
The Soviet ethnography however did not always follow the widely 
accepted practice of a theory exploring and explaining the patterns of social facts. 
Quite the opposite, the grand Soviet ideology was supreme, while the ethno-
national theory was expected to illustrate how the social reality supported the 
doctrine. Olivier Roy in explaining Soviet ethnography’s role in Central Asian 
nation-formation states that: 
The ethnic group in question is not first defined by scientific analysis and then 
given administrative status. On the contrary, first it gets its status, and then it is 
up to the experts to find it a post facto scientific foundation.484   
 
 
Soviet theoreticians adopted at least two approaches to lay a firm foundation for 
the constructed national groups, ethno-genesis and linguistics.485 New Central 
Asian communities were ‘imagined’ according to the Leninist theory of 
nationalism, further elaborated by Stalin. One of the postulates of Stalin’s theory, 
published in Marxism and the Question of Nationalities, states that the nation is a 
“historically developed and stable community of people that has emerged on the 
basis of the commonality of their language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-ups as manifest in the community of culture … Absence of at 
least one of these traits is enough for a nation not to be a nation”.486  
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As was mentioned, Stalin’s perspective on nationality and ethnicity had 
elements of primordialism. However, Soviet theoreticians also incorporated some 
modernist aspects to nationhood. They argued that ethnic communities undergo 
the fusion process together with the development of the means of production. It 
could be argued that Soviet ethnography was based on a stage-based theory, which 
incorporated both primordialist and modernist views. Soviet ethnographers 
claimed that ethnic communities are formed through stage process, which 
involved stages that are congruent with the socio-economical development in the 
country. This theory is similar in spirit to Rostow’s prominent model of state’s 
economic development, which outlines five stages that a country needs to pass to 
achieve a desired economic development and modernity.487  
According to the Soviet theories, stages of nation-formation can be 
grouped into pre-Soviet and post-Soviet stages. The pre-Soviet stage progresses 
from plemennoe (tribal) to the capitalist nation. A traditional ethnic community 
has a tribal sense of identity with a self-sustaining subsistence form of production. 
The capitalist form of nationhood is created as a result of emerging capitalist 
socio-economical relations within the community and reinforced by the functional 
division of labour and the accumulation of capital in the society.  
The Bolsheviks argued that the capitalistic mode of community is 
undermined by the exploitation of the working class by the more powerful 
bourgeois class. They believed that the post-revolutionary stages towards socialist 
modernity would take the form of a process of rastsvet (flourishing), sblizhenie 
(coming together) and sliianie (unity). Their approach to nationhood fluctuated 
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between a contingent modernist perception of it as the product of historical 
development to a primordial understanding that it was deeply rooted in the culture, 
ancestry and biology of people. Suny observes that Soviet theorists held the 
contradictory views that nationality was passed on, like genes, from one 
generation to another, and that national differences would eventually grow less 
distinct and the Soviet nations would meld into a single Soviet nation.488  
It is important to note that, following Lenin’s interpretation of Marxist 
concept of the Asian mode of production, the Central Asian peoples were 
supposed to evolve from tribal community straight to the socialist flourishing, thus 
skipping capitalistic model of nationhood. Central Asia was therefore crucial for 
Soviet ethnographers because it was a social experiment that was hoped to prove 
the Soviet model of modernization. It also concerned the possibility of 
transforming tribal communities to a unified Soviet nation through post-
revolutionary stages and institutionalized structures.  
The assessment of the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy should be placed 
in the context of the consequent discussion, which will explore two different 
modes in which nationhood and nationality were institutionalized in the Soviet 
Union: territorial and political on the one hand, ethno-cultural and personal on the 
other hand. 
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3.3.2 Territorial and political institutionalization 
 
The 1919 Party Programme incorporated Lenin’s ideas on national equality and 
the right to secede, while stressing proletarian unity. Even though Stalin was in 
favour of the principle ‘autonomization’, the transformation of certain republics 
into autonomous republics of Russia, Lenin wrote to the Politburo rejecting 
‘autonomization’ and asserting that the RSFSR and other independent republics 
should federate as equals in a union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.489 
Thus, a ‘federal association of states’ was envisaged as ‘one of the transitional 
forms’ to ‘complete unity’.490  
The Soviet Union was therefore constructed as a federation of sovereign 
republics in order to provide the nations of the state with political and juridical 
equality. But that federation was a transitional form with two complementary and 
concomitant tendencies, the flourishing (ratsvet) of nations and the gradual 
coming together (sblizhenie) of nations, which would lead to the eventual merging 
(sliianie) of nations to the single Soviet proletariat. The Union Treaty of 1922 
(also known as ‘federal compromise’) established the Soviet Union and inscribed 
the equality to the larger non-Russian nationalities together with cultural and 
administrative autonomy within the Soviet federation. The federal units of the 
state were constructed on the basis of ethnic communities, followed by the 
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delimitation of national territories, which took place at the time when national 
consciousness was still a vague perception in the region.  
When the above-mentioned Union Treaty was signed, Central Asia 
resembled the tsarist administrative division, and no ethnic group in the region 
had a republican or national status. Bukhara and Khorezm (formerly Khiva) were 
independent People’s Soviet Republics, while Turkestan and Kazakhstan were 
part of the Russian federation (RSFSR). Later on, the Turkestan Republic and 
Bukharan and Khivan People’s Republics were transformed to the Turkmen and 
Uzbek Union Republics, whereas Tajikistan initially had the status of an 
autonomous republic within Uzbekistan before becoming a union republic in 
1929. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were first the autonomous republic and 
autonomous oblast’ respectively within the Russian Union Republic, and after the 
last re-organization in 1936 they obtained the status of union republic.  
National divisions in the Bolshevik Central Asia were reflected in the 
organization of the state apparatus. Even before the territorial delimitation of 
Central Asia, the Bolsheviks established a special ministry, the Narkomnats, in the 
central government to deal with the national question. In Turkestan, there was a 
parallel structure in the form of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs 
(Turkomnats). The first Regional Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan 
passed a resolution in June 1918 stating that Turkomnats were to mainstream the 
ideas of the Soviet regime among the local population, organizing the publication 
of communist literature in local languages, and recruiting native cadres to the 
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Party and Red Army.491 Shortly after the release of the Statute of the 
Commissariat for Nationality Affairs of the Turkestan Republic in February 1919, 
the Turkomnats was reshaped and had separate national divisions of Kazakhs, 
Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks.  
Those institutional and organizational changes in the early years of the 
Bolshevik regime were interpreted by the Soviets as part of the gradual 
implementation of the Leninist nationality policy aiming for national self-
determination. But Arne Haugen points to the pragmatism behind the national 
reorganization of the Turkomnats directed at facilitating the propagation of Soviet 
ideas among the indigenous population, and maintains that: “If the native 
population of the region were to adopt the message of the Soviet power, it was 
crucial that they be approached by people perceived of as ‘their own’ both 
linguistically and culturally, and not, at least not exclusively, by outsiders and 
foreigners”.492 In June 1922, the Turkomnats was abolished, and its national 
divisions were incorporated into the Turkestan Central Executive Committee 
(TsK).  
 The federal principle, through the national delimitation, resulted in the 
creation of five titular nationalities in Central Asia with separate state structures 
within the Soviet Union. It was the most prominent element of the 
institutionalization of nationhood in the region. The Soviet officials drew the 
boundaries of the new administrative units as close as possible to the apparent 
boundaries of ethnic communities. Their objective was “to have ethnicity, 
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territory, and political administration correspond as clearly as the science of the 
day allowed. But since ethnicity was an inherently fluid identity and lines between 
groups were often blurred, officials and ethnographers had to make sometimes 
arbitrary decisions about who belonged where”.493 Smith contends that the 
territorialization and politicization of ethnic groups were essential ingredients in 
the development of a national self-consciousness in the Soviet Union.494 
Stalin’s constant administrative re-organization after 1924 had a 
significant impact on Central Asia. It created an embryonic national state structure 
whose ranks were to be gradually filled by new national elite educated within the 
Soviet framework. The territorial political institutionalization ensured that when 
the Soviet Union dissolved there was a solid foundation for the newly independent 
country to build upon.  
As soviet socialist republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan eventually had all the external symbols of 
statehood: a national flag, a national anthem, a head of national state, relevant 
government ministers including that of foreign affairs, a national communist party, 
a national language, and so forth. The autonomous soviet socialist republics 
located within national republics had their own soviet, a cabinet of ministers with 
limited powers and a national language, which was taught at primary and 
secondary schools only.  
 The territorial institutionalization in Central Asia was only part of a 
classificatory process, which Benedict Anderson defines as ‘official nationalism’ 
in a European colonial context. The creation of borders defining the colonial 
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state’s realm of control and the representation and designation of the population 
used lead to the totalizing classificatory grid with the effect “to be able to say of 
anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not here”.495 The national 
delimitation policy in Central Asia created a similar classificatory grid, which 
contributed to the institutionalization of nationality and enabled the Soviets to 
classify local nations in line with the nationalities policy. Kaiser adds that the 
construction of national homelands, facilitated by the Soviet nationalities policy as 
federal structuring of the state, was particularly crucial for the nationalization of 
the masses.496 
There was also a strategic and political logic behind territorial 
nationalization. The first reason is explained by the pronounced determination to 
curb greater Russian nationalism as well as the less announced intention to curtail 
pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements. The Soviet administration was concerned 
of those popular supra-national movements to the same extent as the tsarist 
regime. So the Soviets reinforced the tsarist timid policy of differentiating and 
distinguishing ethnic groups and began to institutionalize some of them within 
nation-states. Roy also points to the strategic consideration of trans-border nature, 
which dictated that: “Nationalities were created as a function of the principle of 
the dual bridgehead, the idea being to favour ethnic groups which might serve as a 
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bridgehead to enable the USSR to extend beyond its frontiers and, inversely, to 
break up those which might function as bridgeheads for another power”.497   
The classification and territorialization of nationalities contributed to the 
gradual re-definition of distinct ethnic groups to bring them closer to the larger 
titular nationalities. In that regard, Glenn asserts that: “Although in general terms 
the Soviet nationalities policy was intended to represent, in institutional form, the 
various nationalities and ethnic groups within the federation, there were cases 
where the Soviet census served officially to eliminate differences within a state’s 
population by incorporating them under the imprecise and rather erroneous 
category of the titular nationality. In Central Asia, the use of the census 
endeavoured to merge the three pre-revolutionary ethnic layers of the Uzbek 
population”.498 In fact, throughout Soviet history boundaries were re-defined to 
conform to new and evolving understandings of nationhood, but “the basic 
principle of territorializing ethnicity and linking both to politics remained 
constant”.499 The changes of national status or territory were usually announced by 
the promulgation of decrees from the relevant soviets; the practice which would 
persist in the post-Soviet Central Asia.  
The national demarcation with its efforts to combine both ethnic principles 
and economic rationality and according to which a nationality was defined by a 
language and a territory led to well-documented anomalies and created the basis 
for future tensions. In particular, the division of the Ferghana Valley in the south 
of Kyrgyzstan left sizeable Uzbek communities, whose numbers would increase as 
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a result of administrative tinkering in 1936, stranded in the Kyrgyz part of the 
region. At the start of the Kyrgyz delimitation, the boundaries of the Kyrgyz SSR 
were disadvantageously drawn. Most of the fertile land of the Ferghana Valley 
was given to the settled and agriculturally oriented Uzbeks. That was not a 
problem in the early 1920s, because land was still available for grazing by 
nomadic groups wandering down from out of the high mountain passes. But by the 
time the extensive irrigation projects of the Ferghana Valley were developed due 
to the Soviet industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, the land became scarce and 
no longer available to the Kyrgyz nomads for grazing.  
Few Soviet ethnographers could acknowledge that the institutionalized 
ethno-nationalism was actually substituting the professed merging of Soviet 
nations. The reality on the ground pointed to national separatism becoming a more 
intractable problem, while the central authorities found themselves increasingly 
unable to deal with it. To the disappointment of Moscow the next stage of 
modernization became the indigenization of life in each national republic, instead 
of the internationalization, or sovietization, of the population.  
Once national republics were created, the internal borders of the Soviet 
Union catalysed the establishment of political and geographic basis for nations. 
From then onwards, national communities defined that territory as their 
homelands, while some nationalists also claimed territory beyond the borders of 
their republics. National homelands projected an exclusive image of nationhood 
held by each nation that contributed to shaping international relations in the 
context of the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. And because such nationalistic images 
of homeland are exclusive, members of other nations do not share the same mental 
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maps of home.500 As a consequence of these overlapping claims to homeland, 
border conflicts were bound to emerge throughout the territory of the former 
USSR, as they did after perestroika.  
 
 
3.3.3 Ethno-cultural and personal institutionalization 
 
The second mode in which nationhood was institutionalized in the Soviet Union 
was ethno-cultural and personal. The Soviet regime divided the citizenry into a set 
of comprehensive and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalities. Through such state 
classification system, ethnic nationality served both as a statistical category, and as 
an obligatory ascribed status.501 After the consolidation of Soviet power in Central 
Asia, language policy played a crucial role in the institutionalization of nationality. 
During the implementation of korenizatsiia policy, instruction in the national 
languages was rapidly introduced to primary and secondary schools, as well as to 
higher education. Many vernacular languages were given alphabets and literary 
forms. In the pick of indigenization, the Russian language even ceased to be a 
compulsory subject in the schools of the national republics.502  
The classification of languages was one of the key criteria to distinguish 
between different levels of national consciousness and nationality. According to 
the Soviet classification, languages had three statuses: unwritten language, written 
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language and literary language. The classification of local languages was a matter 
of political decision: “A ‘nationality’ which had no written language would not be 
able to have territory, but since the decision to ‘write’ a language comes from the 
administration, this meant that the status of the language is basically political”.503  
Between 1927 and 1930, Latin script replaced the Arabic one for the 
spoken languages of Central Asia. In 1934, a new version of the Latin script was 
introduced by the Soviet government. However, in 1940 the Soviet authorities 
were concerned about direct communication between the Turks of Turkey and the 
Turkic populations of Central Asia, and replaced the Latin script with the Cyrillic 
one.  
In Central Asia, nationality became pervasive and institutionalized in 
personal lives of the local population. It was assigned by the Soviet state at birth 
on the basis of descent, which was registered in passports and recorded in almost 
all bureaucratic documentations and official transactions. Nationality was also 
used to manipulate access to higher education and to certain jobs. The notorious 
‘fifth point’ in the Soviet internal passport listed the holder’s nationality on the 
basis of parentage. In the words of Slezkine: “Every Soviet citizen was born into a 
certain nationality, took it to day care and through high school, had it officially 
confirmed at the age of sixteen, and then carried it to the grave through thousands 
of application forms, certificates, questionnaires and reception desks. It made a 
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difference in school admissions and it could be crucial in employment, promotions 
and draft assignments”.504 
In an insightful historical assessment of the Soviet Union as an 
‘affirmative action empire’ in 1923-1939, Terry Martin argues that: “Russia’s new 
revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic states to 
confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting 
the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many 
of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state”.505  
Suny maintains that nationhood was “institutionalized into the Soviet 
system as a category of identity, a passport to privilege (or discrimination), and a 
claim to political power in national republics”.506 The intention initially was to 
solve the national question, overcome a history of uneven development, and curb 
Russian chauvinism. As was mentioned, the two important elements of that 
solution were the federation structure of the state and korenizatsiia policies, which 
played a key role in the nationalization of the elites and masses throughout the 
post-revolutionary period. Due to its ideological commitment to ensure the 
equality among its nations and to modernize the more ‘backward’ peoples, the 
Soviet Union actively engaged in affirmative action programs designed to 
advantage the indigenous populations in their own national territories.507 Indeed, 
in the formative years of the USSR affirmative action policies helped non-
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Russians to “achieve native language education, to advance socially, and gradually 
to occupy positions of power in industry, education, culture, the party, and the 
state”.508 In addition to the programmes of affirmative action, the geographic and 
social mobilization of the masses during the interwar period increased greatly, and 
therefore contributed to the mass-based national consolidation in the state. At the 
same time, the modernization program that promoted rural to urban migration 
contributed to “the more rapid nationalization of the masses”.509 
Prior to the Soviet rule, Central Asia was home to groups and collectivities 
who ascribed to affiliations other than national: they were based on tribe, kinship, 
religion, territory, language, and extended family. After the Soviet nationalities 
policy and the institutionalization of national culture and cadres in the national 
areas enhanced a sense of fixed and bounded national homeland. Slezkine notes 
that “insofar as national culture was a reality, it was about language and a few 
‘domestic arrangements’: nationality was ‘form’.510 The ‘national form’ was 
acceptable to the Soviets because they believed that there was no such thing as 
‘national content’. 
Even after Stalin shifted the direction away from the early Leninist policy 
of curbing Russian chauvinism and towards the promotion of Russian language 
and culture as part of Russification in the early 1930s, the Soviet regime continued 
to promote the ethno-nationalization of major nationalities in the larger republics. 
On the other hand, indigenous intellectuals in some republics defended and 
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promoted their own culture and language in reaction to Russification. The efforts 
of historians and ethnographic work sponsored by the Soviet state had similar 
aims in Central Asia: to institutionalize the ‘national’ history, obliterate more 
multi-cultural characteristics, and establish national claims to territories. For 
example, the experiences of pre-Uzbek tribes were assimilated into an Uzbek 
national narrative. The cultural activists, foot soldiers of the nationalizing project, 
re-discovered ancient heroes, demanded preservation of national monuments, and 
organized further excavations in search of further confirmation of primordial 
claim to nationality. Thus, during the 1970s the movement to re-discover 
traditional Kyrgyz culture gathered momentum, driven by the national 
intelligentsia in the Kyrgyz republic. Such figures as Kyrgyz writer Chingiz 
Aitmatov represented the modern, cosmopolitan Kyrgyz intellectual and a 
champion of national values while opposing ethnic chauvinism.  
In terms of the Soviet cadre policy, the Kyrgyz republic, similar to other 
Central Asian republics, was governed by a succession of Soviet officials 
appointed by Moscow. The republic’s remoteness may have given its officials 
greater latitude in local action and encouraged them to be more protective of their 
people. After the Second World War, considerable effort went to increase the 
Kyrgyz membership of the Communist party. A decree issued by the Communist 
Party Central Committee in 1958 criticized staffing policy in Kyrgyzstan, stressed 
the failure of economic management by local personnel and condemned the ways 
in which traditional practices continued to dominate. The decree, among other 
things, attacked the failure to promote women, and the readiness of many officials 
to compromise with ‘private property tendencies’ and ‘survivals of the past in 
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everyday life’, which was a semi-coded reference to the continued strength of 
religious practices.511  
Under the leadership of Turdakun Usubaliev, first secretary of the Kyrgyz 
Communist Party from 1961-86, and indeed that of many of his regional 
contemporaries, there developed a multifaceted approach to public life. On the one 
hand, this involved extreme flattery. This was evident in public utterances about 
eternal friendship with the Russian brother and praise for the achievements of the 
Russian people. At the same time, Usubaliev made increasing economic demands 
on Moscow for greater investment within the republic, and tried gradually to 
increase the number of positions available to indigenous elites. The policy of 
expanding positions for the Kyrgyz was highly discriminatory, especially when 
pushed through in the south of the country where there were substantial Uzbek 
populations.512 Thus, Turdakun Usubaliev, had to balance his obligations to his 
native people and to Moscow rather precariously. He was criticized by his own 
people for being too pro-Russian, promoting Russian culture and language, and 
having a Russian perspective on his country’s heritage. But on the other hand, he 
was also criticized by Moscow for being too lenient and for permitting localism 
and backwardness.513 This might have been the reason for Moscow’s replacement 
of Usubaliev with Absamat Masaliev in November 1985. 
The Uzbek republic was heavily populated by Slavic and other non-Central 
Asian immigrants, as a result of the retreat to the hinterlands during the Second 
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World War. Many stayed behind after the war, and still more joined them in the 
1950s and 1960s, drawn by the occupational mobility provided by the expanding 
Soviet economy. During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Uzbek SSR was mostly 
administered by Russian-speaking settlers. But by the 1960s, the native population 
grew and the economic base expanded, which lead to a gradual shift of power to 
local political and economic elite. The local party leader Sharaf Rashidov, who 
served from 1961 to 1983, was crucial in the localizing national impetus. By the 
time of his death in 1983, the party apparatus was securely in the hands of native 
Uzbeks, who had become the real locus of power. During Rashidov’s tenure, the 
party organization in the Uzbek republic garnered the power to win friends and 
punish enemies primarily through its control over party staffing policy and 
organization. 
Powerful national elites therefore emerged in the late Soviet period, as 
Khrushchev and particularly Brezhnev permitted national leaders to remain in 
power for many years (like Rashidov and Usubaliev). The highly centralized 
command system of the initial Stalin years loosened its grip on the national 
republics, and by the last decades of the Soviet state nationalities in Central Asia 
experienced an unprecedented degree of local autonomy.514 
Even though the Soviet cadre policy symbolized a more overt reversion to 
clientelism, it also showed elements of change as well as continuity. Patronage 
networks would continue to be based on kinship and regional identities, yet at the 
same time the system allowed for the cooption of individuals from other ethnic 
groups. However, Usubaliev’s strategy was seen by the nationalistic Kyrgyz as 
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compromised, because it involved subservience towards Russia, which was likely 
to result in the emasculation the Kyrgyz language and the national culture. 
Nationalists also criticized that the republic’s party leadership showed little 
initiative in dealing with the growing socio-economic crisis, in part due to the 
rapid rise in the rural population. Yet during Brezhnev's time in office, the trends 
promoted by Usubaliev were strengthened, because Moscow appeared content to 
allow the creation of regional fiefdoms, so long as political loyalty was maintained 
and five year plan targets met. However some observers noted that with weak 
central control official policies and structures could be distorted through processes 
that Andropov and Gorbachev were to describe as corrupt.515 
In the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, the nomenclatura (Communist elite) 
system took firm roots in Central Asia. First secretaries had to show loyalty to the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS) and 
formally complied with instructions from Moscow. The General Secretary was in 
charge of their political status and carefully selected and manipulated his staff. But 
it was members of TsK KPSS and the Politburo who had the power to sack their 
General Secretary, as it happened to Khrushchev in 1964. Whereas first secretaries 
could be criticized from above, criticism of their administration by subordinates 
was prohibited.  
In their own republics, however, local heads of the Communist Party were 
able to increase their political influence by forming patronage networks which 
ensured the loyalty of regional and local leaders of economic and administrative 
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elites. As oblast´ and republican appointments were decided in Moscow, any 
change of General Secretary of KPSS would be linked with changes in new first 
secretaries in the republics, who then built up new patronage networks by forming 
political alliances and changing administrative cadres.516  
High-level positions, however, were always appointed by the centre in 
Moscow. If Central Asia leaders should disrespect tacit rules governing these 
relations, they were quickly removed. On the other hand, first secretaries who 
became members of the Politburo of TsK KPSS were able to lobby for more state 
economic investment in their republics. In that way, Dinmukhammed Kunaiev 
took advantage of his close ties with Brezhnev to mobilize considerable economic 
means for Kazakhstan, as did Sharaf Rashidov and Turdiakun Usubaliev in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively.517 Relations of ruling constitute the 
identities of rulers and ruled alike. It can be argued that the imposition of the 
Soviet practices of rule on a particular territory elicited a territorially grounded 
national identity among the ruled.518 
The Soviet policy towards Central Asia also helped preserve or even 
revive tribalism and parochialism, in spite of professed fight against them. During 
the purges of the 1920s and 1930s, for example, all of the local political and 
cultural elites were physically destroyed. The Soviets trained new political elites 
whose privileged positions in local state structures of power were connected not 
with the interests of their republics and peoples, but rather with their compliance 
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with Moscow's demands and their ability to implement policies dictated by the 
centre. Besides, the positions of the top-level regional leaders depended also on 
their personal reputation in Moscow and their allegiance to powerful figures in the 
central hierarchy. When the centre was pleased with and trusted regional leaders, 
they were allowed to run internal affairs in their republics and distribute high level 
jobs, a percentage of which were reserved for the non-Russian elites in Central 
Asia in order to secure their support for the Soviet regime.519 
 
 
3.4 The nationality question during perestroika  
 
The rise in nationalist sentiments and the resurfacing of the national question in 
the last years of the Soviet Union was mostly explained in the context of 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost΄. With the political openings offered by 
Gorbachev, the political movements that emerged in the Soviet state quickly 
became the vehicles of nationalist expression in non-Russian republics.520 The 
nationalist advocates claimed that the primordial nations, previously contained 
within the USSR, re-awakened after seventy years of dormancy to reclaim their 
dominant position in the ancestral homelands and equal status of nation-states in 
the world community. On the other hand, some Soviet observers continued to 
claim that the majority of people in the Soviet Union had successfully been de-
nationalized and sovietized. Some other would add that the new post-perestroika 
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nationalism was the work of some manipulative leaders who tried to establish 
themselves politically. Gorbachev clearly shared the last view. He continued to 
believe, throughout his term as the president of the Soviet Union, that nationalistic 
sentiments were the trickery of his personal and the Soviet state’s enemies.  
However, when the Soviet authorities witnessed the actual demise of the 
USSR, they had to recognize that ethno-nationalism had become an irreversible 
mass-based movement throughout most national republics. Moreover, as was 
described earlier Central Asian republics were not the primordial national 
organisms, which nationalists tried hard to prove. National communities in the 
region were institutionalized, modernized and popularized only during the 
twentieth century. The Soviet regime, with its institutions and policies, played an 
important part in the formation of nationhood and the development of national 
territoriality in the region.  
Although the nationalities policy together with rapid socio-economic 
transformation helped Moscow manage the national question of the multi-national 
Soviet state, it in the first case constructed nationhood and played a crucial part in 
institutionalizing and consolidating nationhood in Central Asia. In the ensued 
competition between Soviet and nationalist ideologies, nationalism came out 
stronger and more attractive in comparison with the ideals of a common Soviet 
people and a socialist fatherland. As Central Asians became more socially and 
geographically mobilized, they tended to become more nationalistic and more 
inclined to exert pressure from below for greater socio-cultural, economic, and 
political control over their own nations.  
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The change toward greater politicization and ethno-nationalization in each 
national republic began to accelerate and reached greater proportions under 
Gorbachev’s USSR. But as was described earlier, the underlying direction towards 
greater indigenization of nationhood in the Soviet republics started in the 
formative years of the Soviet Union. The progressive weakening of the central 
Soviet state and the Communist Party opened the way for three distinct political 
patterns in the non-Russian republics.521 First, non-Communist nationalist leaders 
in Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia took power with broad support of the 
population. Second, former Communists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine quickly adapted their political agendas to fit the 
new period of nation-building and to varying degrees adopted programs of 
democratization and marketization. Third, old Communist elites in Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan tried to hold on to power, 
foiled the aspirations of nationalists, and threw up a nationalism façade 
camouflaging a Soviet-style distribution of power.522 
As in other republics, changes began with the March 1989 elections for the 
USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. As a result, the Kyrgyz SSR received 
thirty-two seats on the basis of ethnicity and nine seats on the basis of population. 
Twelve additional seats were filled by public organizations. In the summer of 
1989, new legislation on language and a new electoral law were passed in the 
republic’s parliament. The new parliament was initially to be a bicameral house, 
but later legislation changed it to a single body of 350 people’s deputies. A variety 
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of electoral principles were discussed, but the one finally chosen was a simple 
population formula rather than a consociational formula based on ethnicity.523 The 
first meeting of the new parliament was on April 10, 1990. The parliament elected 
Masaliev as the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyzstan.  
In 1989, new draft election laws were introduced and were adopted by the 
Uzbek Supreme Soviet in October of that year. A new language law establishing 
the Uzbek as the official language was passed. Both the republic and local 
elections were set for the same day, 18 February 1990. With the exception of the 
actual vote, the most important aspect of the elections was the nomination 
process.524 Individuals had the right to nominate from within recognized 
organizations or institutions. Some groups such as the so-called neformali 
(informals) were excluded. Voters received three ballots, one for republic 
elections, one for oblast´ elections, and one for rayon elections. Each voter was 
required to mark off the names of the candidates he or she did not want, leaving 
not more than one name unmarked. The ballots were printed in the Russian and 
Uzbek language versions. In the general election, voter turnout was high, 
especially in the rural areas. A total of 9,385,740 people, or 93.5 per cent of 
eligible voters cast ballots.525 However, toward the conclusion of his remarks to a 
Central Committee Plenum held late in 1989, about three months before the 
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February 1990 elections, Islam Karimov accused the party leaders in Andijan 
oblast´ of manipulating public discontent for their own purposes.526 
Social mobilization along ethno-national lines can be evidenced in the 
open letter from a number of Uzbek intelligentsia coordinated by Mr. Zakirov 
from the Institute of nuclear physics of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences on “social 
injustice in relation to millions of Uzbek people in KSSR”.527 In the letter, the 
group laments the state-sponsored discrimination of Uzbek minority in Kyrgyz 
republic, blaming the artificial division of Turkestan to segments earlier in the 
century on the continual and future tensions in the region. The group saw the 
unified Turkestan statehood, albeit within the Soviet Union, as the ideal 
development. 
Contrary to Soviet propaganda on the nationality question in the USSR, 
nationalism was not resolved through socialist means. Nationalist slogans were 
neither accurate in claiming that their respective national communities had 
previously been asleep, nor their fear-mongering was truthful in warning that 
nations are to disappear under the de-nationalization policies of Communists. One 
of the useful ways to look at perestroika years is through an understanding that the 
revolutionary changes should be viewed as a stage in a much longer process of 
ethno-national development in Central Asia. The disintegration of the former 
Soviet Union into independent, indigenous nation-states was the result of the 
longer process of indigenization, initiated by Bolsheviks. It was not a short-term 
response to the reforms initiated under Gorbachev.  
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Table 1. The Soviet Central Asian Republics of the USSR  
(prior to independence) 
 
Population 
(millions) 
Territory 
(thousand sq. km.) 
Date of  
Formation 
Kazakhstan 16.538 2,717 Dec. 1936 
Kyrgyzstan 4.291 198 Oct. 1924 
Tajikistan 5.112 143 Oct. 1924 
Turkmenistan 3.534 488 Oct. 1924 
Uzbekistan 19.906 447 Oct. 1924 
Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1985, pp. 12-17. The 1989 population figures are from Trud (April 30, 
1989). 
 
 
With the view to countering the growing movement for national rights, Gorbachev 
attempted to re-define the relationship between the central and the republic-level 
governments. He proposed a new version of the Union Treaty to combine self-
sufficiency, independence, and sovereignty of the republics with an effective 
centre in Moscow. The new slogan announced: “A strong union means a strong 
centre and strong republics”, and Gorbachev in the press conference on 31 August 
1990 expanded that the USSR should be held together by mutually advantageous 
economic relations in an all-union market and emphasised the importance of 
maintaining such key economic institutions as a single economic field.528 
The new draft of the Union Treaty was approved by the Supreme Soviet 
(the upper house) in December 1990 and was introduced in the Congress of 
People’s Deputies (the lower house) later that month. But many deputies were not 
satisfied with the provisions of the treaty. Gorbachev retreated from his reform 
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agenda in response, swinging away from the political positions of the early 
perestroika supporters in favour of party conservatives. Facing this opposition to 
his proposed Union Treaty, Gorbachev attempted to undercut his opponents by 
calling for a popular referendum on the concept of the union. The referendum was 
held on 17 March 1991. The referendum question was: “Do you consider 
necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed 
federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an 
individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” Several republics, such as 
Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova boycotted the 
referendum. Accordingly, voter turnout was 80 per cent; 76.4 per cent voted yes 
and 21.7 per cent voted no.  
By the spring of 1991, observers began to speak openly not only of 
devolution but also of disintegration. In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected 
president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) by a strong 
majority, which greatly strengthened his hand in negotiations with Gorbachev. By 
mid-August 1991, Gorbachev had produced four versions of the Union Treaty, 
each one progressively giving greater powers to the republics.  
Communist Party conservatives were well aware that a new Union Treaty, 
if adopted and implemented, would mean the end of the old Soviet Union. In a 
desperate last-minute effort to preserve the old structure, an eight-man committee 
of KPSS conservatives announced the creation of an ‘emergency committee’ and, 
while Gorbachev was in the Crimea on summer vacation, the committee declared 
that it had taken control of the government to save the country. In the ensuing 
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battle, Boris Yeltsin emerged as a courageous defender of democracy. Gorbachev 
returned from his vacation to resume his position as president of the USSR, and 
the coup collapsed. 
On 8 December 1991, the leaders of the three republics, Leonid Kravchuk 
from Ukraine, Stanislav Shushkevich from Belarus, and Boris Yeltsin from 
Russia, gathered in the Belarus capital of Minsk to sign a resolution asserting that 
a new formation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), would serve as 
successor to the USSR. The Minsk Declaration declared that the “Soviet Union 
henceforth ceases to exist”. The Minsk Declaration took the Central Asian leaders 
by complete surprise. The Declaration referred to a new political grouping which 
was exclusively Slavic. The Minsk Declaration was a challenge and opportunity 
for Central Asia.  
In an interview to Nezavisimaia Gazeta in May 1992, Nazarbaev recalled 
the events leading up to the USSR’s dissolution. 529 He noted that after the Minsk 
meeting there was a talk of a broader, Slavic-based political community, implying 
Central Asians should now also form a political community. In the interview, 
Nazarbaev recalled that: “We were very close to a dangerous confrontation 
between the two at that time. We had a draft on the establishment of an Asiatic 
confederation. … Then, at Saparmurad Niyazov’s invitation, we met in Ashgabat 
to discuss the situation”.530 
On 13 December 1991, the five Central Asian leaders met in Ashgabat. 
The outcome was to opt for continued participation in a political community that 
was geographically defined by the political space of the former USSR. The 
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resulting public announcement claimed that the Central Asian presidents were in 
fundamental agreement with the concept of the Commonwealth. The Central 
Asian leaders requested that they join the Commonwealth, but only on the 
condition that they are included as founding members. The three Slavic leaders 
agreed to this condition, and on 21 December 1991, the representatives of eleven 
of the former Soviet republics gathered in Alma-Ata to sign a new agreement to 
form a broader-based Commonwealth. The Alma-Ata Declaration was quickly 
acknowledged by the international community, and sealed the fate of the Soviet 
Union. Thus without a referendum, without a popular mandate, without 
parliamentary consent, the USSR ceased to exist. The Soviet president Mikhail 
Gorbachev simply acknowledged the inevitable and resigned on 25 December 
1991. Nations of Central Asia thus became independent. 
Mikhail Gorbachev tried to abolish the cult of' idolising the Politburo and 
General Secretary. His open disrespect for such rules of government became 
evident during the twenty-seventh congress of KPSS, when Gorbachev interrupted 
the session and demanded that delegates refrain from base flatteries and mindless 
subservience.531  
In relation to the rules of power, described earlier in the chapter, 
perestroika initiated a direct assault on patrimonialism. Gorbachev’s policies were 
in juxtaposition to the patrimonial practices of the past. He supported free mass 
media, invited criticism of political leaders, promoted the establishment of 
independent public associations and gave political opponents access to television 
and the press. These new practices were bound to erode the power base of the 
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Communist Party and to undermine central state structures. The most daring 
Gorbachev's disrespect for the rules of Soviet patrimonial politics culminated in 
the removal of paragraph 6 of the Brezhnev constitution, which stressed the 
leading rule of KPSS, the liquidation of KPSS and the formal dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. 
In the West, Gorbachev’s policies were seen in the context of promotion of 
civil society, initialization of the democratization process and overthrowing 
totalitarianism. In the view of Central Asian leaders, however, Gorbachev was 
seen as a weak leader who demolished the functioning state structures. That was 
one reason why some Central Asian leaders sympathised with ring-leaders of the 
August coup that made a failed attempt to restore the authority of the Communist 
Party. 
To the disappointment of Western analysts, perestroika made little change 
to the patrimonial basis of politics and authority relations in Central Asia. All 
current presidents of Central Asian republics, except Tajik president Rakhmonov, 
were originally appointed as first secretaries by Gorbachev, whose initial intention 
was to renew the state apparatus in Central Asia. And, as Geiss points out, they 
used this mandate to strengthen their positions as supreme rulers, but did not share 
Gorbachev’s dislike of Soviet patrimonial practices and were less keen on western 
ideal of democratization, which arguably generated the decline of the Soviet state 
structures to a considerable extent.532  
 The Soviet ethnicity policies were doomed to fail mainly due to their 
inherent contradiction. They explained the formation of the initial ethnos in 
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primordialist terms as if those communities were natural. This view reminds of the 
Germanic primordialist concepts. Then, they suggested that as a result of the 
distinct Soviet way of development and modernization the nations will inevitably 
merge into a common Soviet community. The contradiction here is that the Soviet 
state had gone their own way – the statist way. It actually intervened in nation-
building and imposed a controversial two-layered culture to the Central Asian 
peoples. In the end, once the central government got weaker the local high cultures 
prevailed. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most significant events of 
the twentieth century, which most Western Sovietologists spectacularly failed to 
predict. Many Sovietologists mistakenly believed that the nationality question was 
long resolved in the USSR, and that it became a homogenous nation-less entity. 
They were caught by surprise when they witnessed growing national movements 
during glasnost period and when separatist ambitions eventually tore the union 
apart. After the demise, however, some scholars claimed that the collapse was due 
to the economic slow-down. Other experts suggested perestroika policies created 
a political chaos and undermined the central government, and yet another view 
held that nationalism had a crucial affect on the event. It is evident that 
nationalism played a significant part in the collapse of the Soviet state. Even after 
the Soviet republics became independent, they still faced the institutional ethno-
national legacy inherited from the USSR.  
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4.0 Conclusion 
 
 
 
DRAWING from the institutionalist perspective of nationhood, the chapter 
contextualized and explained the formation and development of ethnicity and 
nationhood in Central Asia. It illustrated that nationhood is a modern phenomenon 
in Central Asia, which emerged in the region as a result of colonial geopolitical 
and institutional influences.  
Treating the nations as a category of practice and institutionalized cultural 
and political form, the chapter presented a new way of looking into the past and 
present of nations in Central Asia. It revealed that state institutions, both Soviet 
and post-Soviet, have played a crucial role in forming and sustaining ethno-
nationalism in the region. The Soviet institutions embedded the sentiments of 
nationhood and ethnicity profoundly in the imaginations of Central Asian people. 
The legacy of such institutionalized ethno-nationalism is bound to have a long-
term affect on political and social development of the local societies.  
Differing with the views by most Sovietologists, the chapter showed that 
the institutional condensations of nationality in the Soviet Union were by no 
means empty forms or legal fictions. Institutionally-defined nationhood not only 
played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape 
and structure the national question in the newly-independent Central Asia. The 
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Soviet institutionalization of nationhood was based on two-tiered elements: 
territorial organization of politics and the social classification of people. 
As was noted throughout the chapter, the intentions guiding the architects 
of Soviet nationality policies had the opposite consequences on the institutional 
definitions of nationhood. Those nationality policies were intended to achieve two 
aims. The first was to control, contain and channel the potentially disruptive 
political expressions of nationality by establishing national-territorial 
administrative structures and fostering, co-opting, and repressing national elites. 
And the second was to drain nationality of its content while legitimating it as a 
form, aiming to promote the long-term fading away of nationality as a vital 
component of social life. The Soviet regime actively institutionalized the 
existence of multiple nationalities as intrinsic elements of the state, as well as 
codified nationhood as fundamental social categories distinctive from statehood 
and citizenship. While the first aim of the Soviet nationality policies was achieved 
to a large extent, the second aim, far from being realized, reinforced the salience 
and significance of nationality as a central organising principle in the society. 
Moreover, in Central Asia ethnicity was individually ascribed and publicly 
expressed as nationality. Ethnic diversity was perceived as national heterogeneity. 
Therefore, minority ethnic groups in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan understood and 
still understand themselves, as well as seen by others, as belonging to distinct 
nationalities. 
The chapter leads to the suggestion that Soviet and post-Soviet national 
struggles should not be seen only as the struggles of nations, but also as the 
struggles of institutionally constituted national elites. The next chapter will show 
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how inter-ethnic struggles in Central Asia were and remain crucially framed, 
constituted and reconciled by institutionalized definitions of nationhood. 
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CHAPTER V, ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND 
CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL ASIA  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
THE previous chapter suggested that Soviet institutions embedded ethno-national 
sentiments deeply in the imaginations of Central Asian people, and that the legacy 
of institutionalized ethno-nationalism will have a long-term affect on political and 
social development in Central Asia. This chapter will continue this theme by 
looking specifically at the dramatic politicization of ethno-nationhood in Central 
Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of independence.  
It will show how the expanded political scene during perestroika not only allowed 
for greater political mobilization along national lines but also changed the 
dynamics of inter-ethnic interaction. In the context of more political freedom and 
the reform-minded Moscow, local state apparatus in Central Asia was unable to 
control the potentially disruptive political expressions of nationality, which spilled 
to inter-ethnic conflicts.  
The increased politicization of nationhood in Central Asia was a natural 
effect of seventy years of the Soviet regime’s institutional condensation and 
codification of nationhood as the main organising principle of the society. Another 
consequence of highly institutionalized ethno-nationality in Central Asia is the 
potential for ethnic conflicts. The chapter will therefore explore the dynamics of 
inter-ethnic clashes during the last years of the Soviet Central Asia.  
Its geographical focus will be on the Ferghana Valley, which is the most 
volatile, yet strategic, area in the region. Hence the analysis of unprecedented 
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inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority groups in Osh, 
south of Kyrgyzstan. The choice for examining the Osh conflict is justified by a 
number of reasons. Firstly, inter-ethnic violence in Osh is a dramatic prototype of 
a dozen of other, smaller inter-ethnic clashes that took place from 1986 to early 
1990s in Central Asia. Secondly, the Osh conflict involved two national groups, 
Uzbek and Kyrgyz, whose formation and development as institutionalized ethno-
nationality was described in the previous chapter. Thirdly, the scale of casualties 
and intensity of the Osh conflict, which shocked not only the local population but 
even central bureaucrats in Moscow, was unsurpassed by other inter-ethnic riots in 
the region. And finally, the analysis of the Osh conflict is beneficial given the 
spectre of inter-ethnic tensions is present in today’s southern Kyrgyzstan.  
Several recent studies on Soviet ethnic relation have confirmed that the 
Soviet Union was one of the unique governments to confront the rising tide of 
nationalism after the Revolution and respond by systematically promoting the 
national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of 
the characteristics of the nation-state. Terry Martin provided a detailed account of 
the logic and content of the Soviet nationality policies from 1923 to 1939 that 
aimed to create national republics, elites, languages and other attributes of 
nationhood in a manner that the Soviet state could be appropriately labelled as the 
Affirmative Action Empire.533 On the basis of materials from the archives of the 
Central Asia Bureau, Arne Haugen considered the delimitation of national 
republics in Central Asia during the same period of time, by looking at the role of 
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the central Soviet authorities as well as indigenous political actors in that 
process.534 
Analysing samizdat, a key manifestation of Soviet dissent through 
censored publications, Zisserman-Brodsky presented a systematic and 
comparative study of ethnic politics in the Soviet Union, as formulated within 
dissident ethno-nationalist movements between 1964 and 1986.535 The study 
found that samizdat not only served as a free voice for the politically mobilized 
part of the nationalist intelligentsia, but also expressed the most popular ethnic 
claims and championed the most popular political objectives.536 Focusing on the 
continuous process of transition, Sengupta’s research looked into how the Uzbek 
nation-state has come to terms with its ‘modernity’ in the course of nation-
forming transformations and shows that, while the political construction of 
cultural elements continued, the Uzbek state in transition could not ignore the 
possibilities inherent in the cultural elements.537 Olivier Roy provided a 
commanding historical account of the re-composition of traditional solidarity 
groups in Central Asia and the emergence of new nationalist elites from within the 
Soviet framework.538  
A large number of studies have focused on the examination of how ethno-
national identities evolved and how nation-states developed in the post-Soviet 
states. Bearing in mind that national identity is not fixed and subject to changes, 
one of the authoritative volumes on the subject explored how national identities 
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were reformulated, revitalized and contested as symptoms of the perceived post-
colonial status of the former Soviet states.539 The key issue of integration of 
national minorities was the focus of the comparative study of nation-building in 
two post-Soviet societies, according to which the governments of Kazakhstan and 
Latvia, rather than ‘de-emphasize’ ethnicity in their national-building process, 
adopted a ‘re-ethnification’ strategy.540  
Acknowledging the role of rational elite choices and structural factors, 
Sally Cummings addressed the question of how Central Asian states started from 
the initial common path after independence and diverged into different forms of 
authoritarianism.541 On a different note, Pauline Luong assessed divergences in 
the development of electoral systems and the political trajectories of 
transformation in three Central Asian states, through the examination of pacts and 
perceptions and in the framework of a bargaining game model.542   
Scholarship has also shown keen interest in exploring various cases and 
aspects of nationalist mobilization in the Soviet and post-Soviet era. In a path-
breaking study of nationalist mobilization in the late Soviet period, Mark 
Beissinger looked at successes and failures of nationalist mobilization and argues 
that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could not have taken place without the 
effects of tidal influences of nationalism.543 He described nationalist movements 
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in Central Asia as a ‘mobilization failure’ but a ‘political issue success’, since the 
demands raised by the nationalist movements were consequently owned by the 
state and incorporated to its nationalizing policies.544  
Bhavna Dave considered the case of Kazakhstan in explaining the absence 
of ethnic mobilization in the country and describing how the top-down coercive 
ethno-national strategy of the Kazakh government resulted in the prevention of 
overt conflict along ethno-national markers.545 She focused on two key elements 
of the state intervention. According to the first, the granting of state language 
status to Kazakh not only established a new ethno-national hierarchy, but also 
eliminated sources of conflict with the Russian minority over language issues, and 
second held that the Kazakh state erected a ‘surrogate institutional infrastructure’ 
to co-opt ethno-national elite in a hierarchical nationality system.546  
In regard to the liberal-democratic theory of transition, Jack Snyder’s From 
Voting to Violence contributed to widespread apprehensions among practitioners 
and policy-makers in transitional politics that the move to democratic politics can 
create fertile conditions for nationalism and ethnic conflict, which not only raises 
the costs of the transition but may also re-direct political participation into anti-
democratic path.547 Reiterating the doubts of sustainability of democracy in multi-
ethnic societies, Roeder criticized the promotion of power-sharing as aggravating 
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the ‘ethnicization’ of politics through polarization of preferences that ultimately 
undermines the consensus for democracy.548  
However, the above argument was challenged by Hughes and Sasse for its 
neglect of the fact that an institutional architecture was already in place, when the 
Soviet Union collapsed, and for its denial of the capacity of institutions to be an 
effective means of democratic conflict resolution.549 Their approach, tested by the 
examination of regions in conflict in the former Soviet Union, emphasized the 
crucial role of institutions both for the initiation of conflict and for how states may 
mitigate, manage or prevent conflict.550 A separate research by Easterly similarly 
concluded that institutional factors do interact with ethnic diversity, as they “affect 
whether ethnic conflict is destructive or is contained by the rules of the game”.551  
It is important from the outset to outline how this study approaches ethnic 
conflicts, as many confusing and conflicting interpretations often surround the 
term. In the analysis of the ethnic question, Stavenhagen argues that “ethnic 
conflict as such does not exist. What does exist is social, political and economic 
conflict between groups of people who identify each other in ethnic terms”.552 In a 
study of social conflicts in the post-Soviet countries, one of the editors makes a 
contentious conclusion that “the overwhelming majority of the case studies 
presented here do not support the notion that the conflicts we are witnessing in 
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Central Europe and the NIS [newly independent states] are ethnically based or that 
ethnicity provided the key to the outbreak or resolution”.553  
While it is reasonable to believe that the “mere existence of ethnicity is 
certainly no precondition for conflicts”,554 the assertion above demonstrates the 
problem of distinguishing ethnic conflicts from other kinds of conflict situations. 
In that context, Ryan points out that the term ethnic conflict “should not be taken 
to mean that the ethnic differences that separate the groups are the cause of the 
conflict, any more than the term inter-state conflict should be taken to imply that 
violence between sovereign states occurs because there are separate sovereign 
states”.555 Henderson thinks that much of the confusion regarding the 
categorization of disputes as ethnically based or not can be avoided by use of “the 
more appropriate phrase, ‘inter-ethnic conflict’, rather than ‘ethnic conflict’, since 
the latter appears to suggest that the conflict itself derives from ethnicity instead of 
the actual issues of the dispute”.556 Ethnicity is rarely the root cause of the ethnic 
conflict. It is often the crucial form of that conflict.  
So what is an ethnic conflict? Various definitions for ethnic conflict have 
been put forward by experts in the field. To begin with, the word ‘conflict’ usually 
denotes relationships that involve a measure of overt hostility. Tishkov sees ethnic 
conflicts as “any forms of civic clash within or across state boundaries when at 
least one of the warring parties is mobilized and organized along ethnic lines or on 
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behalf of a certain ethnic group”.557 According to Yamskov, an ethnic conflict 
represents “a dynamically changing socio-political situation caused by rejection of 
the existing status quo on a part of significant number of people representing one 
or more local ethnic groups”.558 
Our working definition of ethnic conflicts encompasses violent559 or non-
violent disputes and tensions between two or more ethnic groups over significant 
political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues. Anthony Smith defines an 
ethnic group as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, 
shared historical memories and one or more common elements of common 
culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at 
least among the elites”.560 According to the assessments from chapter two, ethnic 
group is an interesting hybrid of putative beliefs and shared objective 
characteristics. Because it operates in a larger social ‘reservoir’, it has to interact 
with other groups, which enhances its kinship ties. Members of an ethnic group 
act, or participate, in shared cultural activities, which not only symbolize ethnic 
bondage but also sustain the putative belief. Ethnicity’s ability to “combine 
symbolic and instrumental purposes, and coalesce an interest with an affective tie” 
561
 can be one of the reasons for its effective and appealing social organization.  
Conflicts between ethnic groups often arise over cultural issues, scarce 
economic resources and political power. What makes a conflict ‘ethnic’ is the 
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perception and general acceptance among the participants that they are engaged in 
ethnic conflict. Kolsto is correct to say that: “If the group accepts the story, then 
an act that originally was ethnically irrelevant is transformed into an ethnic issue. 
It would, in my view, not make sense not to classify a violent conflict as ethnic 
simply because the initial spark that ignited it was ‘unethnic’”.562 He further adds: 
“The touchstone should not be any inherent quality in the act or the contested item 
itself but how it is perceived by the actors and the immediate surroundings”.563  
As was also discussed in chapter two, ethnicity can serve as a political 
resource open for manipulation to strengthen power, enhance or undermine 
national security, legitimize authority, or promote national unity. Ethnicity is not 
only a social construction of descent and culture, but is also the social 
mobilization of descent and culture. Ethnic mobilization pre-supposes the salience 
of ethnic identity. It is hard to disagree with Henderson, who argues that: “An 
ethnic group has to perceive the political significance of its ethnicity before it can 
be mobilized for political action. To analyze inter-ethnic conflict one must 
examine the conditions associated with the increased salience of ethnic 
identity”.564  
 
Given that institutionalized ethno-nationhood has a direct relation on inter-
ethnic relations in Central Asia, the chapter will explore the benefits of 
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institutional reforms at the state-structural level in order to harness and counter-
balance institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. It will propose 
considering institutional reforms within the framework of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism for that end, because the rule of law is intuitively and 
professedly more acceptable to the local population and regional governments. 
Central Asian leaders publicly praised the benefits of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism and called for its adherence. But the rule of law is not a 
problem-free concept, and that is why the chapter will untangle its complexity. It 
will also examine its links with similar political ideals, such as democracy and 
constitutionalism, and outline how institutional reforms within the rule of law 
evolved in Central Asia.  
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2.0 Nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union 
 
 
The topic of ethno-national dimension of the Soviet collapse has been discussed 
and debated at great length by scholars both inside and outside the former 
USSR.565 A staple theme of academic and journalistic discourse about post-Soviet 
Central Asia has been focused on the importance of ‘ethnicity’, with particular 
emphasis on the discussion of the Ferghana Valley region.566 The region is seen as 
a dangerous ‘powder keg’ of ethnic and territorial conflicts,567 which finds itself 
‘in the midst of a host of crises’.568 Scholars of the post-communist region were 
compelled to ‘re-tool’ themselves, following the demise of the Soviet Union. One 
of the most prominent trends involved studying ethno-national politics in post-
communist states, given the number of ethno-national conflicts in the region and 
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the problems of state-building and democratization in many new multi-ethnic 
states.569  
While there is no widely accepted theory of causes and results of ethnic 
conflict, various approaches and perspectives have been put forward to explain 
certain aspects of it. The discussion in chapter two addressed those that deal with 
how ethnic identities form and change over time. Other approaches focus on the 
sources of competition and conflict between ethnic groups.570 While some others 
are concerned with explaining why and how ethnic groups mobilize politically and 
enter into open conflict with other groups or governments.571  
A review of the literature written on the subject would lead to 
categorization of three competing persuasions: primordialist, instrumentalist and 
modernizationist. Primordialist persuasion sees ethnic identities as historically 
rooted, deeply embedded in people’s culture and reinforced by collective myths 
and memories.  It argues that ethnic conflict has been persistent in the world 
because ethnic groups mobilize in defence of their culture due to the 
modernization threat to ethnic solidarities.572 Conflicts therefore arise from 
‘ancient hatred’ between various communities. Henderson points to the 
primordialist insistence that “ethnic similarity leads to cooperation and ethnic 
difference leads to inter-ethnic conflict”.573 As was discussed in chapter two, 
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primordialism has been mostly marginalized in the Western scholarship. However, 
it still resonates with some Russian and post-Soviet scholars.574 
Instrumentalists assume that ethnic identity is invoked as a means to 
achieve material and political goals. They regard ethnicity cynically and as “a 
fraud perpetuated by persons with self-serving objectives to exploit mass publics 
in pursuit of their political or economic ambitions”.575 The effect of ethno-
political mobilization is therefore to increase economic differences, as well as 
awareness of differences, between dominant groups and minorities, so that 
‘political entrepreneurs’ can “capitalize on these differences to establish ethnically 
based political movements aimed at increasing the economic and political well-
being of their group or region”.576   
Modernization school of thought views ethnicity as imagined, constructed 
and dynamic reality.577 Following the chapter two analysis, ethnic groups are 
likely to be transitory, contingent and susceptible to manipulation. For 
modernizationists, ethnicity is malleable and its boundaries and content subject to 
change. Tishkov holds that “ethnicity is constructed and reconstructed by specific 
verbal and political actions that reflect contemporary conditions, including power 
relations among social groups, and the meanings that people give to these 
conditions”.578 Contemporary ethnic conflict has therefore no causal relation to the 
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so-called ‘ancient hatred’ between communities, but is linked to disputes over 
political, economic, cultural values and resources.579  
Drawing from the above three frameworks, academic studies of the causes 
of ethnic conflict develop explanations at three main levels of analysis: the 
systemic level, the domestic level, and the perceptual level.580 At the systemic 
level, the security concerns of ethnic groups as well as the nature of the security 
systems in which ethnic groups operate are addressed.581 Domestic level 
explanations focus on such factors as the effectiveness of states, the impact of 
ethno-nationalism on inter-ethnic relations, and the influence of 
democratization/transition on inter-ethnic relations. Perceptual types of 
explanations look at how the myths and narratives that ethnic groups have of 
themselves and of others influence inter-ethnic relations.  
Having outlined the main perspectives on and explanations of the causes 
of ethnic conflict, our discussion should now move to the consideration of the 
eruption of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union.  
The primordialist account, surveyed previously, explains the ethnic 
conflicts erupting from the fall of the Soviet Union as an echo of ancient hatreds 
and struggles, which were suppressed or controlled by the communist regime. 
Even Marxist modernist Hobsbawm claimed that the nationalist disintegration of 
the Soviet state was more a consequence of the collapse of the regime than a cause 
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of it.582 But Hroch rejects such conventional view that the turmoil is “the result of 
the release of irrational forces that were long suppressed - ‘deep-frozen’ as it were 
- under communism, and are now in full revival after a lapse of fifty years, is 
evidently superficial”.583 In their assessment of regionalism and ethnic conflict in 
the former Soviet Union, Hughs and Sasse contest the notion that the conflicts in 
the region can be primarily explained as resurgent ‘unfinished business’ from past 
nationalist or ethnic conflicts.584 
The demise of the Soviet state released conflict potential, which was 
dispersed mostly along ethno-national lines. While Gellner denied the possibility 
of a ‘third way’ for cultural pluralism between the assimilatory and the 
nationalizing state,585 a significant body of literature illustrates that deeply divided 
societies can be stabilized by political mechanisms and strategies of regulation. In 
the survey of such solutions, O’Leary identified two major instruments: first, an 
institutional approach that focuses on constitutional and institutional design with a 
preference for consociational devices, federalism, or autonomy arrangements; and 
second, a ‘group-differentiated rights’ approach.586 The analysis of Central Asian 
conflicts by this study will focus on the first approach, by exploring the 
institutional foundations of the nation-building process, which was inherited from 
the Soviet ethno-nationalized federal state. Such ‘institutionalized 
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multinationality’ was the key contributing factor in the nationalization of politics 
and the ‘ethno-constitutional’ crisis during the disintegration of the USSR.587  
There are many perspectives on the eruptions of ethno-political conflicts in 
the former Soviet Union, but Suny’s rough categorization of the dominant views 
on nationalism in the Soviet state into two colourful models, the ‘sleeping beauty’ 
and the ‘bride of Frankenstein’,588 provides a useful background to ethno-national 
mobilization in Central Asia. The sleeping beauty view incorporates approaches 
that explain growing nationalism as “eruptions of long-repressed primordial 
consciousnesses, as expressions of denied desires liberated by the kiss of 
freedom”.589 This view encompasses mainly primordialist approaches that focus 
on the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, which originate from various social 
anthropological findings. Primordialists suggest that an ethnic group shares 
sentiments of solidarity towards that community based on a common culture and a 
belief in shared history and ancestry.590 It is argued that those common identities 
are conserved and passed on from generations to generations, and that they 
constitute the main building material for social groups. 
The sleeping beauty approach is frequently criticized by other scholars of 
ethnicity and colonialism. Instrumentalists, for instance, have challenged 
primordialists’ assumptions of unchanging nature of culture, and instead stressed 
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“the variable and context dependent nature of ethnic identity”.591 It was also 
criticized by other influential scholars, who argued that nationalistic discourse 
became dominant among masses in the modern history mainly as a result of social 
and political developments after the French and American revolutions.592   
 In the Central Asian context, the sleeping beauty view does not appear 
convincing. The identities that had long bonded the peoples of Central Asia were 
different from ethno-nationalistic feelings that sprang in the last decades of the 
Soviet Union. Before the Soviet Union, Central Asian peoples had sub-national or 
supra-national identities. At the supra-national level people identified themselves 
with shared, though weak, Muslim and Turkic cultures. At the sub-national level 
people had local, tribal and family identities that were strong but counteractive for 
national unification.  
In contrast, the ‘bride of Frankenstein’ view incorporates approaches that 
perceive ethnic conflict as confrontation between ‘created’ and ‘imagined’ 
communities. This approach offers a distinct advantage of historicizing the 
problem of nation-formation and providing a comparative perspective on the 
histories of the Soviet peoples.593 According to it, Soviet policies not only 
constructed national ethnicities in Central Asia in line with the Leninist principles 
on the nationality question, but at the same time they managed and suppressed the 
same national sentiments, if they grew stronger and dangerous for the Soviet state. 
When relative freedom was briefly experienced in Central Asia during glasnost’, 
nationalism played a crucial role in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the 
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establishment of new nations along the earlier Soviet lines. Suny explained that in 
the absence of “powerful constituencies favouring Western-style capitalist 
democracy, a furious search for an ‘authentic’ national identity and politics 
occupied both state officials and the cultural intelligentsia”.594 And the social 
mobilization intensified inter-ethnic competition for limited social resources, 
while urbanization and education led to “heightened national self-consciousness 
and increasing national separatism among the more socially mobilized members 
of each national community”.595  
The bride of Frankenstein model is made up of 
modernization/communication and statist branches. Communication theorists 
draw parallels from European social experience and stress the importance of 
modernization. Modernists are said to emphasize “the metamorphosis of society 
into a new form – the industrial society, with its concomitant processes of political 
and economic centralisation, standardisation of education, and the effects of mass 
literacy and the mass media”.596 In other words, it is argued that during this very 
process of modernization, supported by growing communication and 
enlightenment, nations are concomitantly developed.  
  Modernization approach lacks one crucial aspect in explaining the 
invented nature of nations, state intervention. Changes in the society involving 
increased communication and population mobilization rarely happen without the 
intervention of centralized state. It is a state that is legitimized in order to secure 
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national homogeneity by superimposing a ‘high culture’, This is Gellner’s label 
for the superimposing of a uniform language, standardized education and national 
symbols, over the local ‘low cultures’. Benedict Anderson’s ‘official nationalism’ 
fits neatly with the description of statist approach, where cultural homogeneity is 
imposed top-down by state actions.597 It should be noted, however, that supporters 
of statist approach acknowledge the essential role of the concepts of 
modernization and industrialization in the formation of nationhood.  
The statist, or more specifically instutionalist, approach seems to explain 
more adequately the institutional formation of imagined communities in Central 
Asia by the Soviet state. The Soviet central government undertook to establish a 
local high culture for Central Asia peoples and simultaneously attempted to 
superimpose an even higher Soviet culture over the former. As a result of the 
contradictory experiment, the ‘bride of Frankenstein’ was created, which, many 
claim, eventually turned against its ‘creator’.     
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3.0 Ethnic conflicts in Central Asia  
 
 
The re-organization of political space in Central Asia after perestroika had 
dramatic consequences. Millions of people became residents and citizens of new 
states, conceived as belonging to an ethnic nationality other than their own. In the 
whole territory of the former Soviet Union, some 25 million ethnic Russians were 
transformed from privileged national group, culturally and politically at home 
throughout the USSR, into minorities of insecure status, disputed membership, 
and uncertain identity in a host of non-Russian nation-states.  
Focusing on the way in which the legacy of the dual Soviet institutional 
nationality has shaped the national question in the emerging successor states, 
Brubaker points to the crucial triadic nexus between incipient nation-state, 
national minority, and external national homeland replicating throughout post-
Soviet Eurasia.598 The incipient nation-state is conditioned by ‘nationalizing 
nationalism’ that involves claims made in the name of titular nationality, which is 
in sharp distinction to the demands and expectations of the citizenry as a whole. 
The titular nationality sees itself as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is 
perceived as the state of and for that nationality.599 Due to the perception of its 
weakened culture, economy and demography, the state’s nationalizing policies are 
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often directed at promoting the language, cultural revival, economic welfare and 
political hegemony of the titular nation. 
 Nationalizing nationalism was omnipresent in Central Asia in the late 
Soviet period and after independence. Nationalizing policies were apparent in the 
privileged status attributed to the indigenous languages, the newly revised and re-
formulated histories and the exclusion of representatives of non-titular groups 
from power. According to Smith et al, “Titular elites in Central Asia have engaged 
in nation-building not only as a response to pressure exerted ‘from below’ by the 
indigenous intelligentsias, but also as a means of fortifying the integrity of the 
titular nations themselves, which has been undermined to a certain extent by sub-
ethnic ties and loyalties”.600  
The issue of state language was the first to become politicized in the 
region. Under the pressure from nationalists and in attempt to capture popular 
mood, the Central Asian republics designated the languages of the titular 
nationality as the state language in the newly-adopted constitutions. That act 
signalled to the majority and minority groups that the status of the core nationality 
is higher than that of other non-titular groups. Nationalizing states in the region 
also strived to discover, formulate and exploit ethno-symbolic resources at their 
disposal. As was proposed by ethno-symbolist scholars, discussed in chapter two, 
those resources are essential for the creation of a unified and distinct nation with a 
shared history and destiny.  
In Kyrgyzstan, knowledge of Kyrgyz language became mandatory for 
presidential candidates and essential for government officials. Foreign Minister 
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Roza Otunbaeva ordered diplomatic negotiations to be translated into Kyrgyz, 
while Justice Minister Marat Kayipov proposed that the cabinet meetings are 
conducted in Kyrgyz rather than Russian.601 Due to the more democratic nature of 
politics in Kyrgyzstan and its heterogeneous demographic composition, 
nationalism played a key role in state-building and an ethno-national element was 
in every major sphere of state activity, from the adoption of the constitution and 
the formulation of foreign policy to the production of new national currency.602  
The change in the official name of the country, from ‘Republic of Kyrgyzstan’ to 
‘Kyrgyz Republic’ in 1990 echoed the popular nationalistic slogans like 
‘Kyrgyzstan for Kyrgyz’.  
Nationalizing Kyrgyz state chose the image of Manas, hero of the Kyrgyz 
epic poem, to revive and promote Kyrgyz culture. Manas served two concomitant 
purposes, denoting a popular symbol of Kyrgyz culture and representing Kyrgyz 
nationhood. At the same time, another aspect of history was revised and 
politicized. The Basmachi movements of the 1920s, who fought against the 
Bolshevik regime and who were detested by the Soviet regime, were rehabilitated 
and glorified as heroes of liberation movement.603  
Uzbek government also played a key role in implementation of language 
policies. The Council of Ministers appointed a supervising commission, assisted 
by a terminological committee and advised by the linguistics section of the Uzbek 
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Academy of Sciences. As a result of that policy, official organizations increasingly 
conduct their correspondence and clerical work in Uzbek, rather than in Russian. 
State-run institutions insisted that fluency in the state language was required for 
employment to lucrative posts and promotions. Much attention was paid to the 
promotion of Uzbek teaching. A special committee was set up to implement the 
teaching for adults, and a new law determining obligatory examinations in Uzbek 
was passed.604 In terms of the replacement of Russian and Soviet toponymes 
(place names) by indigenous ones, Uzbekistan has been the most vigorous, trying 
to eliminate non-titular languages and signifiers from public view to the extent 
possible. A great number of regions, cities, streets and squares have been renamed 
in order to recover the past and to graphically symbolize a change in the 
ownership of the land.605   
With a view to harmonizing national history and imparting a sense of 
common glorious past, Uzbek President led national campaign to project the 
medieval ruler Amir Temur (Tamerlane) as the founding father of the Uzbek 
nation. Amir Temur became Uzbekistan’s primary national and political icon, in 
glorification of which eleven monuments were erected in the country, an 
expensive museum dedicated to the Temurid dynasty was built in the capital and 
the year 1996 witnessed the commemoration of the 650th anniversary of 
Tamerlane’s birth.  
The nationalizing policies of indigenization and positive discrimination in 
the post-Soviet period seemed to be a ‘remake’ of the Soviet ‘affirmative action’ 
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during korenizatsiia, which was thoroughly reviewed by chapter four. As was 
discussed, korenizatsiia aimed to increase political representation of the 
indigenous nations, which strengthened networks of patronage by well-placed 
titular nationals in Central Asia. The new nationalizing policies accelerated the 
process of concentration of power in the hands of titular elites, as most important 
positions in government, administration and business shifted to members of the 
titular nationality. 
National minorities that reside within nationalizing states have their own 
nationalism. They designate their own political stance in specifically national 
terms, such as “a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethno-cultural 
nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or 
political rights”.606 That quality of a national minority is a subjective result of its 
self-perception, which was channelled and shaped by the national structure of 
social classification, institutionalized by the Soviet Union. Due to the Soviet 
legacy, national minorities in Central Asia have grown to think of themselves as 
members of distinct nationalities, because the Soviet regime was key to the 
institutionalization of that self-ascription.  
The elites of minority groups tend to represent their minority constituents 
as belonging to a nation different from the titular national group. According to 
Brubaker’s assessment, the self-definition of minorities as members of distinct 
nations and their consequent claims for public rights in that capacity reinforce 
ethno-nationalistic perceptions and practices of dominant elites.607 It can also 
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strengthen the tendency of the dominant majority to define their own nationhood 
in ethno-nationalistic, rather than civic-territorial terms and to rule their nation-
state accordingly. That can also apply to the cases when national elites formally 
define their statehood and citizenship in liberal terms. The reason being is that in 
an ethnically heterogeneous state with institutionalized and distinct ethno-cultural 
nationalities, liberal and ethnically neutral definitions of statehood and citizenship 
may mask a substantively ethno-centric organization of public life.608 
Kyrgyz government claimed to follow such nationalizing policies that 
would aim to revive the Kyrgyz culture, while taking into account the interests of 
all ethno-national groups. The official line held that the Kyrgyz nationality 
policies were shaped by the desire to ensure ethnic harmony and peace in 
Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and by the need to respond to nationalistic demands, 
on the other. In a number of cases, Akaev prevented enactment of laws by the 
parliament that would hurt the interests of national minorities. In 1991, he vetoed 
the law sponsored by nationalist party Asaba and adopted by the Parliament, 
which would ensure that the land and natural resources in Kyrgyzstan become the 
property of the Kyrgyz.609 That measure was welcomed by national minorities, 
who saw private ownership of land crucial to their rural livelihoods. Kyrgyz 
government tried to appeal to national minorities by officially endorsing the policy 
of ‘Kyrgyzstan - our common home’.  
In February 1996, Kyrgyzstan became the first and only Central Asian state 
to eliminate the infamous ‘fifth column’ in the Kyrgyz passports, which denoted a 
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passport-holder’s ethnic nationality and manifested the Soviet legacy of social 
classification according to institutionalized nationality. It was replaced with a 
‘citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic’. However, the decision caused a backlash of 
protests from nationalist Kyrgyz, and the ‘fifth column’ was reinstated by an edict 
of Prime Minister Jumagulov.610 Akaev was also crucial in according Russian the 
status of ‘official language’, while retaining Kyrgyz as ‘state language’ in the 2003 
constitution. The move was seen as a compromise that granted Kyrgyz superior 
status, while allowing Russian to be widely used in public life.611  
Given the government support for civil society organizations, there were 
around one thousand social organizations in 1997, including fifteen political 
movements/parties and more than twenty ethno-national organizations.612 In 1994, 
Akaev established the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan to give voice to 
minority groups in the country. Since political parties based on ethno-nationality 
were banned in the country, the participation of national centres and organizations 
in the activities of Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Peoples was crucial in channelling 
their perspective and guiding the government on nationality issues. Gradually 
though, the Assembly lost its credibility and became a tool to promote 
government’s political agenda.  
The measures directed at allaying concerns of other nationalities in the 
country did not necessarily brought rapid improvement in inter-ethnic relations or 
living conditions of minorities. Uzbek national minority, constituting around 16 
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per cent of the total population in Kyrgyzstan, traditionally backed Akaev’s 
government for the ability to prevent repetition of inter-ethnic violence and the 
accommodative discourse towards ethno-national minorities. They also 
appreciated cultural freedoms provided by the policy of ‘our common home’, 
government’s support for land ownership by minorities and more tolerant 
treatment of ethno-national minorities, compared to that in neighbouring states.613  
Notwithstanding that appreciation, Uzbek groups continuously expressed 
their concerns to the government, demanding that Uzbek is accorded ‘official 
language’ status and complaining that Uzbeks lack political representation and 
face discrimination in the country. They were disconcerted that the amendment to 
2003 constitution resulted in the disappearance of the clause enabling the free use 
of minority languages. Uzbek leaders wanted to change that omission, so that the 
community regained a right to use their language in formal circumstances.614 After 
the Tulip revolution, Uzbek protesters in Jalalabad voiced their discontent with 
the slow progress in implementing reforms by the administration of Bakiev and 
urged the government to allocate a quota of government posts to Uzbek 
community proportionate to their numbers.615   
The demands of ethno-national minorities for collective public rights, 
language privileges or territorial autonomy, which have roots in the institutional 
legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, directly challenged the claims of the 
republic’s titular elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and 
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territories. The Kyrgyz nationalist elites perceive the political demands by national 
minorities as threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. For example, in 
reaction to Russian becoming official language of Kyrgyzstan, several nationalist 
parties (Asaba, Uluu Birimdik, Ashar) joined in establishing a campaign for 
“protecting the state language from the expansion of Russian”.616 The head of 
Uluu Birimdek blamed Russian expansion for the lack of progress in promoting 
the Kyrgyz language. He stated that: “But the fact that Russian has been made an 
official language reduces the sphere where the state language is used; it allows 
people to say they write and speak the official language, which prevents the state 
language from ever establishing itself”.617  
Furthermore, minorities’ political or cultural demands make them more 
vulnerable to charges of outright disloyalty by the nationalist majority. Although 
they are formally part of the citizenry of the national state, they may be excluded 
substantively from the actual membership of the nation-state. Attempts by 
minorities to seek greater rights often provoke angry reactions from Kyrgyz 
representatives. Former Kyrgyz parliamentarian, Kuvanychbek Idinov alluded to 
the possibility of voluntary migration for those minorities and proposed that “If 
people are dissatisfied with their life here, they can always move to another 
country. No one will stop them”.618  
Even within the community, there is a palpable sense that political protests 
by their co-ethnics run a risk of inciting inter-ethnic strife. Crisis Groups reports 
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that the memories of the Osh conflict “are still fresh in both Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
minds, and shape today’s Uzbek attitudes”.619 The anxiety of a repeated ethnic 
conflict has been a major factor in the reluctance to over-stress ethnic issues and 
divisions. Some Uzbek politicians constantly recall the Osh bloodshed in attempt 
to warn people off from public protests. Davron Sabirov, who represents Uzbek 
Osh community in the Kyrgyz parliament, reminded parliamentarians of the 
sensitivities involved in inter-ethnic relations and suggested that holding a 
demonstration was the wrong way of achieving things.620 
Various political actors have tried to attract Uzbek groups to their strategic 
alliances. At every election before 2005, the Uzbek vote was a key southern 
constituency for President Akaev.621  The Uzbek community in the south served as 
a crucial ally for the north in its struggle with the formerly dominant southern 
elite.622 Portraying itself as an inclusive and tolerant regime, the Akaev 
administration projected its opponents as narrow-minded Kyrgyz nationalists. 
Indeed, Uzbeks had concerns about prospects of a new regime being more 
nationalistic than the Akaev’s one, and many perceived Akaev as the best of bad 
options.623  
Naturally, opposition politicians have denied accusations by the 
government that they held views against minorities. Deputy Head of People’s 
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Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Ishengul Boldjurova, said that: “Minorities support 
Akaev because they are used to him, and because twelve years of spin have had an 
effect”. 624 While Emil Aliev, Deputy Head of Arnamys Party accused the 
authorities of bribing ethnic groups to secure their votes by noting that: “In some 
regions which consist of large number of minorities, their votes may decide the 
outcome of the election. So the authorities use various techniques to get votes – 
such as promising to provide ethnic groups with newspapers in their own 
language. We do not have this opportunity”.625   
During mobilizations for the Tulip Revolution in 2005, opposition 
politicians managed to win over significant section of the Uzbek community by 
refusing allegations that they hid intentions to expel Uzbeks and insisting on the 
policy of Kyrgyzstan remaining their common homeland. Once the political 
protests expanded, prominent Osh journalist Saipov reported that: “Many Uzbeks 
have realized that the Akaev era is over, and that they might find better 
opportunities in the new world. They are placing great hopes in the new regime, 
including the creating of new workplaces, fair employment policies and an end to 
corruption…” and he added that: “Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south are united by 
common problems – unemployment, corruption, and a shortage of water, land and 
food”.626 Now the popularity pendulum was gradually swinging to Bakiev’s 
favour, as the Uzbek community looked for change. One Uzbek leader in 
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Jalalabad commented: “Bakiev is the lesser of two evils; he has a Russian 
upbringing and is tolerant on inter-ethnic relations”.627 
After the Tulip revolution, the new regime appointed an Uzbek, Anvar 
Artykov, as a governor of the Osh region. It was a symbolic gesture to boost 
confidence amongst southern Uzbeks and to reward Artykov for his leading role in 
organizing protests prior to the March revolution in southern Kyrgyzstan. 
President Bakiev dismissed Artykov later that year and replaced him with a 
Kyrgyz to boost alliance with the Kyrgyz elite in the south. After the regime 
change, the Bakiev administration was also accused by the Uzbek representatives, 
such as parliamentarian Kadyrjan Batyrov, for ignoring concerns of national 
minorities and using the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan as a propaganda 
tool.628 
In Uzbekistan, while nationalizing nationalism has created a sense of 
grievance and discomfort amongst the country’s national minorities, it has not 
provided sufficient ground for political reaction from national minorities. As was 
mentioned before, for national minorities to succeed in political mobilization, 
their activists and leaders depend on material resources and political opportunity 
structure. Given Uzbekistan’s authoritarian form of governance and the prevailing 
repressive politics, the capacity of national minorities to organize collective action 
has been severely restricted. Some Kyrgyz nationalists have voiced their support 
for that kind of uncompromising stance in Kyrgyzstan as well. In the words of 
Asaba party head Nusupov: “Uzbekistan and the Baltic states put considerable 
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pressure on Russian and do not indulge it the way we do here”.629 Other reasons 
for the low level of political activity among national minorities in Uzbekistan may 
include “a dearth of leadership skills, organizational structures and experience in 
forming social movements”.630    
The third form of nationalism that emerged in the aftermath of the re-
organization of political space along national lines in the former Soviet Union is 
‘transborder nationalism’ or ‘external national homeland’. According to Brubaker, 
transborder nationalism assert state’s right and obligation to monitor the 
condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, and protect 
the interests of ‘their’ ethno-national kin in other states.631 Due to its centrifugal 
nature, external national homeland poses a direct challenge to nationalizing 
nationalism. 
In the first decade of post-independence, transborder nationalism has been 
non-significant in Central Asia.632 Pointing to the disengagement by Russia in its 
co-ethnics abroad, Beissinger notes that “the Russian national homeland, 
consumed with its own weighty problems and interested in the advantages of 
stability, never played its expected, catalyzing role”.633   
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Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian state that partially embraced 
transborder nationalism, mainly in the form of repatriation, which was explained 
by the centrality of the demographic concerns to the Kazakh nationalizing state. 
Cummings’s research shows that an active diaspora policy was considered 
essential to reverse the ethno-national imbalance that was initially favouring the 
Russian group.634 As a result of the extensive repatriation, the ethno-national 
balance reversed and the Kazakhs became the national majority in the country.635  
In Kyrgyzstan, the government had no policy of external national 
homeland, but it tried to gather Kyrgyz co-ethnics from all parts of the world 
through the organization of the World Congress of the Kyrgyz. The first Congress 
took place in 1992. The second World Congress was held in 2003 and brought 
three hundred Kyrgyz diaspora from more than twenty countries. During the 
Congress there were official celebrations of the purported 2,200 years of Kyrgyz 
statehood and Kyrgyzstan’s twelve years of independence, as well as the 
honouring of the Kyrgyz victims of tsarist repression in 1916.636 The event was 
controversial because President Askar Akaev promised help to diaspora in the 
field of education, opening Kyrgyz-language schools in areas with Kyrgyz 
populations, and designating quotas of places in higher-educational institutions for 
ethnic Kyrgyz from abroad.637 The frequent references to ‘ancient statehood’ and 
‘Manas legacy’ by the Kyrgyz President gave the event a more nationally-charged 
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character. The Kyrgyz journalist Saipjanov warned that the celebration of the 
2,200th anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood could stir up tensions between the Kyrgyz 
majority and the country's other ethnic groups, particularly the Uzbeks.638 In 2001, 
Akaev signed a decree with a view to simplifying citizenship and residence 
procedures for the repatriation of ethnic Kyrgyz to their historical homeland.  
In the analysis of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Uzbeks abroad, 
Fumagalli correctly points to the absence of support by the kin state to its co-
ethnics across borders and puts forward three main factors to explain that.639 First, 
security concerns perceived as originating from across the borders compelled 
Uzbek leadership to prioritize consolidation of the state over strengthening ties 
with co-ethnics. Second, Uzbek government preferred bilateral inter-state 
relationship with Kyrgyzstan to exchanges with the Uzbek cultural organizations 
in Kyrgyzstan. And thirdly, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan have enjoyed a limited degree 
of pluralism and more open political climate, which has made their initial interest 
in annexation with Uzbekistan unattractive.  
Another important factor for Uzbekistan’s limited interest in promoting 
relation with co-ethnics abroad can be explained by the government’s worry of the 
reciprocation of transborder nationalism from other nations and concern of 
provoking nationalist demands from its own national minorities. However, 
Uzbekistan disinterest in its co-ethnics abroad does not nullify Kyrgyz fears of 
cultural encroachment by its bigger neighbour. That concern was witnessed in the 
thorny issue of broadcasting in Uzbek in the south of Kyrgyzstan, when the 
authorities in Kyrgyzstan were locked in a conflict with two broadcasters, Osh TV 
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and Mezon TV, over the excess of their airtime in Uzbek beyond the permitted 
fifty per cent.640  
 
 
3.1 Inter-Ethnic Riots  
 
In the End of the Soviet Empire, d’Encausse provides an account of how 
nationalist forces destroyed the ‘Red Empire’ and points out that the first serious 
threat to the reforms introduced by Gorbachev were the December 1986 riots by 
Kazakhs in Alma-Ata, which she views as the most noteworthy mass 
demonstration since 1927.641 As will be shown later in this section, after Alma-
Ata riots, Central Asia witnessed more than a dozen of incidents of violence 
linked to ethno-nationalism (see Table 2). Those tragic events represent inter-
ethnic conflicts, and more specifically, riot-type ethnic conflicts. Inter-ethnic riots 
are generally localized, explosive, short-lived and extremely brutal. They often 
stem from accumulated anger against governments for neglecting certain 
grievances or for persistent discriminatory treatment and disrespect.642   
In the insightful study of ethnic riots,643 Horowitz notes that accumulated 
suspicion, anger and rumours of atrocities contribute to the explosive and deadly 
outbreak of violence during riots, which have long-term repercussions on inter-
                                                                                                                                  
639
 Fumagalli, M. (2007). “Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and 'Uzbeks 
abroad'.” Central Asian Survey 26(1). 
640
 Mamaraimov, A. (2008). “Sound of Uzbek Fills Void in Kyrgyz South.” Institute for War & 
Peace Reporting(4 January). 
641
 D'Encausse, H. C. (1993). The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations, Basic 
Books.  
642
 Esman, M. (2004). An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict. Cambridge, Polity, p. 70 
643
 Horowitz, D. (2001). The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley, University of California Press 
 257 
ethnic relations. In referring to the Osh ethnic riots, Tishkov defines it as conflict 
with no structured armed forces and organized long-term fighting with explicit 
front-lines.644  
The common determinant of conflicts in Central Asia was that they 
encompassed violent and non-violent disputes between two or more ethnic groups 
over significant political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues. Most of 
the inter-ethnic riots in the region took place between two or more ethno-national 
groups in the typical ‘us’ against ‘them’ framework of ethnic conflict. Our 
discussion of the subjective application of ethnicity in chapter two noted its key 
element in terms of a subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of 
culture to differentiate one group from other groups. Awareness of ‘the other’ and 
the subjective salience of that difference contribute to mobilization around 
conscious difference.  
Ethnic disputes in Central Asia were unfolding in the context of increasing 
political agitation due to perestroika, worsening economic situation and 
weakening state structures. Reznichenko describes the political environment of the 
time in the following way: “Once the political thaw set in, the nationalist tensions, 
which existed and were artificially hidden away for decades, rose up from the 
fragments of the totalitarian ice in their dramatic form”.645 The effect of the 
perestroika era policies on the fine balance between ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan 
was profound. According to Melvin:  
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The rise of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationalist sentiments brought about by the rise in 
nationalist politics throughout the USSR and the declarations of sovereignty in 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan greatly exacerbated tensions in the south. 
Fears among the southern Uzbeks that the Kyrgyz would have increased power 
within a sovereign Kyrgyz Republic formed an important part of the background 
to ethnic rioting in 1990 between the two groups in Noviy Uzgen and Osh.646  
 
 
Ethnic tensions tend to mount during the times of transition, which is because 
“when it looks as though the shape of the polity is being settled once and for all, 
apprehensions are likely to grow”.647 In the analysis of ethnic conflicts in 
democratizing countries, Prazauskas argued that ethnic conflicts emerge when 
instances of inequality are perceived by ethnic elites as directly infringing on the 
rights and interests of entire community, and he outlined the most important of 
those: “the threatened or actual loss of groups status, the danger of assimilation, 
the loss of cultural integrity, the curtailment of the functions and sphere of 
utilization of the native language, the erosion of the ethnic territorial base due to 
an influx of migrants, and the lack of real self-government”.648 Those factors were 
also present in the Central Asian region and will be later discussed in more detail.  
In an interview with Berliner Zeitung, Uzbek President Karimov stressed 
the effect of the Soviet nationality policy on inter-ethnic tensions and noted that: 
“The background of the events in Ferghana also includes the decades of national 
suppression of the Central Asian peoples… In May 1989, the long-overdue 
explosion was then directed against the ‘foreign’ Meskhetian Turks, who had been 
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deported to this region decades ago”.649 The Secretary of TsK KPSS Girienko 
suggested that tensions in the inter-ethnic relations in Osh were unfolding before 
the events and were partly due to the attempts of the Kyrgyz titular nation to 
obtain privileged position in terms of culture and language, which were perceived 
by the Russian and Uzbek community as an infringement of their rights.650 In fact, 
the legacy of the Soviet institutionalized ethno-nationalism created conditions that 
fostered violence. As Beissinger’s observes: “By creating a hierarchy of groups in 
which smaller ethno-territorial units were embedded inside larger ones, by 
consolidating ethnicities around those units, and by encouraging limited access to 
the state by ethnic groups, Soviet ethno-federalism inadvertently created the 
conditions for the explosion of violence that accompanied its break-up”.651  
The economic weakening of the central government not only signalled its 
vulnerability to ethno-nationalist demands but also stimulated them through 
turning the relationship with Moscow less economically attractive and burdening 
peripheral populations, which further added to their grievances.652 Distribution of 
collective goods of the state along ethno-national lines and the perceived 
discrimination was an important reason for protest and contestation. Conflicts 
between ethnic groups arise over cultural issues, scarce economic resources and 
political power. Demands of a socio-economical or political nature, which may be 
pertinent to the larger population, become skewed towards the interests of ethnic 
groups in the competitive environment, thus creating tension between groups.  
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Competition for state resources becomes a matter concerning not just 
individuals and societies of shared interests but rather entire ethnic groups. As the 
series of events in Central Asia showed, even what starts as an innocent quarrel 
over fruits in a bazaar in Ferghana or youth brawl in a bar in Jalalabad can 
transform to an ethnically-based dispute on a larger scale. That may have been 
why some political observers in the region asserted that even the economic 
catastrophe and the crisis of ideology in the USSR were not as threatening as the 
deteriorating inter-ethnic strife.653 
When interviewed by Schmodt-Haeuer of Die Zeit on the causes of 
nationalist clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in 1989, Islam 
Karimov offered the following insight:  
[T]hey were the consequences of many unsolved socio-economic problems that 
accumulated over decades. In addition, there is the historical injustice that was 
done to entire peoples under Stalin, among them the Meskhetian Turks… For 
decades they lived side by side with Uzbeks and other peoples in our country. 
Then perestroika was initiated in the country… The leaders of the Meskhetian 
Turks, who live in the north Caucasus not only organized demonstrations, but 
also made their compatriots intolerant of the local population and thus triggered 
off an avalanche.654   
 
 
Prominent Kyrgyz writer, Chingiz Aitmatov, in numerous interviews referred to 
extreme poverty, unemployment and housing shortages as key reasons for the 
inter-ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, and blamed the tragic events on extremist 
nationalist forces, which “have stirred up these passions and that we are now 
seeing is an extreme nationalism”.655 According to Sadikov, First Secretary of the 
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Osh Communist Committee, unresolved socio-economic problems resulted in the 
Osh mass riots that severed the “centuries-old friendship between peoples”.656  
There were official warnings about the danger of political and socio-
economic issues taking ethno-national forms. For example, the declaration by 
Soviet of Nationalities on the land use disputes between Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan stated that “the absence of settlement of land use disputes in the border-
zone Batkenskii District and Vorukh and Oktiabrskii in Isfarinskii District 
sometimes leads to direct clashes. A most acute conflict situation that required the 
introduction of a state of emergency developed here in July 1989”, and it further 
resolved “To appeal to the presidents of the republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Tajik 
SSR to return to constructive dialogue, urgently consider the disputed land use 
questions, and enact mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of Article 78 of the 
USSR Constitution, with the aim of removing the tension in relations between the 
Kyrgyz and Tajik populations in the border-zone raions”.657 The Osh Office of the 
Kyrgyz KGB was aware of the increased inter-ethnic tensions in the region after 
the Ferghana riots in 1989.658 
Apart from the common context of the volatile political situation and 
socio-economic crisis, the regional conflicts were conditioned by incapacity of the 
local state structures to respond to increasing tensions. Pravda correspondent 
Razguliaev noted that the Kyrgyz authorities’ yielding to the unsanctioned 
acquisition of land by the Bishkek protesters in May 1989 served as an open 
invitation for other Kyrgyz groups to grab land for housing at the expense of other 
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groups and at a risk of escalating inter-ethnic relations.659 He writes: “In the 
following year [1990], conflict erupted in two spots at once, in Frunze and in Osh. 
They [authorities] yielded again, and again at the cost to the interests of other 
groups. However, this time the obvious injustice sparked a bloody flame”.660 
When the authority within the Soviet regime shifted, Beissinger notes that 
“competition over defining the physical, human, and cultural boundaries of the 
state intensified, and the signals sent by local authority frequently gave the 
impression of support for the aims of those contesting the nation”.661 
It is interesting to mention how the events were perceived by the leading 
figures, observers and experts in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The perception and 
general acceptance among the participants that they are engaged in ethnic conflict 
is useful in determining if the conflict is inter-ethnic. In that regard, Kolsto’s 
observation is rather fitting: “The touchstone should not be any inherent quality in 
the act or the contested item itself but how it is perceived by the actors and the 
immediate surroundings”.662  
In an interview with Sovetskaia Kirgizia, First Deputy Minister of Internal 
Affairs Kulov pointed to the importance of the rising inter-ethnic tensions in the 
region by saying that “I also consider the overall complex situation in the country 
to be a factor. The events in Trancaucasus, and now also the pogroms in 
Dushanbe, have been received with alarm by millions of people and have given 
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rise to uncertainty and concern”.663 At the meeting with journalists after the mass 
unrest in Parkent on 3 March 1990, Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Uzbek Communist Party Khamidov noted the similarities between the events in 
Parkent and Buka and inter-ethnic riots in Ferghana.664 During the Osh riots, the 
Central Committee of KPK, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council 
of Ministers of KSSR made a joint appeal to two ethno-national groups, ‘Kyrgyz 
and Uzbeks – blood brothers in language, culture and religion’, asking them to 
“display restraint, good sense, and humanity” and “Extend a hand to one another. 
Restore peace to your common home”.665 The first act of the newly-elected 
President Akaev was to acknowledge the ethnic issue as a major concern. He said 
at a meeting with  representatives of national and cultural associations that there 
was no way of resolving the socio-economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan without settling 
the ethnic conflicts and reaching national accord.666  
It is notable that the Office of Public Procurator of the USSR set up a 
special investigation team focusing on crimes committed during the Osh ethnic 
riots. When queried on the purpose of setting up the special investigation team on 
the federal level rather than locally or nationally, the head of the investigation 
team Frolov replied: “The group was created taking into account the fact that the 
conflict in the oblast was inter-ethnic in nature, which reflects on the functioning 
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of local law-enforcing organs. The scale of committed atrocities demanded the 
involvement of significant forces to investigate them”.667  
The participants in riots and protests often saw their participation in terms 
of securing the interests of their groups in opposition to those of other groups. The 
rumours about flats and plots of land allocation to refugees from Azerbaijan 
prompted the unsanctioned January meetings in the capital of Kyrgyzstan in 
1990.668 The participants in the meeting warned that a mass relocation of refugee 
families would exacerbate the housing problem in Bishkek.669 Similarly, during 
the riots in Bukinskiy rayon in Tashkent oblast, more than one thousand young 
Uzbeks demanded the immediate eviction of Meskhetian Turks living in the 
Karabak settlement.670  
The policy of openness and restructuring in the Central Asian context took 
an anti-Central Asian overtone in the beginning of perestroika in 1986. The Soviet 
leadership was disappointed with the volatile situation there and with the regional 
political elites.671 Moscow was concerned with inability of the regional leadership 
in Central Asia to fight effectively against growing nationalism. In the final years 
of the Soviet Union, inter-ethnic strife in Central Asia brought the region to the 
notice of the outside world. This was not characteristic of the region because 
Central Asia had previously enjoyed peaceful inter-ethnic relations. The rising 
inter-ethnic tensions were in contradiction to the claims of the Soviet authorities 
that the nationality question in the USSR was resolved once and for all.  
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The events in Alma-Ata in 17 and 18 December 1986 had significant 
repercussions and were arguably a starting date for the glasnost’ mobilization 
cycle. Even though the riots did not constitute an ethnic violence, they represented 
the first unauthorized political manifestations in the region, arguably unleashing 
the consequent waves of unrest in Central Asia. During the events, up to ten 
thousand participants took to the streets in response to the removal of the 
Communist Party leader of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, and the 
appointment of a Russian in his place.672 Alma-Ata protests were spontaneously 
organized by a group of students from the Kazakh State University but lacked 
proper movement organization.  
 
Image 1. Alma-Ata riots in December 1986 
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Thousands were arrested and hundreds were sentenced to prison, fined, or 
fired from work. About 3,000 students were expelled from universities and other 
educational institutions.673 Extensive repressions accompanied and followed the 
riots, which could explain why there was no repetition of protest mobilization till 
June 1989, when local Kazakhs in Novyi Uzen carried out pogroms against local 
Meskhetian Turks. According to Beissinger, the Alma-Ata events did not evoke 
any iterative attempts to challenge the Soviet state and that there was no evidence 
that “the student organizers of these protests were inspired to take to the streets by 
liberalizing change within Soviet institutions, but rather by outrage in response to 
a contemptible personnel decision by Moscow. They pressed reactive rather than 
proactive demands”.674   
From late 1987, attempts by the central leadership to introduce ethnic 
Russians into the political elite circles and administrative apparatus of the Central 
Asian republics were curtailed and later practically abandoned. For instance, in 
July 1989 Gennady Kolbin, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh 
Communist Party (KPQ), was recalled from Kazakhstan because his name had 
notoriously been linked to the Alma-Ata events of December 1986. 
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Image 2. Alma-Ata students protesting, December 1986 
 
 
 
Central Asian public opinion was acutely against what it considered as 
colonialist policy of the centre. As vertical social structures with widespread 
patronage and clientage were characteristic of Central Asian society, economic 
and other benefits were distributed not only in accordance with a person's general 
standing in the society, but also depending on his position in these vertical 
structures. If the power of a patron diminishes in the system, his clients also find 
themselves in a disadvantageous position.  
The growing discontent with existing conditions affected all strata in 
Central Asian societies by 1988. This was the context in which general discontent 
was channelled through nationalistic streams. National groups and movements 
 268 
began to emerge in the Central Asian republics, where intelligentsia and educated 
urban groups articulated political goals and actions. Of all these nationalist 
movements, the largest was the Movement for Preserving the Natural, Material 
and Spiritual Wealth in Uzbekistan, aka ‘Birlik’ (Unity). Birlik was formed in 
November 1988 by eighteen Uzbek intellectuals. As any other anti-colonial 
nationalist movement, its original demands included the end of cultural 
imperialism and colonial exploitation in Uzbekistan. It also called for the 
sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR.  
However, one needs to bear in mind that the formation of mass national 
movements in Central Asia took place under more difficult conditions than those 
in other regions of the Soviet Union. The national intelligentsia in the region was 
rather a new phenomenon, and even though its members demonstrated anti-
colonial feelings they were a generation created by the Soviet regime. Khazanov 
makes an astute observation that the national intelligentsia in Central Asia lacked 
a clear vision of the political future for their republics.675 Therefore, the Central 
Asian intelligentsia tended to incline towards ethno-nationalism because they 
regarded the dominance of their own ethnic group in the titular republic as the best 
safeguard of their own positions in the society. Moreover, the national 
intelligentsia was not as numerous in Central Asia as those in other parts of the 
Soviet Union. They also featured ties to some extent to the old political elite and 
official power structure. This was evident by the fact that most of members of 
nationalist movements were involved in culture, education, and other 
humanitarian professions, which were always under the strict control of KPSS.  
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It is not surprising therefore that during perestroika most of the leaders of 
the opposition nationalist movements and groups in Central Asia were moderate 
in their political demands, avoided anti-Communist slogans, and showed 
willingness to collaborate with local authorities. The common criticism that was 
made by them referred more often to personalities of the criticized subject than at 
the Soviet institutions. Thus, participants of a protest rally booed the leader of the 
opposition ‘Erk’ (will) party, Muhammad Salih, when he took a moderate position 
toward the unpopular government while trying to ease the atmosphere during the 
rally at the university campus in Tashkent on 17 January 1992, a day after a 
student demonstration had been brutally dispersed by police.676 It is notable that 
even influential and highly respected figures of the Central Asian cultural elite 
such as the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov and the Kazakh poet Olzhas 
Suleimenov preferred to maintain good relations with the government and never 
openly sided with the opposition. 
However, some social movements such as the Committee in Defence of 
the Aral Sea stridently opposed environmental mismanagement of the 
government. But public dissatisfaction with the state of affairs propelled the social 
movements to openly challenge government authorities. The party and the 
government fought back by narrowing the range of permitted discussion and 
debate. Birlik was thus criticized by the Uzbek Communist Party and the 
government for being manipulated by “those who would divide the country and 
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stir up ethnic antagonisms”.677 One government-sponsored social organization 
attacked the leaders of Birlik, claiming that: 
“[Birlik leaders] have appointed themselves representatives of the people and try 
to discredit everything positive that is done in Uzbekistan. They appeal to the 
people to nominate the leaders of Birlik to the post of Peoples’ Deputy. Their 
actions cannot be described as anything other than the lust for power”.678 
 
 
The reasons mentioned above explain why the opposition in Central Asia was not 
influential enough to lead broad national movements with clear social and 
political goals. The weak opposition from the local intelligentsia was one of the 
factors that caused local dissatisfaction to become expressed through more 
sporadic, loosely organized mass protests. The underclass and the rural 
population, who had been worst hit by transitional hardship, were particularly 
prone to the extreme forms of ethnic nationalism and they were most likely to 
subscribe to the more radical political slogans like “Uzbekistan for Uzbeks”, 
“Russians out of Tajikistan”, or “Priority to the indigenous people in Kazakhstan”. 
Inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia deteriorated during perestroika, and two riots 
took place in Ashgabat and Nebit-Dag, both in Turkmenistan, on 1 and 9 May 
1989.  
Inter-communal tumult in Ashgabat was followed by the Uzbek pogroms 
against the Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. In June of 
1989 clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks broke out after a 
disagreement in a market between an Uzbek vendor and a Meskhetian buyer. The 
incident sparked widespread inter-communal violence that spread to several cities 
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in the Ferghana Valley. Several thousand troops were dispatched to quell the 
violence, which lasted over the course of a week. Around 100 people were killed 
and 600-800 wounded as a result. Hundreds of homes and government buildings 
were burned. The victims were mainly Meskhetians and the perpetrators were 
reportedly Uzbek by nationality. In order to prevent further troubles, Moscow later 
evacuated 17,000 Meskhetians.  
Nearly a year later, on 20 February 1990, a rally of more than a thousand 
of young Uzbeks in Bukinski raion in Tashkent oblast´ demanded eviction of 
Meskhetian Turks living in the Karabak settlement.679 After series of assaults on 
Turks, Uzbek leadership decided to evacuate them to the ‘Ten Years of October’ 
sanatorium in the neighbouring raion. Blood was also shed in Buka and Parkent of 
Uzbekistan, when on 3 March 1990 clashes occurred between the local population 
and representatives of law enforcement after the resettlement of the Meskhetian 
Turks to the area. The small unit of the militiamen were not able to disperse the 
agitated crowd. The rioters moved towards the town, where they held troops as 
hostages in the local office of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and set the 
building in fire.680  Some 44 internal troopers and officers were injured as a result.   
Concerned with the similarities between Buka, Parkent and Ferghana inter-
ethnic events, the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Uzbek SSR formed a 
commission to investigate the circumstances and consequences of the mass unrest 
that occurred in Parkent and Buka.681 On those events, Khamidov from the 
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commission noted that “there are forces whipping up inter-ethnic conflicts and, 
unfortunately, the organisers of the pogroms in Ferghana oblast´ have still not 
been found, although dozens of people involved have now been sentenced”.682 
Novyi Uzen and Mangyshlak in Kazakhstan also witnessed inter-ethnic 
strife from 17 to 20 June 1989. The following year saw an unrest in the 
neighbouring Dushanbe, Tajikistan (11-14 February 1990), as well as a pogrom in 
Andijan (2 May 1990) and clashes in Namangan (2 December 1990), both in 
Uzbekistan. But the most ferocious inter-communal conflict was between the 
Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek minority groups in the Osh oblast´, in the south of 
the Kyrgyzstan and adjacent to the Uzbek border, in the summer of 1990. The 
intensity and extent of the inter-ethnic violence in Central Asia shocked the Soviet 
officials and observers.  
For a long time, the central and regional authorities blamed incidents of 
civil unrest on various subversive forces. Thus, the central government often 
pointed to extremists, Islamic fundamentalists, enemies of perestroika, corrupt 
local political officials, and the mafia. At the same time, regional officials chose to 
blame informal opposition movements, like Birlik in Uzbekistan, or Kirghizia in 
Kyrgyzstan. The opposition in Central Asia, on the other hand, argued that the 
violence was the result of outside provocation and claimed the involvement of 
local and central authorities, as well as the Committee for State Security (KGB). 
With that in mind, Muhammad Salih, an opposition leader in Uzbekistan, 
remarking on the pogroms in Ferghana, stated that: 
“[T]he violence that occurred was instigated. Which organ instigated it - the 
KGB, the Central Committee [of the Uzbek Communist Party], or the centre - we 
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cannot say with certainty, but it is very clear that all of the actions were planned 
in advance”.683 
 
 
In order to remain in power, the political elites of Central Asia did not hesitate to 
resort to violence, and sometimes even to instigate it. For example, there is some 
reason to believe that the unrest in Dushanbe in February 1990 was provoked by 
the local elite who knew how strong the dissatisfaction was and feared losing 
power in the upcoming election to the supreme soviet of the republic.684 Even 
though the Dushanbe unrest was a mass nationalistic expression, directed against 
the Slavic and russified population, there was however a concomitant demand for 
the resignation of local leadership. The leaders of Dushanbe initially promised to 
comply, but it tuned out to have been a tactical manoeuvre to save time before the 
order was restored with the help of the regular Army troops. Consequent elections 
in Dushanbe took place under a state of emergency, and the Communist elite 
claimed the victory in the end. 
In response to the tensed nationalistic environment, government officials 
tended to react by issuing formal decrees. Thus, in February 1990 the Supreme 
Soviet Presidium of Uzbek SSR issued an order setting out penalties for 
fomenting public disorder. The order referred to “prevocational rumours which 
were inciting the public to panic”, and set a fine of 200 to 500 roubles or two 
months of hard labour for anyone circulating material calling for pogroms or the 
use of violence, threatening the public order, or spreading panic among the 
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population.685 The tragedies of earlier violence in other republics of the Soviet 
Union and the fear of growing chauvinistic feelings formed a backdrop to the 
inter-ethnic tensions in Central Asia. Even as officials were locked in conflicts 
with the centre, they were aware of a background of mounting social and inter-
ethnic strife.  
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Table 2. Inter-ethnic strife in Central Asia, 1989-1990  
DATE  EVENT  
April 1988 Anti-Uzbek unrest in Charzhou, Turkmenistan 
February 1989 Protests against Russians in Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
1 May 1989 Pogroms of Armenians in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan 
9 May 1989 Anti-Armenian riots in Nebit-Dag, Turkmenistan  
3 June 1989 Pogroms of Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley, 
Uzbekistan 
17 June 1989 Anti-Caucasians riots in Novyi Uzen and Mangyshlak, 
Kazakhstan 
July 1989 Anti-Kyrgyz riots in Isfara region, Tajikistan  
25 January 1990 Anti-Azerbaijani protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan 
10 February 1990 Protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan  
11 February 1990 Anti-Armenian riots in Dushanbe, Tajikistan 
20 February 1990 Anti-Meskhetian riots in Bukinskiy district of Tashkent 
region, Uzbekistan  
3 March 1990 Protests in Buka and Parkent, Uzbekistan 
2 May 1990 Unrest in Andijan, Uzbekistan  
6 June 1990 The Osh conflict, Kyrgyzstan  
2 December 1990 Riots in Namangan, Uzbekistan  
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3.2 The Osh Conflict  
 
Having discussed the nature of ethnic conflicts in Central Asia and the dynamics 
of the series of inter-ethnic riots in the region, the forthcoming section will 
consider at the Osh conflict in the context of two opposing forces, the Kyrgyz 
nationalizing state and the Uzbek national minority. The legacy of Soviet ethno-
federalism, the centrality of ethno-nationalism in politics, the increased political 
mobilization and the more open political environment provided necessary 
structural opportunities for the Kyrgyz titular nationality to legitimize its 
nationalizing policies and strengthen its cultural privileges and political power. 
Other communities, including Uzbeks,  felt compelled to push for their own 
political demands and agendas, lest they lose in the inter-ethnic competition over 
scarce public goods and resources.  
The fear of losing a privileged status enjoyed during the Soviet period also 
contributed to the urgency of the Uzbek national minority to act. National 
minorities become key to the state- and nation-building issue. Kyrgyzstan faced 
two urgent challenges. On the one hand, the Kyrgyz state was involved in the 
simultaneous processes of nation-building and consolidation of the new central 
authority, and on the other, it was confronted by the growing assertiveness and 
political mobilization of the Uzbek national minority. Thus, the demands of the 
Uzbek community for collective public rights, language privileges or territorial 
autonomy, directly challenged the claims of the Kyrgyz titular elites to unitary 
ownership of their national polities and territories. The Kyrgyz community 
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perceived the political demands by Uzbeks as threatening and fundamentally 
illegitimate. 
In January 1990, the Soviet press was alarmed at telltale signs of social and 
political tensions in Bishkek (then Frunze), the capital of Kyrgyzstan. Radio 
Liberty noted that tensions had a significant element of ethnic friction.686 These 
predicaments reflected the situation on the ground, which was characterized by the 
increase of popular mass gatherings, a hallmark of Kyrgyz society since then.  
In January and February 1990, three demonstrations were held on the main 
square of Bishkek. On 25 January, Kyrgyz students and ‘extremist-minded 
persons’ gathered in the square amid concerns with rumours of a thousand 
Azerbaijani refugees arriving in Kyrgyzstan for settlement and sought to receive 
some clarifications from authorities if the refugees would be provided with 
accommodation from the Bishkek housing stock.687 The demands and petitions 
made during other demonstrations were similar. At the rally of 10 February 1990, 
demonstrators demanded that migration into the republic should be regulated and 
called for rapid solutions to housing shortage.688 A year before that, residents of 
Bishkek took matters of desperate housing shortages into their own hands by 
squatting on vacant plots of land outside the city and building homes. 
In Jalalabad, the Uzbek community presented a petition to local authorities 
demanding autonomy for the Osh region. Frustration and the feeling among 
Uzbeks of being mistreated was a factor in their nationalistic claims for 
autonomous Uzbek entity in Osh. A local informal group called ‘Adolat’ (justice) 
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was instrumental in organizing Uzbek people in the region. Adolat was 
established in late 1989 with the objective of preserving the Uzbek culture, 
language and traditions in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. In early 1990, as a result 
of Adolat’s advocacy, the building that hosted the local history museum was 
returned to Uzbeks as a mosque. This decision by local authorities was negatively 
perceived by local Kyrgyz youth and intelligentsia.689 As its popularity increased 
among Uzbeks, Adolat activists wanted to achieve the declaration of Uzbek as a 
state language and announce Osh region as an autonomous Uzbek republic.690 
These demands further contributed to the worsening relations between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek communities. 
Kyrgyz community in the south of the country, especially those that 
abandoned their villages and migrated to cities, were worst affected by serious 
economic and social hardships. Feeding into the growing frustration among 
Kyrgyz, a political movement ‘Ashar’ emerged in July 1989. It quickly gained 
popularity among Kyrgyz population. The radical group under the umbrella of 
Narodno-Demokraticheskii Front Kirgizii (Kyrgyz democratic movement) stated 
as its main objective the allocation of land for housing for homeless Kyrgyz 
people.691 Ashar’s success on a republican level prompted the creation of a similar 
organization in Osh oblast´ under the name ‘Osh Aimagi’. Osh Aimagi was 
founded in April 1990. Its proclaimed objective was to help Kyrgyz in obtaining 
land for building private houses. By 20 April Osh Aimagi collected five thousand 
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applications from homeless Kyrgyz for land allotments.692 One of the pre-election 
promises by the head of Osh Aimagi, K. Bektemirov, was to pressure local 
authorities to designate land from the territory of the Lenin kolkhoz (collective 
farm) for construction of private houses for Kyrgyz workers. Even though this 
promise was greeted enthusiastically by young Kyrgyz who had migrated from 
villages to Osh city, Uzbek dwellers of the kolkhoz were very anxious about this 
prospect.693 The competition for land was to have wider ramifications for inter-
communal relations.  
The situation on the ground pointed to the fact that growing nationalism 
combined with popular anger over severe social problems could produce a volatile 
mix that was reminiscent of the situation in Alma-Ata immediately prior to 
Jeltoqsan riots of December 1986.694 Correspondent of Sobesednik, Natalya 
Airapetova, described Osh as ‘the capital of unemployment’ and warned the 
authorities that the problems in Osh were similar to those evident in Uzbekistan’s 
part of Ferghana Valley prior to the disturbances between Uzbeks and Meskhetian 
Turks in June 1989.695 Moreover, Osh oblast´ was made up by multi-national 
population of 1.3 million people that included Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians and 
many other smaller ethnic groups. 
The confidential report from the Kyrgyz KGB transmitted to the 
republican authorities indicated that heightened inter-ethnic sentiments were more 
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evident in the south of the country. On 9 May 1990, at the KGB headquarters in 
Frunze, a high-level meeting involving top Communist Party officials was held to 
discuss the situation in Osh oblast´.696 On that meeting, second secretary of the 
Central Committee of the KPK, N. Chepelev, pledged to undertake necessary 
actions for alleviating inter-ethnic tensions. Yet official statements ranged from 
foolhardy optimism to deluded wishful thinking. Thus, sources from the MVD 
reported on the possibility of destabilization as a result of the problems of a social 
and economic order, migration of the population, unemployment among young 
people and reforms of the law on state language, and stressed its efforts to 
convince concerned people that the Kyrgyz people “have never tried to inflame 
inter-ethnic strife”, which was seen from its long history.697  
Responding to the article from Komsomol΄skaia Pravda, An Echo of Baku, 
which compared volatile situations in Dushanbe and Bishkek, Feliks Kulov, the 
first deputy minister of internal affairs, said in unequivocal terms that: “I state in 
all responsibility that a criminal explosion of that [Dushanbe riots] kind will not 
take place in the republic. There are no grounds for that”.698 But oddly, he did not 
rule out ‘group hooliganism’ at night clubs and rock-concerts. Kyrgyz leadership 
thought that anti-Russian strife was more probable to take place than riots between 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek people. Thus, in an interview with Sovetskaia Kirgizia on 
Bishkek rallies, Kulov refuted a possibility of inter-ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan 
by noting that protesters’ demands were directed at curtailing migration to 
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Kyrgyzstan and that “even this appeal did not amount to an infringement of the 
interests of the Russian-speaking nationalities residing in Kirghizia”.699 
From 17 May 1990, local authorities fell under intense pressure by mass 
meetings organized by the leaders of Osh Aimagi. On 27 May, during the big 
mass protest at the state school no.38 local authorities agreed to provide 30 
hectares of irrigated land for the purposes of Osh Aimagi. On the following day, a 
counter mass protest by the local Uzbek community forced authorities to abandon 
the decision and put forward an alternative option for the consideration of both 
groups. The alternative plan offered to the Kyrgyz group 600 hectares of land in a 
different location, in the collective farms of Kenesh and Kalinin.700 Osh Aimagi 
leaders however refused to accept the new deal and proclaimed an ultimatum to 
the authorities with a deadline of 4 June 1990. Furious at the intransigence of the 
Kyrgyz counterparts, Uzbek activists of Adolat urged to boycott the Kyrgyz group. 
As a result, some Uzbek bread-makers stopped selling bread to Kyrgyz in the city 
and Uzbek flat-owners expelled 1,500 Kyrgyz tenants from their rented flats. 
Local KGB sources reported that that action had only added more Kyrgyz 
supporters to the ranks of Osh Aimagi.701 
By the summer of 1990, ethnic confrontation gained its momentum in the 
Osh oblast´ with only a trigger needed to spark off the conflict. The June decision 
by local Soviet officials in the city of Osh resolved to relocate the communal land 
of the Lenin kolkhoz, which ethnic Uzbeks had been farming for years, in order to 
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give it to the Kyrgyz protesters. That decision was not the most favourable for the 
prevention of the inter-communal unrest. Squatting incidents by Kyrgyz of the 
Uzbek land in the collective farm was similar in serving as a triggering 
mechanism for a fully blown ethnic conflict.  
The unrests started on 4 June 1990 in the city of Osh and later spread to 
the whole Osh oblast´ and Kyrgyzstan, affecting Osh, Uzgen, Bishkek and 
Jalalabad cities. The first reports of the riots suggested that it was a spontaneous 
outburst of ethnic conflict. Later official reports, however, stressed the pre-
meditated character of many attacks and the fact that preparation of much of the 
violence had been made well in advance. The chronology of the Osh conflict starts 
from the dispute between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks over the allocation of the farmland 
for housing lots on a suburban Uzbek-run Lenin kolkhoz in Osh oblast´. From 30 
May, activists from Osh Aimagi organized daily protests on the fields of the 
kolkhoz. On 4 June, a counter rally was held in the kolkhoz with the purpose of 
discussing rival claims made by the Kyrgyz group, who had illegally occupied the 
field for dividing it up for housing lots. Protesters heard the position of the Uzbek 
group, Adolat, which wanted to maintain the status quo over land possession.702 
Supporters of Osh Aimagi also gathered in the field, which already had 1,500 
Uzbek and 10,000 Kyrgyz protesters.703 By the evening of that day, more Uzbek 
supporters were coming from the adjacent cities in Uzbekistan such as Namangan, 
Ferghana and Andijan.  
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The Lenin kolkhoz dispute was reminiscent of Bishkek squatting incidents, 
but with a key difference being that the land in the suburbs of Bishkek belonged to 
no one, while the land in the Lenin kolkhoz was within the working and living 
habitat of the local Uzbek community. The ethnic element created serious 
consequences, especially as the dispute over land was set against tensed social and 
ethnical background. 
Attempts by Apas Dzhumagulov, chairman of Kyrgyz Council of 
Ministers, to calm the crowd failed. A militia squad of 900 officers was 
dispatched to separate two ethnic groups. Futile efforts of militia men to disperse 
people by firing blank ammunitions, and later live bullets, did not resolve the 
situation. Rioters, instead of dispersing, went into the city centre vandalising and 
setting fire to cars, houses and shops. Local KGB officers reported at the time that 
the arrival of a group of young Kyrgyz with Salpiev, the representative of the 
movement ‘Kirghizia’, from Bishkek to Osh was another destabilizing factor in 
the charged atmosphere. Even though their official purpose was to get acquainted 
with the situation in Osh, some ‘Kirghizia’ activists were reported to have 
engaged in heating up the flames of violence and provocations.704 It was also 
noted that representatives of Uzbek movement Birlik were engaged in similar 
activities. The events took an ugly turn when several houses, both Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz, were identified with markings to indicate the nationality of residents.  
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As the clashes between the two groups escalated, a state of emergency, 
including a curfew, was declared in Osh.705 The centre of Osh city eventually 
became quiet when troops blocked roads into the city to prevent opposing groups 
from entering.706 However, the violence spilled beyond Osh city into the 
surrounding countryside. The first day of violence in Osh city left 11 people dead 
and 210 injured.707 With the arrival of additional troops of the Army on 6 June, 
the situation improved and violence subsided.708 But the city was totally isolated. 
Rumours spread fast, and those reaching adjacent villages prompted many Kyrgyz 
villagers to travel en masse to support their people in the Osh city. Fortunately, 
most of them were prevented from entering the city by the military, which was 
crucial in cordoning off Osh city and warding off agitated young Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek people from adjacent areas to aggravate the situation further.709  
On 5 June, riots spread to another city in Osh oblast´, Uzgen, which 
witnessed the most horrific incidents of inter-communal violence. Even before the 
riots regular fights between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youngsters took place in Uzgen. 
Those youngsters under intoxication often scuffled, especially during official 
holidays. But on that day massive clashes between local Uzbek people and the 
Kyrgyz youth from outside Uzgen unfolded in the town market and central bus 
station. This was unusual in its scale and violence. It is notable that the first week 
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of the Osh conflict claimed 116 lives, with 468 people wounded and 500 cases of 
arson.710  
 
Image 3. Riots in Osh city, June 1990  
 
 
After the effective crowd dispersal by local militia, rioters went to town 
centre causing further disturbances. At the same time gangs of Kyrgyz men from 
nearby villages flooded into town and subjected Uzbek population to pogrom, 
which resulted in murders, rapes, mutilations and three-quarters of the town burnt 
down.711 It was also reported that some Kyrgyz inhabitants from Osh city arrived 
in Uzgen to warn their fellows and spread the rumours about unrests.712  
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As Uzgen’s population was predominantly Uzbek, local authorities 
decided to evacuate immigrant Kyrgyz people to their villages or make-shift 
camps outside the town with the view to creating crucial space between two 
communities.713 But this move only brought partial results, because fleeing 
Kyrgyz rioters still took part in other fights and destroyed property on their way. 
By afternoon of 5 June, Uzgen was engrossed in turf fighting between local Uzbek 
community and Kyrgyz groups form surrounding villages. By the end of the day, 
one could see Uzgen blazing in flames (see the photo below) and hear bullets 
flying over heads. Ever more people, crazed with violence, took part in the inter-
communal rioting. It was only on 6 June that the dispatch of an Army contingent 
to Uzgen stabilized the situation in Uzgen.714 However incidents of inter-ethnic 
violence continued. Thus, on 14 June, the chairman of Kyrgyz KGB, Asankulov, 
reported cases of marauding and self-willed reprisals.715 Protests against local 
officials continued, and thus on 12 June several rallies were held outside Party and 
local government buildings with such posters as “death to Asanov” and “all Uzgen 
militia under trial”.716  
Uzgen riots caused more than 200 fatalities and were the most violent in 
Osh oblast´. The Committee for protection of rights of Uzbek residents of Uzgen 
reported that 247 people died, 265 people disappeared and 165 people got 
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wounded as a result of riots in Uzgen.717 More than 300 houses were torched 
down and dozens of cars got burned.718  
 
Image 4. Uzgen in flames  
 
 
 
After violence in Uzgen subsided, two thousand Kyrgyz people displaced 
from Uzgen and 140 Uzbek families of refugees in Uzgen were angry with the 
slow pace of their return to homes.719 This situation caused frequent skirmishes 
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, when the latter tried to visit their homes and inspect 
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their property amid hostile receptions by the Uzbek community.720 Persistent 
tensions delayed local authorities’ decision for relocating back the displaced 
Kyrgyz families. A member of the Committee for protection of rights of Uzbek 
residents in Uzgen warned the authorities that the Committee members would not 
be able to control the reaction of Uzbek residents to a hasty relocation of Kyrgyz 
back to the city, and that such relocation would then be treated as ‘an act of 
provocation’ aimed at escalation of inter-communal relations.721 The Committee 
also pointed out that if local authorities were to actively work on the return of 
Kyrgyz residents to Uzgen, then Uzbek residents reserved the right to make an 
appeal to the Uzbek president with the request for a consideration of their mass 
migration to Uzbekistan.722   
Both communities were very upset by the violence and, more specifically, 
with the inadequate handling of the situation by the government. For example, on 
a meeting between local people and government officials, a Kyrgyz woman 
pointed to A. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, 
that: “If you are not able to bring order and to look honestly to the eyes of your 
people, then vacate your posts. Perhaps, there is someone from the Kyrgyz who 
will be better than you”.723 In response to growing criticisms, the office of public 
prosecutor set up an investigative team of 106 officers from its office, MVD and 
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KGB to probe criminal acts committed during riots in Uzgen.724 As a result, 74 
people were under investigation for heinous crimes by 28 August 1990. 725   
Meanwhile, Uzbek residents in Jalalabad region were alarmed at rumours 
of imminent attacks by Kyrgyz and were preparing for self-defence. As Uzbeks of 
Jalalabad were seeking support from their co-nationals in Andijan, the situation 
was further complicated by the arrival of Kyrgyz refugees in Jalalabad from 
Uzbekistan. Thus, on 10 June 1,200 Kyrgyz refugees from Andijan gathered in the 
neighbourhood of Suzak raion of Jalalabad. But on the following day, after 
authorities convinced them that no danger is waiting upon their return in 
Uzbekistan, most refugees were orderly returned to their abodes.726     
The initial silence of the official media outlets on the conflict was notable. 
It created an information vacuum. Little news on the situation in Osh was reaching 
the capital, Bishkek. Information that was available to most Bishkek residents had 
been usually received through telephone conversations with their relatives and 
friends in Osh oblast´.727  Because telephone lines remained open in the otherwise 
blockaded Osh city, news of the violence still could spread to the capital. As this 
was the only means of information, it is not surprising that rumours were the lords 
of the land. Such a vacuum had ramifications on people’s actions. For example, on 
8 June in the village of Kizil-Dzhar, around 200 people gathered with the aim to 
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visit places of mass disturbances in Osh city. They also laid siege to the border 
post outside the village and put forward demands to release credible information 
on riots in Osh and Uzgen cities and to provide weapons for protection of Kyrgyz 
people in trouble zones.728  
The unrest also spread to Bishkek on June 6, mainly in the form of 
sporadic beatings of Uzbeks taking place in the city market. A large group of 
students marched to the headquarters of the KPK in the centre of the city. In the 
violent confrontation, personal injuries were minimized by the crowd control, so 
the violent crowd eventually was transformed into a mass meeting. Radio Moscow 
reported that unsanctioned meetings were held by large group of students, who 
demanded their final exams should be stopped so that they could participate in 
riots.729 On the following day, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Bishkek for 
preventive purposes. 
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Map 6. The Ferghana Valley 
 
 
Source: Megoran, N. (2002). The Borders of Eternal Friendship? Cambridge, Ph.D. 
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Incidents of assault and battery of people of Kyrgyz nationality were 
reported in several towns in neighbouring Uzbekistan.730 This caused the fleeing 
of Kyrgyz refugees from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. On June 7, the head of MVD 
of the USSR, Vadim Bakatin, confirmed that ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan had 
spread to neighbouring Uzbekistan and warned the Supreme Soviet Council of 
Nationalities of the USSR that “local clashes may develop into a conflict between 
the two republics”.731 This concern was heightened when thousands of people 
armed with sticks, stones and other self-made weapons had gathered at the border 
of the two republics between Osh and Andijan. The situation between two 
countries was stabilized when the army troops were dispatched to patrol the 
temporarily closed borders and a state of emergency was declared by president 
Islam Karimov in the areas of Uzbekistan that border Osh oblast´. 
The blockade of the Pamir highway in response to Osh riots threatened 
fuel reserves in Tajikistan. Many drivers that forward freight to the Soviet Pamir, 
autonomous part of Tajikistan, were subject to attacks by Kyrgyz rioters. 
According to Alexander Vasiliyev, the Tajik deputy minister of motor transport, 
stones were thrown at the passing trucks along the Kyrgyz stretch of the road, and 
“in some cases groups of assailants have stopped trucks, dragging out the drivers, 
and beaten them up”.732  
  As the violence intensified, the character of the dispute changed as well. It 
became a political confrontation. In this regard, Komsomol΄skaia pravda reported 
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that Uzbeks demanded more regional autonomy, while Kyrgyz residents called for 
equal treatment with the Uzbek majority in the city.733 Another newspaper, 
Krasnaia zvezda, pointed out that the violence was caused by extremists who 
demanded autonomy for Osh oblast´, the annexation by Uzbekistan of areas where 
Uzbeks constituted majority and the sacking of local leaders.734 In the Uzbek 
neighbourhoods of Osh, leaflets addressing the Supreme Council of Kyrgyz SSR 
were seen to be circulated with a number of demands that included, among other 
things, a total renewal of the local office of MVD personnel, democratic elections 
of local parliamentarians, judges and other authorities according to national 
representation, resignation of the whole of Osh city and regional committees of 
the Communist Party, and brining to justice of Osh Aimagi activists for their role 
in riots.735 
In the open letter from a number of intellectuals from Uzbekistan, state-
sponsored discrimination of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan was condemned as systematic. 
The letter linked the discrimination with the causes of the Osh conflict. The 
authors of the letter also pointed to the pre-mediated character of the violence in 
the Osh city and Bishkek, which they argue was evidenced by the coordinated 
recalling of Kyrgyz students from Tashkent and a number of rumours within 
Kyrgyz community prior to violence.736 
In the early July, a delegation of five persons from the Uzbek community 
of Uzgen, equipped with documentation, video materials and photos of the riots, 
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visited Moscow with the aim of drawing central authorities’ attention to the tragic 
events. Members of delegation met with Eugene Primakov, from the Presidential 
Council, editors of Pravda and Izvestia, as well as with the president of 
Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov.737 The results of their trip were shared with the 
members of the Committee for protection of Uzbeks and aksakals (elderly chiefs). 
A peaceful demonstration was held later on 16 July with most Uzgen residents 
participating in it.738  
The violence continued till late August, with sporadic eruptions occurring 
in cities and villages throughout Kyrgyzstan. It only ended in October and the state 
of emergency was lifted on 21 November 1990.739 The scale of killings and 
destruction was immense. Official figures cite deaths of 120 Kyrgyz, 50 Uzbeks 
and one Russian.740 More realistically, as Komsomol΄skaia pravda suggested at 
the time by July 1990 around 800 people may have died in the conflict in 
Kyrgyzstan.741 However, most unofficial sources claim more than 1000 people 
were killed as a result of the Osh conflict. 
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Table 3. Timeline of the Osh conflict 
DATE  EVENT  
10 February 1990 Series of protests start in Bishkek  
4 June 1990 Inter-ethnic violence erupts in Osh city  
5 June 1990 Riots spread to other cities in the Osh oblast´ (region) 
6 June 1990 State of emergency declared in Osh 
6 June 1990 Unrest spreads to Bishkek, Kyrgyz capital  
7 June 1990 State of emergency declared in Bishkek. 
 
7 June 1990 Violence threatens neighbouring cities in Uzbekistan. 
8 June 1990 State of emergency declared in Uzbek cities adjacent to 
Osh. 
August 1990 Violence subsides 
21 November 1990  State of emergency is lifted in Kyrgyzstan 
December 1990 Hostilities end. Official figures for casualties 120 Kyrgyz, 
50 Uzbeks, and 1 Russian. Actual numbers deemed much 
higher. 
 
 
The Osh conflict has barely been analyzed, with the exception of the 
authoritative anthropological work by Valery Tishkov.742 He used data from the 
ten rulings of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic and Osh City Court on 
criminal cases in the aftermath of the Osh conflict. Forty-eight perpetrators of 
violence were tried, and forty-six were found guilty. Tishkov observes that 
important psychological determinants, the social environment and the communal 
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culture could have contributed to the precipitating the forces of violence and 
producing fear, aggressive distortions, dehumanization and paranoia.743  
The local sociological analysis of the Osh conflict would approach the 
ethnic conflict in terms of social groupings, social stratifications and labour 
functional divisions. Correlations between social disparities and ethnic structures 
are crucial, as the juxtaposition of those two factors can indicate their relation to 
inter-ethnic tensions. Through the sociological analysis of the Osh conflict, socio-
economic parameters are carefully examined so that the conflict can be optimally 
explained.  
The view that the Osh conflict was a result of socio-economic problems 
was widely adopted, especially in the official circles in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz 
parliamentary commission charged with the investigation into the conflict 
confirmed that socio-economic problems caused the tragic Osh events.744 As was 
mentioned before, Kyrgyzstan was facing dire social and economic hardships at 
the time of the conflict. Osh oblast´ was the lowest in the republican rankings of 
Kyrgyzstan in terms of living conditions. Lack of housing, unemployment and 
deteriorating social welfare were the most vivid elements that contributed to the 
hardships. 
 In the last year of the Soviet Union, the housing shortage became acute in 
Kyrgyzstan, and particularly so in Osh oblast´. In the cities the majority of housing 
premises was built and leased by the state. It was a well-recited policy of the 
Soviet state that all Soviet people were entitled to free housing. However, as a 
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result of the economic decline, state-run house constructions dwindled and the 
state could not provide housing to the expectant houseless citizenry, not to 
mention the new-arrivals. According to the official statistics, before the Osh 
conflict as many as 40,000 people were registered as waiting for state flats in Osh 
oblast´ alone.745 The considerable percentage of those waiting for flats in Osh 
were Kyrgyz, as they abandoned their traditional countryside residences for cities 
due to better employment opportunities there.  
In terms of labour market, Osh oblast´ had the highest rate of 
unemployment in the Kyrgyz republic. While the Soviet ideology proclaiming 
jobs for all Soviet people, the reality of being jobless was agonising for citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan, especially young people. To make matter worse, there was no 
reasonable social protection available to the unemployed. This dire situation shed 
light into some of the reasons why the most active perpetrators of violence during 
the Osh conflict were the unemployed youngsters. Another contributing factor for 
their active participation in the riots could have been the absence of daytime 
commitment, which could have otherwise prevented them from rioting. 
Economic hardships can only tell part of the story. As Aynur Elebayeva 
suggests the Osh conflict’s principal cause was not simply dire living conditions 
of the Osh people but it also included “de facto inequality of the principal 
nationality groups in the region in different spheres of social life”.746 Socio-
economic hardships on their own could not cause and sustain ethnic strife. The 
Osh riots were therefore exacerbated by the acute segregation between Kyrgyz and 
                                                
745
 Tishkov, V. (1997). Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The 
Mind Aflame, Sage Publications, p 137  
746
 Elebayeva, A. (1992). “The Osh Incident: Problems for Research.” Post-Soviet Geography 
33(2). p 81  
 298 
Uzbek ethnic groups. The segregation along occupational and residential lines 
creates a fertile ground for deep divisions and perceptions in which ‘us’ is set 
against the ‘others’.  
 The majority of Kyrgyz citizens of Osh oblast´ were engaged in 
agriculture, while the predominant bulk of Uzbeks were occupied in trade and 
retail business. Thus in Osh oblast´, Uzbeks constituted 71.4 per cent of the 
workforce in trade and retailing, 74.7 per cent in public food chains, and 79 per 
cent in taxi services.747 Trade and its agents in multi-ethnic societies tend to 
constitute a special area of interest in sociological analyses. In this regard, 
Tishkov, for instance, notes that “there is a tendency to control the trade and 
market activities by members of a certain group, usually a minority”.748 It was 
frequently noted that the big disproportion between two ethnic communities in the 
employment in these noticeable public spheres could have created in the minds of 
the Kyrgyz population, especially young villagers, a bitter feeling of the wounded 
pride and a sense of deprivation in their own land. Moreover, the trading 
occupation provides better living standards than farming. Uzbek ethnic traders 
were mainly in control of markets where Kyrgyz farmers sought to distribute their 
harvests. The negative perception of traders from different nationality was not 
unique to Kyrgyzstan. A number of pogroms on the markets and businesses run by 
ethnic minorities took place in other Central Asian cities, most notably on 
Armenian businesses in Ashgabat and the Meskhetian Turks in Ferghana.  
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The Uzbek community in Osh, on the other hand, felt disenchanted by the 
Soviet recruitment policy in the republic that favoured applicants of the Kyrgyz 
and Russian nationality for positions in government administration. According to 
the official figures, the Osh oblast´ executive committee consisted of 85.7 per cent 
Kyrgyz, 9.5 per cent Russians and only 4.7 per cent Uzbeks. 749 This is so even 
though Uzbek constituted up to 26 per cent of the total regional population. 
Similar inequalities were recorded in the trade unions and law enforcement 
organizations. The persistent discrimination and consequent under-representation 
in the Kyrgyz administration generated among some segments of the Uzbek 
population the idea of creating an autonomous Uzbek territorial unit in Osh 
oblast´. This view naturally caused sharp protests among the Kyrgyz groups who 
felt their country was in threat.  
 In spite of the negative perception of the representatives of trade 
occupation, there was a tendency to downplay the role of a competitive labour 
division in the society as a major cause for the ethnic conflict. In many cases, it is 
argued, occupational division is based on mutually beneficial and accepted roles, 
and it is more often the case that political motivations are hidden behind violent 
actions.750  
In accordance with the census data, only 15.4 per cent of the Kyrgyz 
population in Osh oblast´, who constituted nearly 60 per cent of the total Osh 
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population, were city-dwellers.751 Uzbeks, on the other hand, represented the 
majority in the administrative centres of the Osh oblast´. As the economy 
declined, there was a sharp increase in migration of Kyrgyz youth into cities. 
Upon arrival, they encountered a very tight housing market, with most desirable 
jobs slots in the trade sector filled by predominantly urban Uzbeks. In this context, 
it was predictable that newly arrived Kyrgyz felt as left-out and perceived the 
urban Uzbeks as a threat to their space and status. 
The inability and reluctance of local authorities to engage in a dialogue 
with masses was another exacerbating factor of the Osh conflict. Notably, some 
claimed that the mere fact that informal political movements Osh Aimagi and 
Adolat were able to emerge from obscurity and organize mass protests and 
function as outlets for these grievances signalled the inability and/or disinterest of 
the Soviet authorities to address the consequences of the social and ethnic 
stratification.752 The government administration of Kyrgyzstan retained the 
conservative set of mind, which did not and could not adequately react to the 
changes and challenges brought by perestroika reforms. As a result of its failure in 
addressing inter-ethnic strife, the conservative government of Masaliev was forced 
to resign. 
The activities of loosely organized groups and ‘trade mafia’ were also 
acknowledged in the official reports as an important factor in the Osh riots. At the 
times of heightened feelings of national self-awareness, local groups like Kyrgyz 
Osh Aimagi and Uzbek Adolat were very successful in playing on the socio-
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economic injustices. According to Elebayeva, both organizations were skilful in 
shaping a ‘profile of the enemy’ by “manipulating public opinion, which in the 
final analysis was congealed by the introduction into the mass consciousness of 
the two opposing populations of the idea of national exclusivity”.753 One should 
also bear in mind that the perpetrators of the Osh violence did not have a rigid 
internal hierarchy or leadership, determined by any official status. Local bosses 
could have been indirect participants or witnesses of the riots, but nevertheless 
they had given the initial blessings and instructions, and secured the sense of 
permission among the activists and rank-and-file perpetrators.754 
In the context of the nearly total information vacuum, a rather effective 
rumour or myth of mass murders in the cities of Osh and Uzgen was spread 
widely by word of mouth to other parts of Kyrgyzstan. This unfortunately widened 
the scale of ethnic violence. State-controlled media was paralysed and could not 
react adequately to mushrooming rumours throughout the Osh conflict.  
Prior to the outbreak of the inter-ethnic strife, there was an invisible 
balance in the Osh oblast´ between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz majority 
dwelled in countryside and worked in agriculture, while the Uzbek minority lived 
in cities and engaged in trade and public services. This balance was shattered due 
to hard-hitting economic reforms and free-speech perestroika changes. Young 
Kyrgyz started moving to cities as a result of hardships in villages. Then they 
realized that most profitable jobs and decent housing in cities were in the hands of 
the Uzbek minority population. Uzbeks, on the other hand, felt threatened by the 
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sudden Kyrgyz inflow into their traditional neighbourhoods. The perception 
among Uzbeks of being excluded from the decision-making power as a result of 
the biased recruitment by government was further aggravated by concessions 
made by the local authorities towards Kyrgyz squatters.  
 It should be noted however that government-endorsed surveys in 
Kyrgyzstan into the causes of the Osh conflict indicated a clear divergence in line 
with the ethnicity of respondents. While the Kyrgyz respondents emphasized 
socio-economic reasons of the conflict, the Uzbek responders pointed out 
discrimination in the employment for government sectors and unsatisfactory 
performance of government authorities. 
Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan, as any other ethnic minorities of Central 
Asia, thinks of themselves as members of distinct nationalities because the Soviet 
regime through its institutions and structures taught them to think of themselves 
this way. The national elites of Uzbek minority group in Kyrgyzstan represent 
their constituents as belonging to a different, Uzbek nation from members of the 
titular Kyrgyz national group. The Uzbek demands for collective public rights, 
language privileges or territorial autonomy, which stem from the institutional 
legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, are seen as directly challenging the claims 
of the Kyrgyz elites to unitary ownership of their national polities and territories. It 
is no surprise that Kyrgyz state elites perceive such demands by the Uzbek 
community as threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. Furthermore, the 
political and cultural demands of Uzbeks have made them vulnerable to charges of 
outright disloyalty. Although Uzbeks are formally part of the citizenry of the 
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national state, they are excluded substantively from the actual membership of the 
nation-state.  
Following the institutionalist perspective, formulated by Brubaker,755 it is 
possible to suggest that the self-definition of Uzbek minorities as members of a 
distinct nation and their consequent claims for public rights in that capacity 
strengthened ethno-nationalistic perceptions and practices of Kyrgyz elites. It also 
reinforced the tendency of the Kyrgyz majority to define their own nationhood in 
ethno-nationalistic rather than civic-territorial terms and to rule their nation-state 
accordingly.  
Ethnic riots in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan and in the Ferghana 
Valley of Uzbekistan during the summer of 1990 discredited party leadership and 
created general fears among the population of party retaliation and a new wave of 
authoritarianism. Numerous official inquiries into the cause of the riots pointed to 
mismanagement by the official party elite. At the republic’s Central Committee 
plenum in August 1990, Askar Akaev cited press accounts criticizing the party 
leadership for the problems that caused the riots, and he questioned why nothing 
had been done to rectify the situation.756  
While the political elite in the republic refused to enter into constructive 
dialogue with the opposition, it tried to play along with nationalism by placing the 
Kyrgyz in a privileged position in the republic. The explosive situation that had 
developed in the Osh oblast´ was not a secret to anyone, but there were no 
measures taken to alleviate the situation. Thus, the congress of KPK, which took 
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place during the inter-communal fighting in Osh and during a state of emergency 
in the capital of the republic, tried to place the blame for the bloody events in the 
Osh oblast´ on the ‘Kirghizia’ opposition movement and re-elected almost all of 
the old leaders headed by first secretary Masaliev. In July 1990, at the time when 
Kirghizia was being persecuted, news emerged from Kyrgyzstan that the ruling 
powers and the KGB were secretly supporting such extremist organizations as Osh 
Aimagy and Adolat.757  
Continuing struggles with the central authorities in Moscow and political 
conflict in the Kyrgyz SSR led to the scheduling of an extraordinary session of the 
Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet. Members of an opposition group Kirghizia staged a 
public demonstration on the steps of the Supreme Soviet building on the eve of 
the extraordinary session in October 1990 with demands for sovereignty and the 
establishment of presidential rule.  
The Osh events disturbed the situation in Kyrgyzstan, and put Masaliev's 
position in jeopardy. His readiness to preserve the compromised leaders and to 
incite tribal sentiments turned out to be extreme even for the less conservative 
members of the local elite.758 On that session, the parliament voted to introduce 
presidential rule in the republic, and the parliament surprised many by rejecting 
the candidacy of Masaliev for president. On 27 October 1990, Askar Akaev, then 
president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, emerged as the first president of 
Kyrgyzstan after the fourth round of voting. 
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In its turn, the Soviet centre clearly expressed to the political elites in 
Central Asia its support and again demonstrated readiness to close its eyes on their 
old and new errors, as long as they controlled the situation in their republics.  
The party organization continued to fight for power but by the winter of 
1990 it had lost support in Moscow as well. In April 1991, a party plenum re-
organized the party, replacing virtually the entire leadership. Given that the 
political machine was dominated by party officials, the choice of Akaev, who 
entered party work very late, as the first president of Kyrgyzstan was perceived 
exceptional.  
Throughout 1992, the Jogorku Kenesha, the new Kyrgyz parliament, 
debated different versions of the new constitution. Debates concerned relations 
between executive and legislature, language policies, and privatization, 
particularly land privatization. There were a number of draft constitutions. The 
version preferred by Akaev proposed a presidential system with strong executive 
powers. Akaev’s opponents pushed for another version of the constitution, which 
favoured a strong legislature. Akaev’s argument, similar to that of other Central 
Asian presidents, was that parliamentary supremacy would spell disaster for the 
country. He claimed that this could lead to a struggle for power in parliament 
between country's clans and tribes, and warned that “as a result, the southerners 
would win because they are in the arithmetic majority. The northerners could not 
accept that, since the capital is in the north”.759 
The parliament became the staging ground for political opposition to 
Akaev’s reform agenda. Parties, groups and organizations that were not 
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democratic per se took advantage of these legislative opportunities. For instance, 
Aman Amanbaev, first secretary of KPK and a supporter of the August 1991 coup, 
re-emerged from obscurity to be elected a Mejlis deputy by vocally opposing 
Akaev’s program of land reform.760  
Such opposition parties such as ‘Erkin Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Asaba’ freely 
exploited public dissatisfaction over economic breakdown, the role of the Kyrgyz 
language, and the distribution of land and accommodation. Asaba’s position stated 
that the Kyrgyz language law was implemented too slowly and that land 
distribution should only apply to ethnic Kyrgyz. Other nationalist parties had 
narrow nationalistic objectives. Thus, the movement ‘Free Uighuristan’ called for 
the establishment of a separate Turkic-speaking Uighur nation-state in the east of 
China, formerly the territory of east Turkestan. 
Kyrgyzstan’s difficulties over nationality are also linked to the ethnic 
specialization of the population, which has its origins in the Soviet nationality 
policies. The Russian-speaking communities tend to be represented in the 
technical and skilled spheres of the economy. The nationalities from the Caucasus 
and other Turkic-speaking non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups tend to be involved in 
service and trade industries. The native Kyrgyz population are normally occupied 
in agriculture and animal husbandry. Since these economic sectors were affected 
differently by the economic dislocations produced by the collapse of the Soviet 
economy and liberalization, the standard of living of different nationality groups 
diverged widely. Those occupied in the service sectors benefited most, while those 
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groups occupied in the primary agricultural sector faced the greatest hardship. 
Kyrgyz intellectuals and observers were inclined to attribute inter-ethnic conflict 
in the republic to those economic differences.  
It is notable that all regional, ethno-national, and economic fractures in the 
society were reflected in the composition of the parliament. In order to counter the 
political opposition  Akaev, in asserting that the communist-era parliament was 
the reason for Kyrgyzstan’s inability to push forward in solving socio-economic 
problems, departed from his original course and embarked upon a new ‘Asian 
development path’. Akaev’s lurch toward authoritarianism can be traced to a 
meeting between the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
that took place in Almaty (formerly Alma-ata) in July 1994. Convinced by Uzbek 
president to agree upon an Asian development path, Akaev abandoned his efforts 
to reach national consensus democratically. Under threat that Akaev and his 
associates would be accused of corruption and malfeasance in the autumn 
parliamentary session, Akaev decided to strike pre-emptively at his political 
opponents and engineered a quiet revolution in which he disbanded the 
parliament, forced the resignation of the government, cowed the judiciary, shut 
down the opposition press, set up a new electoral commission, and announced 
new parliamentary elections.761  
Reflecting on the stability of the political order, Geiss notes that enduring, 
political order could emerge from the successful inter-penetration of communal 
and political action orientations in Central Asia.762 If it is not successful, then 
political regimes in the long term will face a legitimacy problem and that of 
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diminishing political obedience. It is common knowledge that patrimonialism as a 
form of political community has remained influential in independent Central Asia. 
This could be a partial explanation as to why parliamentary democracy has not 
spread in the region. Thus if communal commitment structures are crucial for the 
establishment of enduring political order, the extent of future Central Asian 
communal commitment structures may  set the limits for democratic reforms.  
 
 
4.0 Ethno-nationalism in independent Central Asia 
 
After the decline of the Soviet Union, most of Central Asian political elites faced 
a new reality which forced to find a new base for the political order of their new 
republics. National independence therefore compelled local elites to find a new 
binding interpretation of collective identity, which could strengthen political 
community structures and establish new normative political order.763  
The Soviet Union’s demise inevitably led to the decline of Soviet 
patriotism and to obliteration of communism as all-inclusive worldview. Realizing 
nationhood’s prevalence in international relations and under pressure from the 
public concerned about the official endorsement of titular nations’ culture and 
history, local leaders were bound to accept nationality as the dominant nucleus of 
political discourse in post-independent Central Asia. It is therefore argued that 
ethno-nationalism of state and society in post-Soviet Central Asia was not purely 
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an opportunistic move of former communist leaders to find a new political 
ideology for their rule, but took place in response to growing public will for a 
more appropriate, institutional acknowledgement of the nations’ cultural and 
historical heritage. The establishment of political community based on ethnic 
identity or ethno-nationalism was to trigger serious problems in all Central Asian 
republics.  
The collapse of the USSR and the transition to independence therefore 
propelled Central Asia to a course of further nation-building. It was a course that 
was particularly beneficial to the entrenched party elite in Central Asia. In this 
way, Central Asia’s communist party officials with new, nationalistic hats came to 
be the engineers of the transition to national independence. Many political leaders 
in Central Asia shifted their stance on key national issues. They quickly became 
champions of titular languages as official government languages. For example, 
Karimov, who spoke in broken Uzbek before independence, took intensive 
training in the native tongue. He and other leaders quickly learned to make 
speeches in their native languages rather than Russian to avoid looking as a totally 
russified agent. They also skilfully took over the cultural and national concerns of 
nationalistic groups like ‘Jeltoqsan’ (December) or the ‘Azat’ (free) movement in 
Kazakhstan, ‘Agzy-Birlik’ (concord) in Turkmenistan, the Democratic Movement 
of Kyrgyzstan, and ‘Birlik’ (unity) in Uzbekistan at the end of the 1980s, which 
already promoted ethno-nationalization of their republics before their formal 
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declarations of independence.764 Moreover, local leaders re-positioned themselves 
as champions of the historical and cultural legacies of Central Asia as well. 
The new-old policy of ethno-nationalism aimed at integrating communal 
commitment and regional political direction to a pre-interpreted, ethno-political 
community of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks. This community 
was seen as the main social underlying layer of the independent states in Central 
Asia. If Central Asian leaders before condemned the nationalist opposition as 
politically naive, foreign-inspired, and counter-productive to the interests of the 
society, now they changed their tack and tried to attract the most capable members 
of the opposition by offering them key government jobs. The sentiments of the 
opposition movements ironically contributed to strengthening of the new nation-
states of Central Asia.765 
Central Asia has always been an ethnically and linguistically diverse 
region, and political unity occurred only for relatively short periods. There were 
over 20 bloody inter-ethnic conflicts in the 19th century within the Khanate of 
Kokand and even more in the Khanate of Khiva.766  
Ethnic consciousness in Central Asia still has a hierarchical character. A 
local person considers himself to belong to a given ethnic group vis-à-vis other 
groups, but in internal ethnic relations his parochial, kin-based tribal and clan 
affiliations still play an important role. Parochial divisions are particularly 
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conspicuous in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while in other Central Asian republics 
one can more often notice pure forms of tribalism.767 
With the collapse of the USSR and achieving national independence, 
Central Asian leaders grew more in favour of a return to the Latin script. The 
governments of both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan announced official reforms to 
complete a return to the Latin script.  
Although president Karimov of Uzbekistan was a staunch supporter of 
Moscow’s authority, he quickly changed his tune after the collapse of the USSR. 
After independence, Karimov spearheaded various attempts to find a new 
normative base for the republic. He championed the national values he had once 
scorned during the Soviet years. He was trained in Russian and spent most of his 
professional life working in that language. But as independence approached he 
changed quickly, and his broken speeches in Uzbek in 1990 were soon replaced by 
a fluent command of the native tongue.  
Days after Karimov gained legal authority over all court cases in 
Uzbekistan, he issued a decree on 25 December 1991, which pardoned most of 
those convicted in the notorious ‘cotton scandal’ that was seen as a symbol of 
foreign intervention. In the new nationalist atmosphere, Karimov proudly 
exonerated those whom he had plainly condemned a few years before.  
Initially, Karimov’s concentration of power under the notion of stronger 
presidential leadership provoked charges of dictatorship. For example, Shukrulla 
Mirsaidov, a vice-president of Uzbekistan in 1990-1991, resigned as deputy of 
parliament in August 1992, writing in a letter to his constituents that an 
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authoritarian regime was being established in Uzbekistan with the connivance of 
the parliament.768 And later on 8 September 1992, he resigned as vice-president in 
criticism of the emerging dictatorship. 
It was evident that the legislature caved in to Karimov’s power, and thus in 
July 1992 the parliament issued a decree authorizing the president to withdraw the 
immunity of a member of parliament who is charged with anti-constitutional 
actions aimed at undermining the state structure. The Karakalpak autonomous 
republic was brought under the direct supervision of the Uzbekistan government, 
and the chairmen of Karakalpak’s Supreme Soviet and its Council of Ministers 
were forced to resign. And the new constitution of Uzbekistan was adopted by the 
parliament in December 1992.  
There were visible opposition movements in the early days of post-
independent Uzbekistan. Two of them, namely Birlik and Erk, were prominent. 
Birlik gained its support by spearheading protest efforts and drawing attention to 
pressing social problems. Birlik’s leaders defined the organization’s main goals as 
achieving economic and political sovereignty, as well as restoring the cultural 
values of Uzbek people. Birlik started as only a small group of intellectuals but 
quickly discovered broad popular support. Established in early 1990, the 
movement was allowed by the government to officially register in November 1991 
but did not succeed in getting on the ballot. Erk won formal status on 11 
September 1991. 
In the formative years since independence, the nationality question 
assumed an entirely new character. Karimov’s policy since independence was to 
                                                                                                                                  
in Historical Perspective. B. Manz. Oxford, Westview Press, p.148 
 313 
encourage the popular support for the celebration of national identity. The decree 
on citizenship in Uzbekistan was adopted in July 1992, which granted citizenship 
to all persons living in the territory regardless of national origin, social status, 
race, sex, education, language, or political view. But it has excluded dual 
citizenship.  
The use of the Uzbek language is another example of the narrowing 
nationality focus of the government. The government’s emphasis on the Uzbek 
language was designed to impose a single linguistic convention in the country in a 
short time. Thus, in September 1992 the general director of the Uzbek National 
Information Agency announced that his agency would soon produce information 
only in Uzbek.769 
In Uzbekistan, it was not a straightforward task to invent an interpretation 
of national history and identity without excluding many sections of the former 
multi-ethnic population, which were merged to a single Uzbek nationality as a 
result of the Soviet engineering. This complication was not only linked to settled 
and nomadic ways of life among the pre-Soviet population, but also emerged from 
the conflicting political heritage of three inimical patrimonial states and opposed 
tribal groups. 
Such prominent historical figures as Uzbek-khan (1313--41) of the Golden 
Horde, whom modern Uzbeks owe their titular name, or Sheibani-Khan (1500-
10), who in 1500 occupied the river oases of Transoxiana with the Uzbek tribal 
confederacy were not resuscitated from national amnesia by Uzbek leaders. It was 
                                                                                                                                  
768
 Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Oxford, Westview 
Press. p. 118 
769
 Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Oxford, Westview 
Press. p. 128 
 314 
Amir Timur, or Temurlane (1409-47), and the Temurids who were destined to 
become the new national heroes of independent Uzbekistan.  
The choice for Temurlane as the founder and father of modern Uzbekistan 
was primarily a political calculation. Born near Samarkand, holding the title of an 
emir and sultan and designating Samarkand as his capital, Temur's historical 
heritage was thought to be appealing to Uzbeks of both tribal and Sart 
backgrounds. Uzbek leaders could claim that Uzbeks have always been settled 
farmers and urban dwellers. On top of that, Temur was a Turk by descent and a 
leader of the Barlos tribal confederacy. This fact is meant to show affinity to the 
Sheibanid and Kipchak Uzbeks, who had recognised Chingizid claims of political 
supremacy. The widespread promotion of Temurlane as a strong national hero did 
not convince all Uzbeks and, in contrast, many Uzbeks regarded this government 
campaign as Karimov’s plot to strengthen the influence of his clan from 
Samarkand, where he was born, as opposed to other regional clans. In addition to 
the Temurlane campaign, the Uzbek government tried to revive the historical 
heritage of Jadids and interpret the Jadid sources as authoritative texts for its 
secular state structures and for its emphasis of Sufi traditions in the re-
interpretation of Uzbekistan’s Islamic heritage.  
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Map 7. Uzbekistan today 
 
 
Source: Soucek, S. (2000). A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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During its first year of independence, Kyrgyzstan immediately encountered 
some of the classic problems of a small and dependent country entering the world 
scene. The country also suffered a series of natural calamities during 1992. 
Exceptionally heavy rains and mud slides caused serious economic problems. A 
major earthquake left as many as 65,000 inhabitants in the areas of Jalalabad and 
Osh without shelter and disrupted water and power systems. In late April 1992, 
hail and late frost killed a large portion of the early plantings. Under these difficult 
circumstances, Kyrgyzstan held to an ambitious policy of Western-oriented 
reform. 
In Kyrgyzstan, ethno-nationalism of the republic faced complex problems. 
Since Kyrgyz only represent around 60 per cent of the republic's population, 
revived nationalism does seem to be most appropriate means to secure the 
political integration of all communities in Kyrgyzstan. That is why previous 
Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev often presented himself as the president of all 
citizens of Kyrgyzstan and a defender of the interests of national minorities. This 
notwithstanding, Akaev had to appeal to the Kyrgyz majority and supported the 
revival of the Kyrgyz national heritage. For that purpose, the government 
supported numerous researches and books about the Kyrgyz epic Manas and 
widely promoted Manas as national hero of Kyrgyzstan. 
Beside the problem of regionalism, Kyrgyzstan has also to deal with a 
serious rift between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan.  This north-south divide 
has survived the Soviet period and is endangering the political integrity of the 
republic now. Before the Soviet colonization these two parts were separated, and 
nomadic tribes maintained different political orientations. While the northern 
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Kyrgyz territories had closer contact with neighbouring Kazakhs from the 
southern edges of the steppe, the Kyrgyz of the south were influenced by the 
Khanate of Kokand, which was key to the Islamization of the southern Kyrgyz 
tribes. Both communities were autonomous and had limited communication with 
each other.770  
 Clan and tribal membership has retained great importance in Kyrgyzstan, 
even though the former first secretary of the KPK, Usubaliev, insisted that 
tribalism no longer existed in his republic and that official appointments on the 
basis of tribe or clan had no place anymore.771 In fact, Khazanov notes that in the 
1930-1950s the majority of leading positions were occupied by southern Kyrgyz 
from the Kipchak tribe, and then the balance of power began to change in favour 
of the northern Sary-Bagysh tribe.772 When in October 1990 Askar Akaev became 
the President of Kyrgyzstan, his election was linked to a struggle not only between 
reformists and conservatives, but also to rivalry between northern and southern 
Kyrgyz. The rivalry was so intense and the period so sensitive that in the view of 
some Soviet observers it put the republic on the brink of a civil war.773 From the 
south himself, president Akaev used to meet the strongest opposition in the 
northern regions of Kyrgyzstan. In the countryside, many Kyrgyz are still able to 
trace their ancestors back at least seven generations, an ability that has survived 
since the tribal organization of Kyrgyz in the seventh century. 
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Map 8. Kyrgyzstan today 
 
Source: Soucek, S. (2000). A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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5.0 Reforming political institutions and state structures 
 
 
The initial optimism after the end of the Cold War was quickly replaced by frantic 
attempts to re-conceptualize approaches to ethnic conflicts, which engulfed a 
number of countries in the post-Soviet landscape. Scholars and policy-makers 
were in frantic search for ultimate peace-providing element that would substitute 
the disappeared bipolar system, which was arguably peace-maintaining instrument 
during the Cold War. This search was often linked to the importance of the state 
systems and institutions that were hoped to ensure peace within state borders and 
beyond them. Many slogans were made that one should not look further than such 
liberal concepts as democracy and the rule of law. While democracy remains a 
topical and divisive issue, especially in the developing and post-colonial countries, 
the rule of law is less disputed by governments and more often quoted as a desired 
component of governance. Central Asian leaders have been no exception in 
praising the benefits of the rule of law and publicly stating adherence to it.  
The rule of law is often perceived as a straightforward and problem-free 
concept. However, the rule of law is a very complex and essentially contested 
concept, and demands a closer look. The following discussion therefore aims to 
explore what the rule of law stands for and analyze its relationship with other 
political ideals, such as democracy and constitutionalism. It will also outline how 
the rule of law and related political and legal reforms have evolved in Central 
Asia, and how and what it may contribute to the future conflict resolution in the 
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social institutional framework. Such discussion is useful for transitional societies, 
such as those of Central Asia, because their aspiration to the rule of law can be 
hindered without proper understanding of the nature of the concept. The meaning 
of the rule of law differs from writer to writer but most frequently it is quoted in 
connection to or in conjunction with the terms of democracy and 
constitutionalism. So the discussion will start with look into the relationship 
between the rule of law and each of those terms in more detail.   
The concepts of democracy and the rule of law date back to the Ancient 
Greek times. Initially, the rule of law was known as isonomia, which meant 
“equality of laws to all manner of persons”.774 Hayek suggests that isonomy, being 
contrasted to the arbitrary rule of tyrants, was older than the concept of 
democratia, which appeared to be one of the consequences of the former.775 The 
term isonomy was still in use after democracy had been in force, “at first in its 
justification and later in order to disguise the character [disregard to the equality 
of law] it assumed”.776 At some point in the seventeenth century the concept of 
isonomy became known as the rule of law, especially in England. However, since 
the times of the Greek democracy it was clearly understood that both concepts of 
the rule of law and democracy, although related, were not the exactly same.  
Moreover, the controversy and debate over the very form of democracy 
that has been evident since the ancient times led to different perceptions of the 
relationship between the rule of law and democracy. The perception of the rule of 
law, as a norm, differs from those who favour the direct, or participatory, model of 
democracy to those who advocate for the representative, or liberal, democracy. 
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 Liberal democracy is widely understood as “a system of rule embracing 
elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent the interests and/or views of citizens 
within the framework of ‘the rule of law’”.777 As it can be seen, some liberal 
democrats perceive the rule of law as the very modus operandi of democracy. 
Hayek, a constitutional democrat himself, went on further to argue that the rule of 
law is an essential feature of constitutional democracy, without which democracy 
would invalidate itself and become ‘doctrinaire’.778 He claims that: 
There has often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an 
autocratic rule than under some democracies - and it is at least conceivable that 
under the government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire majority 
democratic government might be as oppressive as the worst dictatorship.779 
 
 
Underlying this is the idea that the coercive political power of the majority and 
government can be constructively constrained only if certain general rules and 
principles, such as the rule of law, are respected and observed. David Held points 
to Hayek’s support for Locke’s dictum – “Wherever Law ends Tyranny begins”, 
meaning that “the law, properly constituted, binds governments to guarantee ‘life, 
liberty, and estate’… [thus] the legislative scope of governments is, and must be, 
restrained by the rule of law”.780 What is implied here is that the role of the rule of 
law is further developed to the function as a guarantor of freedom in democracy 
and a safeguard against the ‘oppressive’ and arbitrary majoritarian model of 
democracy.   
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 The direct or participatory model of democracy is rooted in the Athenian 
democracy. In those days, democracy meant direct participation of citizens in the 
affairs of the state, and the private life of an individual could only be fulfilled 
within the public life of the citizen. Thereafter, diverging views on the role of the 
rule of law in direct democracy emerged. On the one hand, it was argued that the 
rule of law is necessary to harmonize public life. Pericles in his historical funeral 
speech re-stated adherence to the rule of law, by stating that:  
When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the 
law…. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep 
to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.781 
 
 
Held expands further by stressing that “if the law is properly created within the 
framework of the common life, it legitimately commands obedience” and suggests 
that the notion of the rule of law was incorporated into the polity of the Athenian 
democracy.782 In other words, the rule of law was concerned with the observance 
of procedures for making policy decisions rather than the decision themselves. On 
the other hand, some critics of the direct democracy condemn this artificial 
adherence to the rule of law on the grounds of the dominance of the sovereign 
ruler’s will over laws. Hayek notes that it is in the Athenian democracy that we 
can see “the first clashes between the unfettered will of the ‘sovereign’ people and 
the tradition of the rule of law; and it was chiefly because the assembly often 
refused to be bound by the law”.783 Aristotle in his Politics also denounced this 
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type of government in which “the people govern and not the law” and “everything 
is determined by majority vote and not by law”.784  
As it can be seen the conception of the rule of law in direct democracy 
extends from considering it useless and superfluous to granting it a minimal role 
of mediator in public affairs. The emphasis of advocators for this form of 
democracy is generally placed on achieving the widest direct involvement of the 
people and on eliminating obstacles and constraints to participation. Hence, the 
comprehension of the rule of law in direct democracy depends on perceiving it as 
a facilitator or limiter of the popular will and participation. 
It is evident that the conception of the rule of law is different from 
democracy, and that this distinction dates back to the Ancient Greek period. This 
understanding of the difference is useful for transitional democracies. In their 
attempts to achieve an appropriate form of democracy, transitional societies could 
first strive for strengthening of the rule of law, as it is not totally dependent on the 
former. In addition, those societies that believe that the Western type of 
democracy is alien to their culture or that it is not the right time to endeavour 
meeting those high standards, can still operate in the framework of the rule of law, 
and by doing so they may have made forward steps towards democratic 
achievements. 
Although democracy and the rule of law are not identical ideals, they are 
related. This relationship has been a focus of scholarly debate since the times of 
Athenian democracy. Scholars’ position on the relationship between the rule of 
law and democracy depends on their views on and approaches to either of popular 
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models of democracy - direct or indirect. Since it is not our task to justify a choice 
for either model, suffice it to say that they both share such common ideals as 
equality and freedom. And whatever model of democracy is adopted as preferable, 
the rule of law is either a pre-condition or condition (or indeed both) to 
democracy. For liberal democracies, the rule of law is often perceived as a 
working framework, cornerstone ideal and a guarantor of freedom. For 
participatory democracies, the rule of law is regarded essential to harmonise 
public life and to prevent arbitrariness of political power. As Hayek notes, 
“democratic control may prevent power from becoming arbitrary, but it does not 
do so by its mere existence”. 785 
It is however useful to note that democracy is not an objective indicator for 
the existence of the rule of law, because the rule of law has not exclusively existed 
in democratic societies. In England, for example, it is well established that the rule 
of law pre-dated the emergence of democratic procedures.  Having said that, it is 
necessary to mention that the sphere, or regime, where the rule of law is in place 
should not be confused with its flawed or distorted content.  
Constitutionalism is another notion which is closely associated with the 
rule of law. Like the rule of law, constitutionalism is a concept in-process and has 
gradually evolved from its ancient prototype to its modern conception.786 In order 
to fathom the relations of constitutionalism to the rule of law one need to 
determine contemporary understanding of constitutionalism first. The term of 
constitutionalism is normally used in two senses: narrow and broad. As pointed 
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out by Sir Kenneth Wheare in his Modern Constitutions, constitutionalism in 
narrow sense simply implies the definition of a constitution as “the rules which 
establish and regulate or govern the government”.787 This collection of legal rules 
constitutes the system within which government is to operate. Following this 
logic, constitutionalism concerns itself with creating a meta-legal framework for 
government organization and gives lip service to its content and implementation. 
Such conception has been criticized for its nominal nature. For example, Eric 
Barendt points out that: 
Adherence to constitutionalism means that the constitution must necessarily 
check absolute power; otherwise it does not deserve recognition as a proper, 
liberal constitution. There is little or no point to a constitution unless its structure 
and contents reflect the purposes of adopting one in place of despotic 
government.788 
 
 
Constitutionalism is more frequently perceived in broader terms, which involves 
more concern with and attention to government action. According to Walton 
Hamilton, “constitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men repose in 
the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep a government in order”.789 In 
other words, raison-d’être of constitutionalism rests on promoting the constitution 
as the fundamental law (written or unwritten) in attempts to regulate government’s 
actions. Since governments tend to wield significant power, the principle of 
constitutionalism is based on “this idea of restraining the government in its 
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exercise of power [and] therefore, is to be set in contradistinction to arbitrary 
power”.790  
Some of the components of constitutionalism, usefully described by 
Barnett, suggest that the exercise of power should be limited by law, powers 
within a state should be separated and independent, and that the government 
should be held accountable for its actions.791 It is evident that some elements of 
the doctrine of constitutionalism when conceived in broader terms resemble those 
of the rule of law. There is little doubt that the rule of law and constitutionalism 
both have similar aims and objectives in society. Charles McIlwain notes that 
constitutionalism is linked to the rule of law and claims that “true 
constitutionalism, from medieval times to our own, has never meant government 
enfeebled by divisions within itself; it has meant government limited by law”.792  
Carl Friedrich, on the other hand, widens the scope of constitutionalism 
and defines constitutionalism as “both the practice of politics according to ‘rules 
of the game’, which insure effective restraints upon governmental and other 
political action, and the theory - explanatory and justificatory - of this practice”.793 
The term constitutionalism, when used in its broader conception, is often 
employed as a synonym of the rule of law. Therefore one should beware of 
blurring the distinction between the two. In spite of similarities, the rule of law is 
a fundamental principle of the just and free society, whereas constitutionalism has 
gradually turned to a discipline that prescribes methods of managing and 
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regulating state business. Put it slightly differently, the rule of law encompasses 
principles of a free society and provides for the framework where free society is 
able to operate. Constitutionalism, on the other hand, is one of the means of 
realizing the rule of law through detailed description of the modus operandi. This 
argument is eloquently expressed by constitutional theorist Charles McIlwain: 
Constitutionalism is more a method than a principle. It is the method of law as 
contrasted with force or with will. If this law perpetuated some abuses, it has 
also preserved all our liberties. 794  
  
 
It is possible to infer from the above-said that constitutionalism shares some 
features of the rule of law and complements it but it falls short in terms of both 
scope and objective to be fully equated with it. 
Terms that are closely associated with the rule of law, democracy and 
constitutionalism, have so far been discussed. A more topical contest on the rule 
of law however stems from the debate over the content and principles of the rule 
of law. One can group the views on this issue into formal and substantive 
conception of the rule of law.795 Formal conceptions of the rule of law cover 
procedural principles of law-creating and law-implementing processes. In the view 
of Esteban, “they do not seek to judge the actual content of the law provided that 
the formal precepts of the Rule of Law are respected”.796 What one can infer from 
this is that the formal conception of the rule of law may have first arisen from the 
understanding of the rule of law as supremacy of law.  
                                                                                                                                  
793
 Friedrich, C. in Sills, D. Ed. (1968) International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
Macmillan, p.320 
794
 McIlwain, C. (1939). Constitutionalism and the Changing World, Cambridge University Press, 
p.290 
795
 The terminological classification is borrowed from Craig, P.  ‘Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law’, I Diritto Publico 35, (1995) 
 328 
In his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Albert 
Dicey, one of the authoritative advocates of the supremacy of the rule of law, puts 
forward three ‘distinct though kindred’ features of the rule of law of the formal 
conception.797 Accordingly, the first element of the rule of law states that: 
[N]o man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established before the ordinary courts of the 
land. In this sense the rule of law contrasted with every system of government 
based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or discretionary 
powers of constraint.798  
 
 
It is evident that Dicey distinguishes between law-bound government and arbitrary 
government, implying that the rule of law restrains arbitrariness of the government 
and holds citizens responsible only if they broke distinct law. The second element 
postulates the idea of ‘equal subjection’ of all people to law. This is similar to the 
ancient notion of isonomy, mentioned earlier. Most people would expect that the 
law does not discriminate against people on any grounds and should apply equally 
to ordinary citizens and officials. The third component of the Dicey’s supremacy 
of law is of common-law nature and mainly involves British Constitution. 
According to it, in Britain, for example, “the law of the constitution, the rules 
which in foreign countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the 
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by 
the courts”.799 This element underlies belief that fundamental individual rights 
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“had to be put beyond the reach of governments which might seek to curtail them 
to facilitate broader social and economic goals”.800   
Even though Dicey’s approach to the rule of law is impressive, it has been 
met with criticism, namely that the notion that a person can only be punished for a 
breach of law sounds like a plain tautology. Even though it may sound that way, 
this principle deserves due appreciation as it paved the way for due process and 
fair trial, which are enjoyed in a free society. Dicey’s equal subjection doctrine 
was criticized by Jennings as untrue reality that does not provide evidence that 
officials have the same rights and duties as ordinary citizens. This argument seems 
to be only partially true because even though officials abide by specific 
government acts and provisions, they are not exempt from the ordinary laws of the 
land. This point was highlighted by Dicey some time ago, when he noted that 
“though a soldier or a clergymen incurs from his position legal liabilities from 
which other men are exempt, he does not (speaking generally) escape thereby 
from the duties of an ordinary citizen”.801 Another substantive criticism relates to 
the claim that Dicey’s concept is formal and empty.  
 Joseph Raz in his The Rule of Law and Its Virtue lent significant support to 
the formal conception of the rule of law.802 He points out two main fallacies in the 
treatment of the rule of law. The first relates to the assumption of its supreme 
importance, while the second concerns the ‘perversion’ of the doctrine of the rule 
of law. By perversion Raz means the definition of the doctrine in broad terms, and 
thus turning it to a mere slogan to be associated with other unrelated, loose 
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political ideals; the process that he believes has already seized the fate of 
democracy.803 Raz holds that such perversion can only be obliterated if the rule of 
law is defined formally or literally - the rule of the law.   
 Following Raz’s frame of mind, the rule of law should be understood in 
Aristotelian phrase “government by law and not by men”. Accordingly, all 
government action must have foundation in, and authorized by, law. The law 
should be general, open and relatively stable. However, granted that every legal 
system should consist of both general, open and stable laws (popular conception 
of law) and specific executive or judiciary rules (legal orders), the rule of law 
requires that “the making of particular laws should be guided by open and 
relatively stable general rules”.804  
Raz’s formal conception of the rule of law has two main aspects. The first 
says that people should be ruled by the law and obey it. The second holds that law 
must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. Therefore, a state which 
can satisfy these two criteria would be s state under the rule of law. Expanding on 
the issue, Maria Esteban states that the rule of law is conceived as a ‘negative 
value’ and its role is “to minimise the danger created by the law itself, the danger 
of arbitrary power”.805  
 The formal conception of the rule of law involves principles that make law 
capable of being obeyed and guiding the behaviour of its subjects. Raz classifies 
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eight principles in two groups.806 The first is concerned with conformity of the law 
to standards designed to enable it effectively to guide human action. The second 
group ensures that the legal enforcement system should not deprive the law of its 
ability to guide through distorted enforcement as well as be able to supervize 
conformity to the rule of law. The principles of the first group hold that: 1) all 
laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2) laws should be relatively stable; 
and 3) the making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and 
general rules. The second group states that: 1) the independence of the judiciary 
must be guaranteed; 2) the principles of natural justice (due process and fair trial) 
must be observed; 3) the courts should have powers over the implementation of 
the other principles to ensure conformity to the rule of law; 4) the courts should be 
easily accessible; and 5) the discretion of the crime preventing agencies should not 
be allowed to pervert the law. 
The formal conception of the rule of law by Raz resembles Ronald 
Dworkin’s rule book conception. The rule book conception argues that so far as is 
possible, “the power of the state should never be exercised against individual 
citizens except in accordance with rules explicitly set out in a public rule book 
available to all”.807 Dworkin’s rule book reinstates Raz’s principles of stable, open 
and general laws that are tasked to prevent arbitrariness of the government.  
The above principles of the formal conception of rule of law have been 
widely endorsed by legal and political thinkers. They are supported on the grounds 
that they promote universality, predictability and avoidance of arbitrariness. 
Esteban observes that the discourse on the formal conception of the rule of law 
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tends to focus on “the specification of certain formal or procedural characteristics 
which commands and rules may have or lack, but which are thought to be 
desirable on various grounds connected with liberty and justice”.808 
The Formal conception of the rule of law is argued to have a major flaw - 
that it ignores substantive inequalities in power and disregard the unjust and 
undemocratic regimes. For example, Raz claims that: 
A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on 
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities and religious 
prosecution may, in principle, conform with the requirements of the Rule of Law 
better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened western 
democracies.809  
 
 
Thus, the rule of law in its formal conception implies a government of law rather 
than of men, which is bound by predictable, prospective, open and clear rules of 
the rule of law. It may happen so that countries that follow the rule of law may not 
necessarily be democratic. Raz takes this further by claiming that a non-
democratic legal system “may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the 
rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened western 
democracies”.810 
A substantive conception while admitting the importance of the formal 
conception’s approach to rule of law seeks to develop the notion further. 
Substantive conceptions hold that there are certain fundamental rights (legal 
principles), which are based on the rule of law and are protected by it. Thus, the 
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rule of law not only involves formal principles but also ensures that laws comply 
with certain substantive rights. In these terms, the rule of law means the rule of 
good law. Esteban makes her views clear by noting that “the Rule of Law should 
look to the content of particular laws in order to determine weather they comply 
with the Rule of Law”.811 However, what is bound to hinder Esteban’s 
expectations is the fact that there is little consensus on what the good law is. The 
substantive conception of the rule of law has a different name in Dworkin’s 
terminology. He defines it as the ‘rights conception’. The rights conception calls 
for a recognition of fundamental rights. On the purpose of the rights conception, 
Dworkin states that “it insists that these moral and political rights be recognised in 
positive law so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens 
through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is 
practicable”.812 He continues, by noting that: 
The Rule of Law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book 
conception does, between the Rule of Law and substantive justice; on the 
contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the book capture 
and enforce moral rights.813 
 
 
Reflecting on the rights conception by Dworkin, Esteban notes that “there is no 
difference between the Rule of Law and the particular theory of law and 
adjudication embodied in the rights-based approach to law”.814 As was discussed, 
it is often not fully understood what is implied if a political order is not based on 
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the rule of law. In democracies, competition between various political parties is 
possible, because both citizens and politicians respect the rule of law which 
regulates political competition. Political power is linked to the attainment of 
majorities in constitutional assemblies, which decide on new laws executed by the 
government and its administrative staff and interpreted in the last resort by 
independent courts. Due to the rule of law, authority relations are de-personalized 
and stable, despite changes of political elites. The monopoly on physical coercion 
and taxation are secured by citizens’ and officials’ commitment to the law. On the 
other hand, political orders which form state structures but which are not based on 
‘legal authority’ operate on a quite different basis. This form of political 
community relies on relations of piety and loyalty between rulers and ruled. The 
loyalty of administrative staff to the rulers is the constitutive principle of such a 
political order, which through this means tries to strengthen or secure its 
monopoly on taxation and the use of physical force. In this framework, authority 
relations are personalised and often unstable. Changes in the leadership can have 
direct effect on the political order. 
Since patrimonial politics depends on loyalty to the ruling leader, 
democratic elections have destabilizing effects on the polity. As it is the case in 
Central Asia, whenever the supreme political position is vacant, various groups 
and regional leaders compete for political influence. The successful politician will 
re-arrange the balance of power by forming political alliances and distributing 
important administrative positions to other influential leaders. He will also seek to 
deprive potential rivals of their influence. If several strong eligible candidates are 
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up for election, people tend to vote according to the candidate’s regional or tribal 
origin than for his programme, because they believe that their candidate will 
promote their region’s interest if elected. 
In Central Asia, ruling presidents are more often re-elected for their 
promises to serve as guarantors of peace and stability in their republics. Incumbent 
presidents are also better able to mobilize their electorate through their patronage 
networks during presidential campaigns, via their privileged access to mass media 
or by means of active interference to rival’s election campaign. Bearing in mind 
the under-development of political institutionalization, it is not surprising that 
Central Asian presidents have tried to minimize the political risks of elections in 
several ways.815  
The first method involved their calling for referenda to extend their term of 
office. In this way, for example, Niyazov's term in Turkmenistan was prolonged 
for six years in January 1994 by a 99.99 per cent vote. Uzbek president Karimov 
was confirmed in office for another five years in March 1995 by a 99.6 per cent 
vote, and in January 2002 his term was extended to seven years by another 
referendum. Nazarbaev won a 95.4 per cent vote in April 1995, which extended 
his term of office until 2000. This method was justified on the grounds that the 
constitutions of the republics limited presidency to two terms. Thus, in 
Kyrgyzstan, where no referendum was held, this problem arose when Akayev 
decided to run for a third term in 2000. However, well-briefed constitutional 
lawyers revealed that Akayev's first term (1991-1995) should not be counted 
because the election had taken place before the Kyrgyz constitution was drafted 
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and enforced. One could also mention that till now only the former Turkmen 
president Niyazov formally demonstrated his commitment to patrimonialism by 
becoming the first president in the former Soviet Union to be installed for an 
unlimited period from December 1999. 
The second refers to incumbent presidents’ influencing elections through 
manipulation of the registration process of presidential candidates and parties. 
Elections in 1999 and 2000 symbolised a move to this method with ample 
evidence on how opposition candidates were prevented from registering as 
candidates. The obvious rationale behind these procedures was to prevent the 
emergence of any political group, which may be inclined to oppose or criticize the 
government and the president.  
The third solution concerned their efforts not to grant any significant 
powers to the parliament and to reduce existing powers in favour of strengthening 
the president’s position. This has been the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Some Kazakh political observers have argued that Nazarbaev dissolved the 
parliament in March 1995, ruled by decree, extended his term of office by 
referendum and enacted a new constitution for a strong presidential regime in 
order to eliminate Middle and Small Zhus (horde) opposition to his rule as 
representative of the Great Zhus.816 On a similar note, Kyrgyz president Akaev 
marginalized the parliament by organizing referenda on amendments to the 
constitution in October 1994 and February 1996, which effectively abolished 
Kyrgyz parliamentarism and granted the president powers to appoint and dismiss 
ministers without parliament’s approval.  
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The criticism of Central Asian governments is normally levelled at human 
rights abuses, but it is often meant and understood in broader terms. In some 
respects, this criticism may be read as a disapproval of the entire system of 
governance. Government leaders repeatedly emphasize their commitment to 
democracy and market economics, but these rhetorical statements most often do 
not represent intent. In this regard, some critics feel that the words of the 
distinguished scholar of democracy V. Key may be closer to the truth: “The 
superimposition over a people habituated to tyranny of a leadership imbued with 
democratic ideals probably would not create a viable democratic order”.817 
However, there is more convergence of views between Western 
governments and those of Central Asia on the advantages of aiming for good 
governance.  Good government conventionally prescribes pragmatism rather than 
ideology, urges the rule of law and public accountability rather than personalized 
and arbitrary rule. It also strives to transparency and openness rather than secrecy 
and insider politics. Conventional approaches to good governance emphasize the 
procedures and institutions of the government, bound by the rule of law. The 
institutions of good governance are usually understood to include representative 
government limited by the constitution, and separate functions carried out by 
independent legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The procedures of good 
government stress the rule of law and an independent judiciary.  
The rule of law means that all components of society, including the public 
bureaucracy, operate under the same legal constraints and with the same legal 
                                                                                                                                  
816
 Geiss, P. (2005). Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia. London, Routledge, p.244 
817
 Cited from Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Oxford, 
Westview Press, p. 176  
 338 
rights to enable peaceful and predictable political and economic participation.818 
The law of secured transactions provides a framework for stable expectations in 
the marketplace. The rule of law requires that the legal system exist not only on 
paper but also in practice. Thus written laws must also be implemented, enforced, 
understood, accepted, and used.819 This necessitates a clear legal framework, 
mechanisms for the enforceability of agreements, transparency in dispute 
resolution, and the possibility of recourse against arbitrary acts. 
The political order in Central Asia is based on an efficient state apparatus, 
which seeks the political integration of the population and secures its external 
security. It is also obvious and the regional leadership is aware that Central Asian 
governments will risk instability, if they are not able to solve some of the most 
urgent social and economic of their national republics. Improved economic 
performance alone does not secure political order. The carrot-and-stick approach 
in this context may enable opportunistic political order, but is less efficient in 
terms of the normative commitments of people. 
If to take Uzbekistan as an example, the problem of political order is 
equally acute. In the pre-Soviet era a great part of the former Sart population of 
Uzbekistan was committed to sharia laws. This commitment did not disappear 
among today’s Uzbek population. Even during the Soviet period, Islamic cultural 
traditions continued to be covertly transmitted, and mullahs had an important 
position by performing religious ceremonies. When Karimov increasingly began 
to oppose ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ after the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan, 
                                                
818
 Hayek, F. (1976). The Road to Serfdom. Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 72 
819
 Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Oxford, Westview 
Press, p. 177 
 339 
he was partly reacting to a perceived threat to the secularization of his country and 
partly trying to consolidate his power base.  
According to Geiss, a functioning political order will be difficult to 
establish in Central Asia if there is little legal consciousness or if there are 
competing legal traditions regarding the notion of justice.820 As was discussed in 
previous chapters, legal conceptions in pre-tsarist Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan, were based on tribal customary law, which regulated social relations 
between tribesmen. These legal traditions were influential and were allowed to 
exist in a limited and modified way within tsarist local administration. At that 
time, numerous compilations of customary law were collected and published to 
spread knowledge about it among tsarist officials. In contrast, the Soviet 
administration deliberately abandoned these legal traditions, combated them and 
tried to replace them by socialist laws and practices. Although this struggle seems 
to have not been fully successful at local level, it deprived state politics from its 
embedment in a legal culture, which could be shared by great parts of the 
population.821 
An evolutionary development of customary law towards the legal 
integration of authority relations and the constraint of state authority, such as took 
place in Anglo-American countries, is not probable in Central Asia because 
customary law no longer has any political significance in the region.822 In 
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addition, its pre-tsarist state of development does not allow any basis for conflict 
regulation within contemporary Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen societies.823  
In sharp contrast, during the Soviet period patrimonial authority relations 
were re-established, as was described in detail in previous sections. They secured 
the political integration of regions in the republics and guaranteed the maintenance 
of the social infrastructure and the allocation of resources without being embedded 
in a legal culture shared by the people.824 In contemporary Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, for instance, these state-society relations are still intact. The state 
has strong control over strategic economic sectors and can effectively use its 
revenues to implement central policies. Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that 
have opened their economies to international markets and privatized strategic 
branches of their economy, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have retained strong, 
hegemonic state structures. This factor has led to greater competition between 
regional leaders and central government, and has also decreased the state’s ability 
to provide the population with basic social infrastructure.825 
As most observers would agree the state’s withdrawal from economic and 
social responsibilities in Kazakhstan, backed by some financial and legal reforms, 
increased the protection of property and the rule of law in economic matters. This 
helped to recover the Kazakh economy and increased income for private services. 
In the current Central Asian situation, only state structures have an ability to 
spread a legal culture in areas which have been deprived of their legal traditions. 
This culture is an important precondition for the attainment of some kind of 
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political freedom and the rule of law. On the other hand, one should beware that 
sustaining the strong state structures do not automatically guarantee the successful 
establishment of enduring political order, but may often cause worse human rights 
records. In balance, there are good reasons to assume that client-patron relations 
will remain a constitutive element of Central Asian politics, even if some kind of 
legal culture evolves concomitantly. 
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6.0 Conclusion  
 
 
 
THIS chapter examined the consequences of the dramatic politicization of ethno-
nationhood in Central Asia during the last years of the Soviet Union and the first 
years of independence.  The increased politicization of ethnical nationhood in 
Central Asia was a natural effect of seventy years of the Soviet regime’s 
institutional crystallizations and codification of nationhood as the main organizing 
principle of the society.  
The chapter showed that the expanded political scene and more political 
freedom during perestroika allowed for greater political mobilization, which 
followed national lines. The new political environment also changed the scene of 
inter-ethnic relations, which shifted from one of the ‘eternal friendship’ to 
sporadic hostilities. As the reform-minded Moscow was not able or willing to 
intervene politically, the local elite in Central Asia not only was unable to control 
the disruptive political expressions but also took advantage of the national 
sentiments and ethno-national platform for gaining fast declining political 
legitimacy.  
The relevance and applicability of the triadic nexus between three distinct 
and mutually antagonistic nationalisms - nationalizing state, national minorities, 
and external national homelands – was examined in the context of Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Having analyzed the cases of the two states, the study modified the 
triadic nexus framework by emphasizing the duality of nexus between two 
 343 
opposing nationalisms - the core nation and national minority. It was shown that 
both states were nationalizing states and developed national policies in the name 
of titular nationality. Both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks saw themselves as legitimate 
owners of their state. After perceived long repressions by the Soviet regime, the 
state’s nationalizing policies were directed at promoting the language, reviving 
national culture, boosting economic welfare and boosting political hegemony of 
the titular nation.  
At the same time, transborder nationalism was hardly present in the region, 
with the exception of repatriation policies of Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan tried to 
sporadically involve the diaspora in its nationalizing policies through the World 
Congress of the Kyrgyz, but it was opposed by the elected parliamentarians. 
Uzbekistan disinterest in supporting its co-ethnic abroad was largely based on 
security concerns originating from the other side of its borders, contentment with 
its homogenous demography and unwillingness to change the status quo in regard 
to its treatment of national minorities.    
National minorities residing in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also designated 
their political space in specifically national terms. National minorities in Central 
Asia perceived themselves as members of distinct nationalities, which had been 
channelled and shaped by the national structure of social classification, 
institutionalized by the Soviet Union. Such self-definition and the consequent 
claims for public rights in that capacity strengthened nationalistic perceptions and 
practices of the titular nation. It also pushed the dominant majority to define their 
own nationhood more in ethno-nationalistic than in civic or territorial terms. The 
nationalizing Kyrgyz and Uzbek states employed different approaches toward 
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their national minorities. Kyrgyz nationalities policies tried to achieve two aims: 
first, to ensure harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the country; and second, to 
respond to nationalistic demands to the extent possible. The Uzbek government 
aimed for the total consolidation of power and territory and provided minimum 
opportunities for political mobilization of its national minorities. Its authoritarian 
style of governance and repressive approach to civil society significantly reduced 
the capacity of national minorities to organize politically. 
The opposing ethno-nationalisms of the nationalizing states and national 
minorities resulted in the series of inter-ethnic clashes. One of the bloodiest 
conflicts was between two ethno-national groups, Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek 
minority, in Osh oblast´, south of Kyrgyzstan. The Osh conflict lasted several 
months, from June 1990 to November 1990, and the scale of casualties and 
destruction was immense. Official figures quoted the number of up to 200 people 
dead, but unofficial sources claimed that more than 1000 people were killed in 
violence. The analysis of the Osh conflict provides fascinating revelations. Even 
though one of the most quoted causes for the Osh conflict were said to be socio-
economic in nature, the chapter showed that socio-economic hardships were one 
of a number of other contributing factors that added ‘kerosene to fire’.  
The most crucial element in the Osh conflict was in fact the rigid 
institutionalized distinction between ethno-national groups in Kyrgyzstan, which 
was a result of the Soviet ethno-national experiment in Central Asia. The Osh 
conflict was an ethnic conflict between an ethno-national minority and a dominant 
majority struggling for power and resources in the context of volatile and 
expanding political environment. In this situation, the ethno-national majority 
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controls access to the power and resources of the state while the minorities, 
normally without resorting to an open confrontation with the dominant national 
group, question the state structure as a whole. But in the Osh case, the Uzbek 
minority as well as the Kyrgyz majority did react violently at the decreasing 
resources and increasing opportunities because the state and its institutions were 
unable to suggest alternative mechanisms for regulating and resolving these 
contradictions. 
With the benefit of hindsight, what should have been done different to 
prevent the Osh conflict? And, what lessons can we draw from the Osh conflict? 
The chapter argued that, bearing in mind that institutionalized ethno-nationhood 
has had a crucial factor in Central Asia’s socio-political development in general, 
and inter-ethnic relations in particular, it is reasonable to explore institutional and 
structural solutions, as well as other available tools. The chapter therefore 
explained the benefits of institutional reforms at the state-structural level so that to 
harness and counter-balance institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. 
It proposed considering institutional reforms within the framework of 
democratization and the rule of law to move towards a more peaceful, predictable, 
and resolvable inter-ethnic relations. Mechanisms of democratization and the rule 
of law can contribute to the institutionalization of preventative mechanisms, 
which could serve as a counter-balance and discharging element of the destructive 
effects that ethno-nationalism is bound to manifest in the social and political 
development of Central Asia.  
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THIS study has explored nation-formation in Central Asia and its effect on inter-
ethnic relations in the region by employing institutional perspective on ethno-
nationhood. It has disassociated itself from the mainstream approaches to Central 
Asia’s questions of ethnicity and nationality, which tend to pose such questions as: 
“are these nations modern or ancient?”, “how are ethnic groups in Central Asia 
defined and characterized?” and “are ethnic and ethno-political conflicts caused by 
ancient hatreds or modern circumstances?”  
The discussions of nationalism in Central Asia have usually been 
dominated by two perspectives. The first, primordialist view, treats nationalist 
mobilizations and conflicts as eruptions of long-repressed ancient hatreds and 
identities, as well as expressions of nationalistic desires denied by the Soviet 
regime and liberated by the political opportunity after the fall of the regime. It 
tends to fuse primordial identities and contemporary nationalities, and claims that 
a nation is a community based on a common culture and descent, that its shared 
identity is conserved and passed on from generations to generations. The 
proponents of primordialism therefore trace the origins of Central Asian nations to 
the emergence of proto-ethnic groups in the region during ancient times. They 
either neglect or downplay profound national developments that took place 
throughout the modern period. Accordingly, the origins of the Uzbek nation would 
arguable date back to the Dashti-Kipchak nomadic tribes, which migrated to the 
region in the early sixteenth century under the leadership of Sheibani-khan. Such 
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primordialist views were mostly dominant in the Soviet scholarship during the 
Cold War and still re-surface in the native and Russian scholarship in Central 
Asia.  
The primordialist perspective fails to fully match the historical reality of 
the nation-formation process in Central Asia. There are clear differences between 
collective identities of Central Asian people several centuries ago and ethno-
national sentiments of the present. In ancient Central Asia people ascribed 
themselves to a different set of sub-societal and supra-societal identities than those 
of today. At the supra-societal level, the Islamic heritage and a fusion of Turkic 
and Persian cultures were dominant factors. At the sub-societal level, Central 
Asian population identified themselves with strong local, tribal and family 
sentiments. Furthermore, as the thesis illustrated characteristics of ancient ethnic 
tribes differ from social, cultural and political characteristics of the modern ethno-
nationalities in Central Asia.  
The second, modernist view approaches nationhood as wholly modern, 
social constructs of modernity and stresses the ‘imagined’ nature of communities. 
Nations are therefore not ancient or immemorial, they are historically specific.  
Modernism points to the dramatic transformation of a traditional society to a new 
industrial society, with associated characteristic processes of political and 
economic centralization, standardization of education, and increased 
communication. Modernist perspective offers a more advantageous position to 
address the question of nation-formation and provide a comparative perspective 
on the histories of Central Asian people. It treats nations as territorial political 
communities, conjoined with modern states, which constitute the main political 
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loyalty of their citizens that override their allegiance to other ties. As nations are 
consciously and deliberately ‘constructed’ by their elite and citizenry through a 
range of political processes and institutions, a successful nation depends on the 
infrastructure of social communications and comprehensive institutionalization of 
values, roles and identities.   
However, traditional modernists tend to reify the nation, treat it as an 
enduring collectivity and neglect state intervention, a crucial aspect in the 
processes of nation-formation. And in contrast to the expectations of 
modernization and Marxist theory, industrialization and urbanization in either its 
capitalist or socialist variant did not lead to an end to national differences and 
conflicts, but in fact nationality was preserved in the Soviet Union and the power 
and cohesion of nations and their elites were enhanced.826  
The dissertation therefore employed the institutionalist approach to 
ethnicity and nationhood, which subscribes to the fundamental modernist 
assumptions. Institutionalist perspective accepts the reality of nationhood and 
proposes to re-conceptualize that reality and decouple ethno-national study from 
the study of nations as substantial collectivities. Because group membership is not 
a fixed but a variable state, one cannot assume that collective action stems from 
ascribed collective designation. Testing the institutionalist approach for the first 
time in the context of Central Asia’s nation-construction, the dissertation 
considers nationhood as a conceptual variable and treats nation not as substance 
but as institutionalized political form and practical category. As the study 
confirmed, institutionalist perspective is one of the most optimal frameworks to 
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understand ethno-national developments in Central Asia and grasp the reality of 
nationhood and the power of nationalism, without invoking teleological 
postulates. It is important to add that the application of the institutionalist 
approach in Central Asia is not meant to constitute yet another theory of 
nationalism, but rather, serve as a framework for organizing and explaining 
nationalism in the post-Soviet context. Institutionalist model is important in that it 
points out the need for new directions in the research of post-Soviet nationalisms. 
And as an organizing framework, the institutionalist perspective does not seek to 
replace as much as include and go beyond existing studies and approaches.  
Thus, drawing from institutionalist framework the dissertation examined 
the development of ethno-nationhood in Central Asia. It approached Central Asian 
nations in general and the Kyrgyz and Uzbek nations in particular, as an 
institutionalized cultural and political form, as well as a political claim and a 
category of practice. The dissertation outlined that our understanding of and 
studies on Central Asian nations should move beyond viewing them as a purely 
ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact, and instead approach Central Asian 
nationhood as a political claim and a social category, used to transform the reality, 
change people’s self-consciousness, express demands and mobilize identities. This 
is important because social mobilization depends on the level of self-
consciousness in ethno-national group and awareness of difference with other 
communities. These are intricately connected political processes: nationhood 
generates political claims that transform self-consciousness and awareness of 
otherness, which contributes to increased social mobilization. Mobilization in turn 
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leads to further group affiliation and community formation along ethno-national 
lines. In this context, state institutions not only provide structures necessary to 
these nation-forming processes, but also allow nationhood to be utilized as a 
political resource. As a political resource, and as has been the case with Central 
Asia, nationhood is open for manipulation, with such diverse purposes as to 
strengthen power, enhance national security, legitimise authority or promote 
national unity.    
During the Soviet and post-Soviet period, state institutions in Central Asia 
have played a crucial role in forming, transforming and sustaining ethno-
nationhood. Contrary to the prevalent view by Sovietologists, the research has 
shown that the institutional crystallizations of nationality during the Soviet Union 
were far from being empty forms or legal fictions. Its institutionalization has had a 
profound effect on the ethno-national development of the region. The Soviet 
institutionalization of ethno-nationhood followed the two-tiered path of territorial 
organization of politics and the social classification of people.  
The Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia aimed mainly to achieve 
two things. Firstly, they purported to control, contain and channel the potentially 
disruptive for the Soviet system political expressions of nationality through the 
establishment of national-territorial administrative structures, as well as through 
promotion, co-option, and repression of national elites. And, secondly, the Soviet 
leadership wanted to drain nationality of its content while legitimating it as a 
form, with the view to promote the long-term fading away of nationality as a vital 
component of social life in Central Asia. The Soviet regime actively 
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institutionalized the existence of multiple nationalities as intrinsic elements of the 
state, and codified nationhood as fundamental social category distinctive from 
statehood and citizenship.  
The Soviet nationalities policy, however, had the opposite from intended 
consequences on nation-formation in Central Asia. While the first aim of the 
Soviet nationality policies was achieved to a large extent, the second aim, far from 
being realised, reinforced the salience and significance of nationality as a central 
organising principle in the Central Asian societies. Moreover, in Central Asia, 
ethnicity became individually ascribed and publicly expressed as nationality. 
Ethnic diversity was perceived as national heterogeneity. Therefore, minority 
ethnic groups in Central Asia perceive themselves and are perceived by others as 
belonging to distinct nationalities. Thus, the Soviet institutions successfully 
embedded ethno-national sentiments deep into the imaginations of Central Asian 
people.  
The study also described how the expanded political scene and more 
political opportunities during perestroika led to the drastic politicization of 
nationhood. For the first time, the emerging political space allowed for a greater 
political mobilization, which usually took the national form. The new political 
environment also influenced inter-ethnic relations. These relations shifted from 
one of the ‘eternal friendship’ to aggressive competition, and even to open 
hostilities. When tensions culminated to violence, the reform-minded Moscow 
was weak and reluctant to intervene politically. The Central Asia elite not only 
were unable to control the disruptive political expressions but it also took 
advantage of the national sentiments and ethno-national platform in order to retain 
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rapidly declining political legitimacy. The tense environment and politicized 
ethno-nationalism inevitably spilled to violence and inter-ethnic riots in Central 
Asia, as was the case throughout the territories of the Soviet Union. Thus, 
previously peaceful inter-communal relations were replaced by violent 
confrontation and ethnic conflict.  
The dissertation offers the original analysis of a number of inter-ethnic 
disturbances in Central Asia that took place during the last years of the Soviet 
Union. It also examined in detail the Osh conflict in Kyrgyzstan, the most vicious 
conflict between the ethno-national groups of the Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek 
minority in Osh oblast´. The Osh conflict occurred in June 1990 and lasted several 
months. The scale of casualties and destruction was enormous in Central Asian 
terms. Official figures put the number of casualties up to 200 people, but 
unofficial sources claimed, more probably, that more than 1,000 people were 
killed during violence.  
The study revealed a number of interesting findings as a result of the 
analysis of the Osh conflict. Even though one of the most acknowledged causes of 
the Osh conflict were said to be socio-economic degradation, the dissertation 
showed that the socio-economic decline in Kyrgyzstan was one of a number of 
secondary factors, which only served to aggravate inter-ethnic competition before 
the eruption of riots, as well as for official purposes to present with a simplified 
causation of the conflict. The most crucial element in the Osh conflict was, in fact, 
the rigid institutionalized interaction and inter-relation between the two ethno-
national groups in Kyrgyzstan, which was a result of the Soviet institutionalization 
of ethnicity and nationality in Central Asia. The Uzbek ethnic minority in 
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Kyrgyzstan perceived themselves as members of distinct nationalities because the 
Soviet regime taught them to think accordingly of themselves. 
The Osh conflict took place in the context of volatile and expanding 
political environment, where an ethno-national minority and a dominant majority 
were engaged in the struggle for power and limited resources. The Kyrgyz 
majority controlled access to state power and resources. While the Uzbek 
minority, normally avoiding an open confrontation with the dominant national 
group, questioned the state structure and institutions due to the widespread 
government discrimination of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan. In Osh 
oblast´, both ethno-national groups resorted to an open confrontation when faced 
with the decreasing resources and increasing opportunities. The state institutions 
of Kyrgyzstan were unable to adapt and propose alternative mechanisms for 
regulating and resolving these antagonisms. 
The national elites of Uzbek community represented their constituents as 
belonging to a different nation from members of the titular Kyrgyz nationality. 
The demands of the Uzbek groups for collective public rights, language privileges 
and territorial autonomy in Osh, which have roots in the institutional legacy of the 
Soviet nationality policy, directly challenged the claims of the Kyrgyz elites to 
unitary ownership of their national polities and territories. It was only expected 
that Kyrgyz state elites perceive such demands by Uzbek ethnic minorities as 
threatening and as fundamentally illegitimate. In this context, the political or 
cultural demands of the Uzbek community made them vulnerable to charges of 
outright disloyalty to the statehood and citizenry of Kyrgyzstan. Although Uzbek 
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are formally part of the citizenry of the national state, they feel excluded 
substantively from the actual membership of the nation-state.  
From the examination of inter-ethnic riots in Central Asia it can be noted 
that the self-definition of minorities as members of distinct nations and their 
consequent claims for public rights in that capacity can reinforce ethno-
nationalistic perceptions and indeed practices of the elites of the dominant 
nationality. It can also reinforce the tendency of the dominant majority to define 
their own nationhood in ethno-nationalistic rather than civic-territorial terms and 
to rule their nation-state accordingly, as the Osh case attested.  
Given that the institutionalized ethno-nationhood has been a pervasive 
factor in Central Asia’s socio-political development in general and inter-ethnic 
relations in particular, the study prompts to look for institutionalist solutions to the 
national question in Central Asia. With that in mind, some of the institutional 
changes at the state-structural level and within the framework of democratization 
and the rule of law have been shown to have the potential to harness and regulate 
the effects of institutionalized ethno-nationalism at the social level. It recommends 
considering such institutional reforms as part of wider deliberations into 
promoting more peaceful and secure inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia. 
Institutional mechanisms of the rule of law and constitutionalism can thus 
contribute to the institutionalization of confidence-building and structural 
preventative measures. These institutionalized measures could balance and 
regulate sometimes destructive effects of ethno-nationalism on the social and 
political development of Central Asia.  
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The dissertation’s findings in regard to Central Asia’s nation-formation 
and its effect on inter-ethnic relations confirm that inter-ethnic struggles and 
antagonisms in Central Asia were, and remain, crucially framed, constituted and 
reconciled by institutionalized definitions of ethnicity and nationhood. 
Accordingly, institutionalized nationhood not only played a major role in the 
disintegration of the Soviet state, but continues to shape and structure the national 
development of the newly-independent Central Asian states.  
In the first decade of post-independence, little was known about the nature 
and role of sub-national and regional identities, loyalties and patronage networks. 
That gap has been gradually filled by the researchers and experts in the field. In 
the study of the electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
Pauline Luong argues that following independence those states continued to 
witness the influence of regional political identities on the establishment of the 
new electoral systems, and pointed to the shared Soviet legacy and the 
“persistence of old formulas for making political decisions and resolving political 
conflict effectively re-encoded pre-existing conceptions of power and power 
relations onto new institutional forms”.827  
Regional divisions tend to correlate with clan affiliations in the region. A 
study by Kathleen Collins suggests that the third face of culture, clan identity 
(other two being ethno-nationality and religion), has also been crucial in 
structuring conflict for control of economic resources in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan before, during, and after the Soviet Union.828 She points to the 
mitigating influence of informal clan institutions on regional conflicts: “By 
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informally providing access to goods, resources, and jobs, the clan has provided a 
social safety net that enables its members to survive the transition. Without 
undermining the latter, clan networks have mitigated both economic deprivation 
and identity politics”.829 There is indeed a symbiotic relationship between clan, 
region and ethnicity, and we are often reminded that clan systems in the region are 
“vast patronage networks that are related to ethnic and geographic factors”.830 
What invites further investigation, however, is the role of those clan institutions in 
the series of inter-ethnic riots in Central Asia, discussed by this study, and the 
relations of clan networks, being ‘intra-ethnic and intra-religious groups’, with the 
other, more conflict-prone faces of culture, ethno-nationalism and religion.  
Today, there is a potential for a repetition of inter-ethnic riots in the region. 
In its Calming the Ferghana Valley report, the Centre for Preventive Action of the 
Council on Foreign Relation warns that while the memory of the Osh conflict 
makes all parties aware of the dangers of inter-communal conflict, Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz continue to mistrust each other.831 After the inter-ethnic riots, the 
Ferghana Valley witnessed other incidents of insecurity and conflict: Tashkent 
bombings in 1999, Batken incursions of 1999 and 2000, Aksy protests in 2002, 
Tulip Revolution and Andijan uprising, both in 2005.  
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Various policy-oriented reports have described the area as continuing to be 
volatile and explosive with multiple sources of insecurity.832 Given the potential 
for conflict, a number of organizations and projects have focused on various 
aspects of conflict in the region: early warning networks, civil society initiatives, 
media and education projects, mediation networks, social justice and local 
development programmes.833 The Bishkek-based Foundation of Tolerance 
International reported that during the 2005 political protests in Kyrgyzstan, inter-
ethnic relations were tense and ethnic minorities felt vulnerable.834 For a decade, 
Crisis Group has worked to prevent conflict worldwide and has continuously 
drawn the attention of the international community on the conflict situation in 
Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.835  
The special issue of the Central Asian Survey discussed different aspects 
of the ‘discourse of danger’ in Central Asia, exploring the possible motives, 
rationales, and consequences in the projection of the region as a risky and 
dangerous place.836 Bichsel’s research showed how that discourse has been 
translated into conflict mitigation measures in the Ferghana Valley that stress the 
need for conciliatory conflict mitigation, while local communities prioritize 
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rehabilitation of infrastructure.837 From an ethnographic perspective, Reeves 
criticizes the discipline of konfliktologiia for its tendency to “essentialize ethnic 
identities and to assume ethnic difference to be necessarily antagonistic, to see 
territorial ambiguity as inherently dangerous”.838 She argues that the very 
ambiguity of borders is seen by affected villagers as a peace-fostering factor that 
ensures a shared use of area and control-free movement, which is threatened by 
the much resented demarcation and delimitation of the borders.839 
In a critique of alarmist discussions of the danger of ethnic conflict in 
Kyrgyzstan, Megoran develops an approach to researching ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic 
conflict’ through the use of focus groups.840 That approach leads him to conclude 
that Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan expressed similar views about the 
closures of international boundaries, framed in terms of ethnicity but understood 
through ‘Uzbekness’ or ‘Kyrgyzness’, which is based on “the performance of 
endogenous kinship practices and Muslim/Soviet notions of class morality, 
nuanced by geography”.841  
Nonetheless, Crisis Group warns in its recent reports that the new regime 
in Kyrgyzstan faces threats from at least three sources (the street, the 
disenfranchized  political elite and dissension within government ranks),842 and 
that the old regime in Uzbekistan remains a serious risk to itself and the entire 
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region.843 One should not be complacent because the political situation in Central 
Asia remains volatile and unstable, as the latest violence during the Andijan 
massacre in Uzbekistan and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgystan has shown. The 
legacy of institutionalized ethno-nationalism is likely to continue having a long-
term effect on Central Asia’s security and prosperity, and it is therefore vital that 
regional and international stakeholders address the development of 
institutionalized nationhood and its relation to inter-ethnic relations. It is also 
crucial that more funding and research is directed towards taking fuller advantage 
of institutional reforms and mechanisms, such as the rule of law and 
constitutionalism in the subject areas beyond their commonplace utilization, such 
as nationalism and conflict studies.  
One cannot and should not be complacent given that the political situation 
in Central Asia has been deteriorating and universally acknowledged as far from 
stable, especially in the context of such events as the Andijan massacre in 
Uzbekistan and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, both took place in the spring 
of 2005. And because the legacy of institutionalized ethno-nationalism will 
continue to have a long-term effect on Central Asia’s security and prosperity, it is 
vital that regional and international stakeholders invest more time and attention 
for the considerations of the institutionalist dimension of nationhood and its 
relation to inter-ethnic relations. It is also crucial that more funding, research and 
political will is directed towards taking fuller advantage of institutional reforms 
and mechanisms, such as the rule of law and constitutionalism in the subject areas 
beyond their commonplace utilization, such as nationalism and conflict studies.  
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 This dissertation, like any other study, opens up more lines of inquiry than 
it has been able to pursue. Naturally, there is scope for further research. The first 
area could be a further examination of the applicability of institutional perspective 
on a cross-regional comparative level. Through conducting an analysis of nation-
formation and ethnic conflicts within the same time period but in a different 
regional setting, for example countries in Caucasus, the study will enable us to test 
the applicability of the above conclusions, as well as wider validity of the 
institutionalist methodological framework.  The second area for further research is 
a more in-depth and wide-range examination of current developments of the 
institutionalized nationhood in all five Central Asian countries, focusing on more 
recent and crucial developments, such as the above-mentioned Tulip Revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan. This will provide us with the understanding of any changes in the 
institutionalization of nationality after more than a decade of independence and 
their relation to inter-ethnic relations in the region. And the final area could 
specifically examine policy issues, lessons learnt and best practices in applying 
institutional reforms in the context of democratization, or lack thereof, with a 
view to proposing optimal ways to manage inter-ethnic relations in pluralist 
societies. 
--ooOoo-- 
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